The Security, Trade and the Economy program aims to provide Canadians with relevant and accessible analysis on current international economic policies with a focus on Canadian interests and trade security. Additionally, the program examines our country’s commitment to NATO’s mandate of encouraging economic collaboration and eliminating economic conflict.
A tariff regime isn’t an act of war, and a supply-chain cut-off isn’t an invasion — even if they are coercive. In this article, Tyler Stevenson examines how Canada is responding to these threats through a new wave of comprehensive partnerships that treat trade as an extension of defence policy.
For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Canada has achieved NATO’s 2% defence expenditure target under the leadership of Prime Minister Mark Carney. While the increase in spending does strengthen Canada’s credibility within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and supports domestic defence-related industries and employment, the 2% target does not measure actual military effectiveness. Can Canada convert higher defence expenditures into deployable capabilities, procurement reform, personnel increases, and reduced dependence on the United States?
As Canada simultaneously hits NATO’s 2% defence spending threshold and launches a debt-financed sovereign wealth fund, Kaya Dupuis asks whether Ottawa can credibly afford both. This article examines whether the Canada Strong Fund can serve as a genuine NATO defence-industrial asset, or whether its borrowed foundation will undermine the very commitments it is meant to support.
As economic security becomes increasingly central to international policymaking, trade law is being reshaped by sanctions, export controls, and other security-based economic measures. In this article, Hassan Ahmed examines how the WTO’s national security exception has evolved from a narrow safeguard into a more routine justification for strategic economic action, and how allied states increasingly coordinate such measures through informal alignment rather than unified legal frameworks. Using examples ranging from semiconductor export controls to sanctions coordination following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the article explores the growing intersection of trade law, strategic competition, and alliance politics, including the implications for middle powers such as Canada.
As Europe advances its pursuit of strategic autonomy, questions are emerging about the future of NATO and transatlantic security. Can a more independent Europe strengthen collective defence, or risk fragmentation? This article explores how alignment and coordination will shape the future of Western security.
Rising oil prices, shifting markets, and geopolitical tensions have left most individuals struggling from the impacts of the Iran War. However, some have reaped the benefits from trading with stocks, futures, and prediction markets. Author Esha Grewal takes a closer look at the broader security impacts from individuals profiting off the war.
As NATO allies commit to spending 5% of GDP on defence by 2035, Kaya Dupuis examines how Canada plans to finance its most ambitious military commitment since the Cold War and whether a new multilateral bank can succeed where Victory Bonds once did. Can capital markets do what kitchen-table patriotism once accomplished?
Like much else in the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Navy’s submarine fleet is rapidly aging out. The RCN’s second-hand Victoria-class diesel-electric submarines, built for the Royal Navy in the 1980s, will reach the end of their service life in the 2030s. The four Victoria-class submarines are already showing signs of their age, having become Read More…
The Strait of Hormuz is barely 30 miles wide at its narrowest point, yet it is arguably one of the most consequential stretches of water on earth. Through this narrow corridor connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman flows approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day (b/d); roughly 20% of global petroleum Read More…
Canada’s decision to replace its aging CF-18 fleet has taken on new geopolitical weight. Initially committed to procuring 88 F-35s, Ottawa began reconsidering further orders in 2025 amid deteriorating US-Canada relations, turning its attention to Sweden’s Gripen as an alternative. This article evaluates the two programs across four dimensions: homeland defence, alliance interoperability, industrial sovereignty, and combat performance. It finds that while the F-35 offers superior stealth and NATO integration, the Gripen presents compelling advantages in Arctic operability, cost efficiency, and supply chain independence. Ultimately, the right choice depends on whether Canada prioritizes allied commitments or long-term defence autonomy.