In many NATO member states, the United States’ impending presidential election is a major source of uncertainty and anxiety. Donald Trump’s recent comments at a campaign rally in South Carolina, suggesting that he would encourage the Russians to “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO allies that did not meet the alliance’s 2% of GDP spending target renewed fears that the upcoming U.S. election “poses a unique threat to NATO.”
The Council on Foreign Relations’ James M. Lindsay suggested that Trump’s hostility could “cripple NATO,” and Finley Grimble, former intelligence analyst for the U.K. Ministry of Defence, maintained that a Trump 2024 victory could lead to NATO’s “collapse”.
Fortunately, however, these predictions rest on questionable assumptions.
Argument #1: Trump Is Serious About Pulling Out of NATO and His Words Prove It!
Trump has a long history of disparaging NATO, calling it “obsolete” and criticizing the United States’s disproportionate economic and military contributions to the alliance. John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, alleged that Trump nearly withdrew the U.S. from the alliance at a 2018 NATO summit, before being dissuaded. As the alliance’s “military and strategic backbone,” the organization would lose an indispensable asset if the United States withdrew.
Mr. Bolton insists that Trump’s verbal attacks against NATO are not empty threats, believing instead that they are laying “the groundwork to get out [of NATO].” Consequently, Mr. Bolton sees a second Trump presidency as an “existential threat” to NATO.
Rebuttal #1: Let’s Focus Less on His Words and More on His Actions
It stands to reason that, when anticipating how Trump will manage a second term, the first point of reference should be his first term in office. From 2016-2020, Trump repeatedly threatened to leave NATO, yet the United States remained at the heart of NATO, providing crucial military and economic support to the alliance all throughout his presidency. As noted by Dr. Charles A. Kupchan, close observation shows that Trump’s accession to power did not result in changes to NATO’s decision-making, command structure, logistics, long-range planning, and numbers of troops deployed.
Similarly, Trump attacked NAFTA while president, calling it “the single worst trade deal ever approved in [the United States]” and floating the idea of terminating it, saying “[a] lot of people don’t realize how good it would be to terminate NAFTA…” Ultimately, Trump did not terminate NAFTA, but chose instead to renegotiate the agreement—delivering the USMCA. In turn, the USMCA retained many of NAFTA’s core features, effectively expanding the agreement that Trump purportedly opposed.
Trump showed during his first term that his disdain for NATO and multilateral agreements in general often surface as verbal outbursts, but do not reliably result in consequential policy shifts.
Argument #2: The Guardrails Are Gone!
John Simon, former U.S. Ambassador to the African Union, suggested that if Trump is re-elected, his second administration might have “all the hallmarks of his first administration without any of the guardrails.” Trump’s first administration featured several passionate defenders of NATO, including John Bolton and Nikki Haley. However, by the end of Trump’s first term, many of those NATO defenders resigned or were dismissed by the former president.
If re-elected, Trump may fill the positions previously held by NATO sympathizers with Trump loyalists; Simon worries Trump would be “like a child without any parents to stop him from doing really bad things.”
Rebuttal #2: In the Absence of Internal Guardrails, External Ones Will Remain Steadfast
Crucially, the argument above fails to account for the magnitude and variety of external guardrails that mitigate the president’s unilateral power.
For instance, a recent report by the Pew Research Center found that a significant majority of Americans continue to hold “largely favorable views” of the alliance. It also found that nearly two-thirds of U.S. adults recognized the benefits of membership, a sentiment shared by a majority of both registered Republicans and Democrats.
In addition, the House of Representatives passed a resolution in 2022, reaffirming its “unequivocal support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an alliance founded on democratic principles,” with overwhelming support, 362-63. Likewise, the U.S. Senate voted 95-1 in favor of expanding NATO by admitting both Sweden and Finland to the alliance.
Importantly, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (NDAA) will be a major bulwark against a NATO-skeptic president. This act, which passed in the House and Senate with super-majority support, prohibits the President from withdrawing the United States from NATO without two-thirds’ support in the Senate or pursuant to an Act of Congress, and from using funds appropriated by the House to those ends.
Thus, the external barriers in place ensure that the potential lack of guardrails within Trump’s White House does not open a clear path for him to dismantle NATO. That being said, it is worth noting that the constitutionality of the NDAA has not been tested in court yet and, consequently, the act may be compromised through judicial scrutiny.
Argument #3: Trump Will Cripple NATO from Within!
Instead of withdrawing the United States from NATO, Trump might undermine the alliance by significantly reducing U.S. participation in the organisation. Since NATO’s effectiveness rests in large part on active U.S. involvement and support, Trump can cripple the alliance by disengaging the American military.
Moreover, some experts argue that the NATO alliance is fundamentally built on trust—trust in the belief that its members will defend each other in an emergency situation. If the United States is no longer seen as a reliable partner, the alliance will be severely compromised.
Rebuttal #3: The Rhetoric May Be Scary, but the Numbers Tell a Different Story
Any attempt at crippling NATO, either through withdrawal or disengagement, will inevitably be met with multifaceted backlash. Similarly, Trump’s anti-NATO rhetoric may harm the alliance by undermining trust within the group, yet, this prediction is not supported by recent history.
NATO’s funding consistently trended upwards before, during, and after Trump’s first presidency. Trump’s hostility towards NATO did not cripple the alliance; rather, it motivated the alliance’s European leaders to rally together. Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sparked a recent increase in NATO funding, several NATO affiliated officials grudgingly credit Trump for the funding increases that NATO enjoyed before Russia’s invasion. Instead of bringing about NATO’s collapse, Trump’s consistent criticisms may be unwittingly boosting its funding.
Conclusion
It is not impossible for Trump to cause immeasurable harm to NATO if he is re-elected, but there are many robust barriers to prevent him from doing so: massive popular support for NATO in America, NATO’s committed European members, Congressional support for NATO, and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, among others. All these factors suggest that, while NATO’s collapse is not impossible, it is nevertheless highly unlikely.
With these formidable bulwarks in place, it is irrational to prematurely conclude that one man, even with the awesome power of the United States presidency in his hands, can unilaterally wreck the most powerful global military alliance in world history.
Photo Credits: “A model of Trump” (202) by Sean Ferigan via unsplash.com.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
