NATO and Canada

Special Report: The MAS Gap, Canada Falls Behind as Allies Adopt Maritime Autonomous Systems

This is Part One of a two part series on maritime autonomous systems.

Introduction

As the geopolitical landscape becomes increasingly complex, with rising global competition and evolving security threats, Canada must take decisive steps to enhance its maritime capabilities by adopting Maritime Autonomous Systems (MAS). While our allies, including the United States, France, and NATO generally, are rapidly integrating MAS into their naval operations, Canada has been slow to follow suit. Adopting and accelerating the development of MAS within the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is not only a strategic necessity but a critical response to the specific advantages that MAS provide to our adversaries and strategic rivals including Russia, Iran and China.

MAS, including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), offer the RCN key operational advantages. These technologies provide extended operational range, reduce risks to personnel, enhance real-time situational awareness, and allow for more cost-effective operations. The ability to operate in contested or hostile environments without risking human lives, the capacity to conduct persistent surveillance over large maritime areas, and the cost savings from reducing reliance on manned platforms will significantly bolster Canada’s naval power, particularly as Canada aims to safeguard its vast maritime borders. This report will explore the MAS initiatives and capabilities the U.S., France, and NATO are adopting, and examine how these nations and NATO are integrating these systems into naval strategies. By studying the successes and challenges of these allies, this report will highlight the importance of MAS for the RCN’s modernization efforts.

Background

With the advent of MAS, a revolution in modern naval warfare and operations is occurring. MAS are increasingly vital for addressing the complexities of contemporary maritime threats, enhancing operational efficiency, and maintaining strategic advantages. Naval operations face a multifaceted threat environment, including anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies, underwater warfare, and the protection of critical infrastructure such as undersea cables and energy pipelines. MAS perform a variety of essential tasks that enhance resilience against these threats while reducing the risks to personnel and expensive manned platforms. Common MAS applications include mine countermeasures, underwater mapping, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and maritime domain awareness. MAS can conduct persistent patrols, providing real-time data and situational awareness in contested or hard-to-reach environments. Their ability to undertake high-risk tasks, such as operating in minefields, toxic zones, or combat areas, protects personnel while executing critical missions. MAS are also increasingly used for logistics, such as resupplying ships or delivering critical equipment to forward-operating units. UUVs and USVs are integral components of MAS. UUVs, often referred to as underwater drones, operate beneath the surface and are specifically designed for tasks such as seabed mapping, mine detection and neutralization, underwater ISR, and inspecting underwater infrastructure. Their ability to navigate the challenging and often treacherous underwater environment makes them invaluable for missions that require stealth and precision. Whereas USVs are surface-based platforms that excel in operations such as maritime patrols, surveillance, and logistics support. They are particularly effective in ensuring maritime security, conducting search-and-rescue missions, and serving as forward-deployed assets for monitoring and data collection. Equipped with advanced sensors and communications technology, USVs can relay critical information in real-time, enabling faster and more informed decision-making.

Adversaries and strategic rivals including Iran, Russia, China and the Houthi movement, have embraced MAS technology to gain asymmetric advantages. The growing use of MAS by adversaries underlines the urgency for Western navies to accelerate their adoption of these technologies to maintain a competitive edge. Climate change is another driver for the adoption of MAS. Rising sea levels, the melting of Arctic ice, and the increased frequency of extreme weather events are reshaping global maritime priorities. The opening of Arctic sea routes demands advanced capabilities for persistent surveillance and operations in remote, harsh environments. MAS, with their ability to operate autonomously for extended periods, can monitor these regions efficiently, supporting search-and-rescue missions, environmental data collection, and the protection of newly accessible resources. Moreover, MAS will be crucial for scalable operations, due to their relative affordability, and will facilitate the capacity to secure the strategic chokepoints which are vital for global trade and Canada’s economy. With increasing competition, MAS provides a critical edge in situational awareness and rapid response. Regarding cost-effectiveness, as personnel remain the largest budget component for Western militaries, including salaries, benefits, and medical care, MAS offer a compelling solution by reducing reliance on large, crewed platforms. Unmanned systems significantly lower personnel-related expenses while enabling navies to expand their operational capabilities. Their cost-effectiveness extends to procurement and maintenance.

The United States

The U.S. Navy is a leader in MAS and has widely published its goals and funded initiatives and projects to integrate MAS into functional designs, platforms and capabilities. These include the 2020 Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All Domain Naval Power, the 2021 Unmanned Campaign Framework, the larger 2022 National Defence Strategy of the USA, the 2024 Naval Science and Technology Strategy and the Replicator Initiative. These policies and initiatives indicate that the DOD and USN recognise the strategic necessity of MAS in the naval domain. A leading Canadian expert on MAS and Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) Fellow, Kate Todd, states that the US Navy, UK Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy are all adjusting their fleet designs, organisational structures, training, doctrine and concepts of operations to take advantage of the benefits offered by MAS. Specifically, the USN plans to transform thirty per cent of their vessels to MAS by 2045, which will include 150 USVs. To facilitate this, the USN is developing and deploying a ‘ghost fleet’ of USVs for naval mission support, including USVs such as the Overlord, Sea Hunter, and Seahawk.

The Overlord USV, whose prime contractor is L3Harris, in 2021 was used in live-fire demonstrations with ballistic missile defence, and anti-air and surface missions. USN Rear Admiral Kevin Smith, the Small Combatants Executive Officer, pointed out that the Overlord USV “represent[s] a significant leap forward in unmanned technology”, accelerating the USN’s ability to expand unmanned testing, and experimentation and accelerate the transition to a hybrid fleet. Moreover, the USVs the Sea Hunter and the Seahawk, created by Leidos are more examples of the USN development of USVs. Nevin Carr, an executive with Leidos, and a retired USN Rear Admiral, contends that drone vessels will manage dull, dirty and dangerous naval tasks, including mapping the sea floor and operating in toxic, radioactive and combat zones. Carr claims the Sea Hunter and Seahawk cost $25 million to build, which would make their deployment cost-effective when compared to the construction of surface combatants and other auxiliary-based vessels, that are also crewed. The Commander of Task Group 59.1, USN Lt. Echeverria, states that the USN is integrating MAS into their operations, including the Sea Hunter and testing their deployment with the USN’s 5th fleet which operates in the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and Aden, and parts of the Indian Ocean. This means that the USV will be integrated into a critical sea node and maritime space that holds the bottlenecks of Bab El Mandeb and Hurmuz, and the Suez Canal.

Large USVs are also being deployed in the USN, these include the Mariner and Ranger, which USN Commander Jeremiah Daley said “will give the ability to turn one surface action group of three destroyers and a certain number of USVs and convert them into three surface action groups covering three or four or five times more space… [which] is a game changer”. The USN’s FY 2024 budget states L-USVs will facilitate “weeks-long deployments and trans-ocean transits and operate aggregated with Carrier Strike Groups, Amphibious Ready Groups, Surface Actions Groups and individual manned combatants”. The deployment of the Ghost Fleet ships will enhance the USN’s distributed maritime operations concept expanding interconnections between USN vessels. US Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Sam Paparo said the distributed maritime operations give the USN the ability to mass fire and expand manoeuvring.

The USN is also purchasing UUVs, which include the Orca XLUUV, the Snakehead, the Razorback, the Viperfish and the Knifefish. The Orca, developed by Boeing and delivered in December 2023 has a range of 6,000 nautical miles and a modular payload bay, which can hold future and current payloads. The Snakehead is the USN’s largest submarine-launched UUV, whereas the Viperfish and the Razorback are medium submarine-launched UUVs, intended for recovery missions. Lera, a program manager at PMS 406 Unmanned Maritime Systems says these UUVs require more testing and development, as they are designed for missions with long durations, and there are still limitations. Nonetheless, the technology is maturing and will enable endurance, communications, precision navigation and advanced autonomy, all enhancing the USN’s capability in the maritime domain. The Knifefish is a medium Mine Countermeasure (MCM) UUV, designed by General Dynamics to deploy off a Littoral Combat Ship, and according to General Dynamics “provides the mine warfare commander with enhanced mine-hunting capability by detecting, classifying and identifying both buried mines and mines with higher clutter environments”.  This means that the Knifefish’s utility is to detect, avoid and identify mine threats, reducing the risk to personnel by operating in the minefield as an off-board sensor while the host ship stays outside the minefield boundaries. The knifefish also gathers environmental data to provide intelligence support to other systems and capabilities.

The USN’s comprehensive efforts to integrate MAS into its fleet are setting the stage amongst allies for a significant shift in naval warfare. By adopting USVs and UUVs, the USN is enhancing its operational capabilities across a range of critical tasks, from mine countermeasures to ISR. A critical advantage of MAS is the reality that these platforms require less personnel and considering the highest cost for the USN is payroll and medical care, this is an attractive budgetary feature. The USN’s commitment to this transformation is evidenced by initiatives such as the Unmanned Campaign Framework, the 2021 National Defense Strategy, and the Replicator Initiative, which are driving the development of a “ghost fleet” and a variety of unmanned platforms designed for multiple roles. These systems, including the Sea Hunter, Seahawk, and Orca XLUUV, are already proving their value in both experimental and real-world operations.

France

The French Ministry of the Armed Forces and the French Navy, the Marine Nationale, have focused their attention on UUVs, this is articulated in their Seabed Warfare Strategy in 2022, which complements the 2022 French National Strategy Review and defence policy, which focuses on Strategic Autonomy, and the 2024-2030 Military Planning Program. The Seabed Warfare Strategy states that control of the seabed will enable France to consolidate its strategic autonomy “by seizing technological, industrial and cooperation opportunities that arise in this new field” (i.e., autonomous underwater and remotely operated vehicles). The Marine Nationale believe that gaining critical knowledge of the seabed is essential to maximizing “safe, autonomous and efficient action in the maritime domain.” This rationale derives from the goal of expanding France’s areas of interest in a variety of capabilities, including the protection of critical submarine installations, and autonomously detecting underwater activity. Due to the existing capabilities, the Metropolitan (BSAM), Overseas (BASAOM) and Chartered (BSAA) Support and Assistant Ships and their capacity to only be used in mild environmental conditions and the inability to conceal their payloads, the deployment of UUV would achieve the goal to have platforms that are capable of conducting search missions in a variety of currently non-permissive environments.

The French Ministry of Defence showcased at the 2024 Euronaval exhibition a full-scale model of a Unmanned Combat Underwater Vehicle (UCUV) by French company, Naval Group. The UCUV is a powerful combat system and displays the Marine Nationale’s priority to enhance underwater combat companies. French Minister of Defence, Florence Parly said the UCUV makes it possible to cover 97 per cent of the seabed, as it is capable of depths of 6,000 metres, and effectively protects French interests, including sub-marine cables. France is well incentivized to “master” the seabed, as France has one of the largest exclusive economic zones in the world, owing to its many territories across the world.

France is also developing and deploying USVs that focus on MCM missions, this includes the Future Marine Mine Countermeasures System (SLAMF), which is designed to replace the current mine hunters, sonar tug vessels, and mine clearance diver-based vessels. Moreover, the SLAMF includes surface, UUVs, and carrier-surface vessels (i.e., mine warfare vessels). Naval News reports that each SLAMF system is composed of two USVs, one with a towed sonar and another with remotely operated vehicles, and two UAVs, which are responsible for detecting, classifying and locating mines. The French have formidable strategic naval assets, including SSBNs and the prize Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier. Therefore, the SLAMF programme’s objective is to secure these strategic assets, protect French ports and support the deployment of amphibious naval forces. The program, also known as MMCM in Britain, is being conducted through a Franco-British Cooperation made possible through the 2010 Lanchester House military agreement with French and British defence industry leaders such as Thales, BAE Systems and ECA. France’s strategic focus on UUVs reflects its broader defence goals of enhancing strategic autonomy and securing critical maritime interests. With the investment in UUVs, including the development of the UCUV and the SLAMF, it is demonstrated that France is committing to expanding capabilities in seabed warfare, mine countermeasures, and the protection of vital undersea infrastructure such as submarine cables.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

In 2018, NATO developed its Maritime Unmanned System (MUS) initiative which facilitates the pooling of ‘resources, talent and ingenuity’ to promote excellence and interoperability amongst Allies. Moreover, the MUS High Visibility Project focuses on information sharing, integrating policy into NATO strategies, standardizing technical details to maximize interoperability, and developing member’s naval doctrines. This project enhances research and operational experimentation amongst members while facilitating logistics, support and training, as well maximizing potential economies of scale and scope opportunities. Crucially for industry, the project focuses on acquisition and industry engagement, exploring design prototyping and industry procurement solutions to maintain NATO’s technological edge and avoid duplications.

In 2024, NATO Allies gathered for NATO’s Digital Ocean Initiative and the Robotic Experimentation and Prototyping with Maritime Unmanned Systems 24 (REPMUS 24) in Portugal to test autonomous systems to enhance interoperability and increase joint understanding of the maritime threat environment, and technological knowledge. Through these NATO initiatives, Allies are collaborating to deter and maximize situational awareness of new emerging and disruptive technologies. 2024’s REPMUS focused on deploying MAS in multi-domain operations, including anti-submarine and naval mine warfare, and the protection of Critical Undersea Infrastructure. To support these initiatives, NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM) established the Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure in 2023, “to increase situational awareness and enhance deterrence and defence” of critical undersea infrastructure. This complements a Coordination Cell at NATO HQ, “to improve information sharing and exchange best practices between NATO Allies, partners, and the private sector.” Moreover, this project and the capabilities that will derive from it will be crucial and timely, considering recent events, such as the damaged undersea cables in the North Sea.

Craig Sawyer, Chair of NATO’s Joint Capability Group Maritime Unmanned Systems (JCGMUS) states that while procuring unmanned assets is a necessity, there is a risk of tackling their development and deployment unilaterally. Instead, NATO members should critically integrate standards and interoperability to ensure the scalability of implementing unmanned systems. Sawyer stated, that “we (i.e., NATO Allies) will never be able to manage thousands of assets as individual cases and programs.” Moreover, Sean Treventhan, a maritime capability manager at NATO HQ said that while “we are at the very beginning of a robotics revolution… we’re not going to win a war with robotics alone”. However, uncrewed surface vessel applications are ‘quite broad’ and the roles that [USVs] can operate “are almost only limited by our… imagination”. NATO’s Unmanned System initiatives underscore the critical importance of collaboration, interoperability, and innovation in addressing emerging maritime threats, ensuring that Allies remain at the forefront of technological advancements while safeguarding critical infrastructure and maintaining collective security.

Canada

Canada is falling behind in MAS technology and doctrine and must enhance its efforts to adopt MAS. This can be achieved through political will, increased budgetary allocations, refocusing priorities and partnering with Allies and strategic partners, and utilizing the Canadian naval and defence industry. According to CGAI Naval expert Kate Todd, there are no implemented or announced organizational or institutional bodies in the RCN ready to adopt MAS. Moreover, Todd states that the RCN “has accomplished the least out Five Eyes navies to integrate autonomous systems into their fleet”, although it is “investigating which autonomous systems should be acquired to best equip the RCN…” While the Canadian DND has signalled its willingness to integrate and adopt MAS into its operational structure, this adoption has been cumbersome and not forthcoming.

Discussions of MAS include the 2016 RCN Leadmark 2050 strategy, under ‘The Evolving Anti-Access Challenge’ subsection, that the RCN intends to adopt “autonomous underwater delivery systems”. Moreover, Leadmark states that the ‘coming decades’ will likely see the widespread adoption of shipborne unmanned vehicles in maritime ISR assets. The strategy acknowledges that MAS will also ‘compromise an essential component’ of ISR and strike assets, ‘performing tasks in very high-risk environments’. In 2017, defence policy, Strong, Secure and Engaged, the DND acknowledges that “technological developments point to a future of defence that is expected to be vastly different than today… [including] autonomous systems”. That “Remotely Piloted Systems, popularly known as drones…[including] underwater – offer great potential in helping Canada meet its defence needs, at home and abroad”. SSE also states that these systems “can be used effectively for… conducting acoustic surveillance, mapping or the surveillance of ‘choke-points’, to naval mine countermeasures”. Fast-forward to 2024 and the DND’s January 2024, Research Priorities: “Undersea surveillance, including sensors on long-endurance autonomous underwater vehicles to protect Canada’s coastlines as well as other new technologies to monitor Canada’s undersea approaches on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in the Arctic”. Autonomous systems, albeit not necessarily naval, are also recognized in the 2024 Defence Policy Update, Our North, Strong and Free (ONSAF) under the changing character of conflict’ subsection, as a ‘frontier’ of military and civilian technology. Since 2016 the general policy direction has been there, but Canada’s adoption and procurement of MAS is lacking due to political will, budgetary constraints and a comprehensive approach to partnering with industry, internationally and domestically.

While DND and RCN are procuring new platforms, including the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPs) and Canadian Surface Combatants (CSC), the government is still stuck in a nascent development and deployment limbo for MAS. For instance, Todd shows that RCN USVs and UUV are managed by the Maritime Forces Pacific Target Cell and are deployed as needed. Todd reports that the RCN has operated small high-speed remote-controlled USVs Hammerheads since 2009 and Barracudas. Whereas the RCN since 2018 have Remove Mine hunting and Disposal system UUVs which assist operations and facilitate underwater domain awareness. Moreover, Canada announced the procurement of two systems to be operational by 2025. According to RCN’s Cpt. Jeff Klassen, the RCN is watching the development of USVs closely and working with “other organizations and militaries” to better understand their applicability by testing small “remote surface vehicles”. How Canada will proceed is unclear. However, what is critically clear is that Canada is not moving fast enough in relation to its allies and adversaries, and will increasingly find itself left behind in the naval domain as the race for MAS intensifies in an era of strategic competition and potential military escalation.

Conclusion

The integration of MAS into naval operations marks a transformative shift in modern maritime strategy. MAS deliver critical advantages by enhancing situational awareness, operational efficiency, and strategic capabilities while reducing risks to personnel. Their ability to operate autonomously in high-risk or remote environments makes them essential for addressing today’s maritime security challenges. Moreover, MAS excel in tasks such as mine countermeasures, intelligence gathering, and securing critical infrastructure. They provide persistent surveillance over vast areas, including remote regions like the Arctic, and are crucial in adapting to challenges posed by climate change. Their modularity and advanced technology allow navies to respond swiftly to shifting threats, integrating seamlessly into multi-domain operations alongside air and ground forces. Financially, MAS reduce costs by minimizing reliance on large, crewed platforms and cutting personnel expenses, offering navies a cost-effective solution for achieving strategic goals. Lastly, MAS strengthen strategic deterrence, maintain maritime dominance, and enhance allied collaboration, with frameworks like NATO’s MUS emphasizing interoperability and innovation. For Canada, MAS adoption is a pressing necessity. With its vast coastline and vital maritime interests, Canada must act decisively to secure its waters, protect infrastructure, contribute to NATO’s objectives and protect the global commons. Drawing lessons from allies like the U.S. and France, Canada can accelerate MAS development, and deployment and ensure its relevance in the evolving maritime landscape. MAS represent a game-changing innovation for naval operations, addressing geopolitical, environmental, and economic challenges.

Photo: “A Hammerhead unmanned, remote controlled vehicle from the Canadian navy auxiliary oil replenishment ship HMCS Preserver (AOR 510) makes a close pass by the guided-missile frigate USS Rentz (FFG 46)” (2013), via Picryl and U.S. Navy. License under Public Domain.

Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.

Author

  • Jake Rooke

    Jake Rooke is the NATO Association of Canada’s Ottawa Operations Manager, a past Program Editor and Research Analyst. Jake has worked with NAOC since January of 2022. Jake holds an Honour's Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a Master of Arts in European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, both from Carleton University. His expertise is interdisciplinary, focusing on the nexus between political economy and security. This includes topics on trade politicization and the intersection of interests and identities, contentious market regulation, international regulatory convergence, BREXIT and UK trade policy. Jake also focuses on global defence industries, geopolitical strategy and strategic thought as well as NATO-EU relations, the rise of China and political-economic dynamics that shape geopolitics. Jake works as a Program Manager at Edelman Global Advisory in Ottawa and Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies graduate recruitment coordinator. He can be reached at jakerooke@cmail.carleton.ca.

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Jake Rooke
Jake Rooke is the NATO Association of Canada’s Ottawa Operations Manager, a past Program Editor and Research Analyst. Jake has worked with NAOC since January of 2022. Jake holds an Honour's Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a Master of Arts in European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, both from Carleton University. His expertise is interdisciplinary, focusing on the nexus between political economy and security. This includes topics on trade politicization and the intersection of interests and identities, contentious market regulation, international regulatory convergence, BREXIT and UK trade policy. Jake also focuses on global defence industries, geopolitical strategy and strategic thought as well as NATO-EU relations, the rise of China and political-economic dynamics that shape geopolitics. Jake works as a Program Manager at Edelman Global Advisory in Ottawa and Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies graduate recruitment coordinator. He can be reached at jakerooke@cmail.carleton.ca.