Canada faces an urgent need to modernize its submarine fleet, particularly with under-ice capabilities, to maintain strategic autonomy and meet its international obligations. Public Service and Procurement Canada (PSPC) must urgently fast-track the acquisition of under-the-ice capable submarines for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) or risk facing a critical capability gap. Several factors have recently combined to press the RCN into deciding on new submarines, these include the reality that the Victoria-Class submarines are scheduled for retirement in the late 2030s, second, the US’s military is pivoting to the Indo-Pacific region, which will force Canada to meet its obligations. Third, the rise of revanchist autocratic powers (i.e., Russia and China) and their materializing interest in the Arctic and fourth, the effects of climate change on the Northwest Passage. These priorities and geopolitical shifts mean that Canada must maintain and upgrade the unique capabilities that submarines provide to facilitate Canada’s international obligations and secure Canada’s economic and national security interests. Without new submarines past 2035, Canada will struggle to deter and deny state and non-state adversaries and respond to hybrid threats and humanitarian disasters in the Canadian Arctic and across the Indo-Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.
Background
In 1962 Canada purchased three British Oberon-class submarines; the first newly built submarines Canada had bought since 1914. The Oberon-class submarines were among the quietest in the world, giving the RCN a strategic edge and prestige amongst other naval forces. In the 1980s, the Oberon submarines were refitted with newer fire-control systems and upgraded sonar and torpedoes to maintain the submarine fleet’s capability to uphold maritime domain awareness, patrol Canadian sovereign territory, add a meaningful contribution to international security and deter the Soviet Union. In 1987, the Department of National Defence (DND) announced through the White Paper on Defence ‘Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada’ and the Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project that ten to twelve nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) would be purchased for $8 billion to defend the Arctic and Canadian economic and national security interests, particularly in response to the Soviet Union’s submarine threat and their claims over portions of the Northwest Passage and territorial maritime space. However, Canada did not buy SSNs and the Mulroney government backtracked due to numerous factors, including objections from the US Department of Energy over the transfer of sensitive nuclear propulsion technology, the end of the Cold War, budgetary considerations and domestic controversy in Canada surrounding the procurement. Due to the Oberon-class submarine’s retirement and the RCN’s potential to lose a critical strategic capability, Canada in 1998 acquired four second-hand diesel-engine Victoria-class (also known as the Upholder-class) submarines from the UK, which were delivered between 2000-2004. The acquisition was often described as a ‘fire sale’, as the submarines cost $897 million in a lease-to-buy deal. This allowed Canada to maintain its submarine capability after the prolonged debates in the 1980s.
The Victoria-class submarines were originally designed for the Royal Navy and came with significant maintenance and design issues for the RCN. Since the acquisition, Canada has spent billions on maintenance as mechanical and structural problems have consistently plagued the submarines. In a recent four-year period, the submarines have spent a combined total of 214 days at sea, with two submarines not deploying at all. Moreover, as discussed in a report by the Macdonald Laurier Institute, a 2003 Department of National Defence (DND) audit pegged the cost of four new submarines in 1998 at $3-5 billion. This begs why the government did not spend the additional funds when the federal surplus was $14 billion in 1998 and the maintenance and retrofitting costs far exceed, with inflation adjustment, the original estimate.
In 2021, the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) was established to examine operating environments and determine which sophisticated technologies are required for a future RCN next-generation submarine. In April 2024, the DND released its long-expected Defence Policy Update, Our North, Strong and Free (ONSAF), emphasising the Arctic’s strategic importance. Moreover, ONSAF stated it would ‘explore’ the acquisition of submarines, raising concerns among industry leaders and key allies. Scrutiny on Canadian defence spending intensified between April and June, as both key allies and industry groups took issue with Canada’s lack of predictability and clarity in achieving its commitment to NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit pledge to spend 2% of GDP on defence. Then, in June 2024 at the NATO Washington Summit, Canada announced it would commit to the procurement of submarines and would also meet its 2% commitment by 2032; Canada then issued a Request for Information (RFI) in September to industry, seeking tenders for up to twelve conventionally powered, under-ice capable submarines. RCN Retired Vice Admiral, Hawco explains that submarines with an under-ice capability would significantly enhance Canada’s maritime capabilities. Canada aims to award a contract by 2028, with the first replacement submarine expected to enter service in 2035.
While PM Trudeau initially did not rule out nuclear-powered submarines, DND has since ruled out their acquisition. This is due to nuclear-powered submarines’ significantly higher cost, including onshore infrastructure facilities, and potentially new naval bases. In a 2023 Senate Report, Arctic Security Under Threat, technological alternatives to nuclear were discussed, including an air-independent propulsion (AIP) capability. However, according to Dr Rob Huebert from Calgary University, AIP technology is unproven and could potentially create delays to Canada’s already long defence procurement schedules. Nonetheless, as RCN Retired Vice Admiral Robert Davidson, former submarine commander and specialist stated, Canada needs submarines that have long-range and possess under or near-ice operational capabilities. These factors have influenced the decision-making process of the CAF’s and DND’s Strategic Context Document and the High-Level Mandatory Requirements (HLMR). With potential operations across the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic and Europe, the RCN needs a submarine fleet that is more than a littoral force. While Canada is moving in the right direction after years of policy delays, the recent announcement that new submarines will not be delivered until 2035, at the earliest, means the ageing Victoria-class fleet will need substantial retrofits to extend its operational life until 2036-2039 with the current estimated cost of $300 million per annum and a further $1.5-2.5 billion for the Victoria-class Modernization Project. Moreover, while it is plausible that submarines may be delivered by 2035, CGAI President and defence procurement expert, Dr David Perry pointed out to the Senate Committee on National Defence that new submarines would likely take between 20-30 years until Initial Operating Capacity (IOC), which is drastically different in contrast to the government’s goal of first submarine delivery in 2035.
The Strategic Utility of Submarines
Submarines are a unique defence platform, providing independence and strategic value to the RCN with their capability to ‘detect, track, classify and engage enemy vessels’ with stealth, power and advanced features. While the Victoria-class Modernization Project will give Canada’s current fleet retrofits and upgrades, new submarines will require an array of advanced capabilities. Crucially for Canada, this includes near-ice or under-ice capabilities, significantly enhancing Canada’s maritime presence and capacity in the Canadian Arctic. However, a submarine operating within the Arctic presents many unique challenges. These include a critical technological requirement to break through the ice in emergencies, which requires substantial momentum and the conning towers to be strong enough to prevent damage. Another critical capability that new submarines would require is more advanced sensors which could better distinguish unique anomalies associated with detection in the north. These anomalies are associated with environmental and biological factors, including the movement of packed ice and the higher ambient noise ice creates. Additionally, sonar is another challenge in the north due to reflectivity which can produce false echoes in shallow, near and under-ice environments, which makes detection more difficult. This is compounded by existing and changing climate features in water salinity as the mixture of freshwater run-off with salt water, can also affect sound transmission and analysis, as well as the command and control of torpedoes. These are critical factors in securing under or near-ice detection and maritime awareness in the north. These factors are also being studied by NATO’s Science and Technology Organization’s Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) and are not unique to RCN and Canada’s allies, but also affect adversaries and the commercial shipping industry.
Future RCN submarines should also deploy unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) which will facilitate new missions and significantly enhance RCN submarine’s battle space. Missions include ‘mine reconnaissance and location, environmental and operational intelligence collection, off-board sensing, seabed sensor deployment, and acoustic source positioning’ and more. United States Navy (USN), Vice Admiral Gaucher, explains that UUV are a key development priority for the USN submarine force’s operational posture and its further development will accelerate in 2024. While these features will help detect and classify operational environments in the Arctic, they will also be vital in littoral and blue-ocean operations and missions as well. Moreover, as reported by Breaking Defence’s Sydney Freedberg, the utilization of artificial intelligence (AI) will aid new submarine features and existing UUV assets already available. This is witnessed in AUKUS, the trilateral alliance between Australia-UK-US, which is exploring in Pillar II on how AI analysis of sensor data and quantum-based detection could give new submarines a lethal edge in underwater warfare. In a study by the Hudson Institute on the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), reported by Freedberg, “… the time a UUV could operate without outside help can be as long as weeks or months, depending on how sophisticated the task is… uncrewed systems [are] the most prominent new technology [ADF] are pursuing”. Furthermore, underwater drones are currently ‘awkward and slow’, however, cheaper and smaller UUV and AUVs could “flood the zone with sensors, watching and waiting” to report to human-based controllers. In turn, Freedberg explains that “new kinds of quantum sensors and sophisticated AI signal processing could make swarms” of these vehicles difficult to avoid. These features could give RCN’s submarine fleet further power projection in the Arctic and complement upgraded sensors.
A critical feature that RCN submarines need is the ability to cross vast distances and maintain its strategic advantage. Distance and Canada’s geographical location creates a paradox for the CAF and RCN. While Canada is relatively geographically secure, being distant from major potential theatres of war and a direct neighbour to superpower ally, it also means that the RCN and CAF must travel vast distances to engage and maintain Canada’s international interests, and its partners and obligations. Another geographic consideration, especially in relation to the RCN, is that Canada has the longest domestic coastline in the world, bordering three major oceans. Therefore, any new submarine fleet must be capable of traveling vast distances and patrolling Canada’s three ocean coasts. Regarding distance, new technology includes air-independent propulsion (AIP) and nuclear propulsion, however, as discussed nuclear propulsion has been ruled out. Therefore, AIP technology would need to be utilized to be capable of operating under-the-ice and across long distances in the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.
Currently, Canada’s submarine force is unique among close allies due to a lack of anti-surface or land strike weapons. As reported by the Macdonald Laurier Institute’s Jeffery Collins report Deadline 2036, Canada removed the Harpoon missile capability over budgetary-driven concerns during the Canadianization of the Victoria-class program. New submarines would greatly increase their strategic threat if they were equipped with submarine-launched land strike capabilities, such as the USN’s tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM), which is already being incorporated in the Canadian Surface Combatant project. This would give RCN submarines the capacity to further enable joint operations with other naval, air and land-based assets in littoral missions. This capability would strategically increase the disruption through first strike on command and control assets on land and assist special force operations through bombardment.
Overall, submarines bolster Canada’s defence posture and strategic capacity. Moreover, their ability to operate undetected makes submarines a strategic deterrent, capable of projecting force and altering the strategic calculus of potential state and non-state adversaries. Collins’ argues that submarines serve as a ‘classic force multiplier’ and are considered among the most lethal naval assets, requiring adversaries to respond disproportionately to their presence. Beyond their role in safeguarding domestic sovereignty and maintaining maritime awareness, submarines are vital for ‘whole-of-government’ missions, such as anti-drug and special forces operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Submarines are critical to an increasingly multipolar strategic international order. This can be witnessed as forty-one countries now possess submarine capabilities.
Policy
Within Canadian defence policy, Canada’s submarine capability is an intricate pillar for the RCN. According to the RCN’s 2015 Leadmark 2050 strategy, the primary mission of the RCN is to defend “the global system at sea and from the sea, both at home and aboard”. This means that Canadian maritime forces are employed to protect Canada by exercising sovereignty in domestic domains, to secure “approaches to North America and contributing to peace and good order aboard”. Moreover, the Leadmark 2050 strategy states the RCN seeks to “prevent conflict by strengthening partnerships and deploy forward to promote global stability and deter conflict”, and “project Canadian power to shape and, when necessary, restore order to the global system”. This vision aligns with Strong, Secure and Engaged (SSE 2017), which supports the RCN’s goal of being a globally deployable “blue water navy”. Central to this pursuit is the Naval Task Group (NTG), typically composed of three to four surface combatant vessels, including submarines, and a support ship. Critically, the NTG facilitates the RCN the capacity to respond to and sustain global operations, protect Canada’s role in maintaining international maritime security and meet its international obligations. Nonetheless, procurement of major defence platforms is a long-term endeavour, as the Leadmark 2050 strategy emphasizes, building a navy is a long-term investment over 40-50 years of commitment. Critically, the RCN cannot succeed and facilitate the goals of these policies and directives without the necessary capabilities to complete the missions. While policy and objectives are important indicators and guides for the Canadian Armed Forces, federal legislators and the Canadian public must understand that submarines are a strategic asset to achieve results, and without them, the RCN will struggle to achieve defence policy goals.
Geopolitics and Climate Change
The international security and physical environment have directly influenced the need for Canada to invest in conventional defence platforms. As outlined by the DPU, ONSAF (2024), climate change has heightened the strategic importance of the Canadian Arctic, making it increasingly vital to Canada’s sovereignty and maritime economy. By 2050, the Arctic Ocean could become the most efficient shipping route between Europe and East Asia, presenting significant opportunities for Canada’s blue economy, which includes harvesting sustainable approaches to ocean resources, such as ‘fisheries, aquaculture, marine transportation, ocean energy and technology, creation and tourism’. These industries accounted for $31.65 billion in GDP in 2020. However, the opening of the Northwest Passage also introduces new risks and vulnerabilities, as Canada’s maritime domain will see increased use by commercial interests, such as international shipping and ‘scientific research vessels’ flagged by adversarial nations. In response, the CPSP team is working closely with stakeholders to assess to impacts of climate change, explore emerging technologies that support prolonged underwater operations and ensure Canada’s preparedness for future challenges in the Arctic and beyond.
Since the acquisition of the Victoria-Class submarines and the launch of CPSP in 2021, the international security environment has drastically changed with the rise of revanchist autocratic powers (i.e., Russia and China). This is exhibited by Prime Minister, Trudeau’s statement, “Rising and disruptive powers like China and Russia mean NATO’s northern and western flank is the Canadian Arctic.” This statement in conjunction with the release of ONSAF (2024) reflects Canada’s recognition of the Arctic’s evolving geopolitical significance, particularly as Russia and China expand their influence in the region through their activities. Russia has been particularly disruptive in the Arctic, indicating its determination to protect its interests, given its dependence on Arctic oil and gas, which is 20-25% of Russian GDP. Disruption is witnessed through hybrid tactics designed to create disunity amongst Arctic nations and undermine the Arctic Council. Notably, this hybrid approach has failed, with the recent development that Canada and its Nordic allies are discussing the development of a new Arctic security group to counter Russia and China.
Regarding direct military disruptions, Russia has unilaterally resumed long-range TU-95 bomber overflights, tested cruise missiles, conducted troop deployments, and deployed armed icebreakers with anti-ship missiles all aimed at probing NORAD defences. Moreover, Russia has expanded its maritime capabilities by strengthening its nuclear deterrent bastion strategy through the construction and refurbishment of northern military bases. This is also featured in Russia’s Basic Principles 2035 (2020) policy, which expands on previous commitments by developing strategic bases and a ‘Northern Sea Route’. These actions and Russia’s November 2022 Maritime Doctrine underscore Russia’s determination to assert its presence in the Arctic and its preparedness to challenge North American security.
While it is evident that Russia seeks to leverage its strategic and tactical capabilities over the Arctic and Canadian interests, China’s ambitions in the region are still under debate. Nonetheless, China is shaping the Arctic’s security landscape through its geo-economic ambitions. Although Beijing’s long-term goals remain unclear, there are concerning signals in its strategic direction. These include the development of the Type-093 nuclear-powered submarine, coupled with rapid advancements in hypersonic technology. The PRC’s commitment is ambitious through the Polar Silk Road initiative and the construction of Arctic Offshore and Patrol Ships (AOPS) and icebreakers. These developments are alarming given the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) interest in operating in the Bering Sea and growing partnership with Russia, witnessed by China’s Coast Guard’s claims to have entered the Arctic Ocean for the first time in a joint exercise with Russia. Moreover, China’s focus on mapping potential Arctic bastions highlights the growing need for Canada to strengthen its under-ice capabilities to counter these threats.
Beyond Canada’s immediate maritime domain, China’s aggressive naval build-up, particularly in the South and East China Seas, has fueled demand for submarine acquisitions in the broader Indo-Pacific region, further complicating the security environment and defence planners calculus. For Canada, having a capable submarine force that can travel vast distances is also crucial for a viable and credible deterrent and a salient NTG. Submarines are an intricate component of the naval arsenal due to their strategic advantage, forcing would-be adversaries to incur tactical risk when entering approaches where submarines are operating underwater. Moreover, this is owing to the reality that other capabilities, such as surface combatants, satellites and missiles have difficulty in targeting and countering submarines, in turn forcing the adversary to rely on submarines to protect convoys and naval surface assets.
A submarine complements other major capability platforms, enhancing strike capabilities and protecting against underwater vulnerabilities, including adversarial submarines. Critically, submarines can be integrated and deployed for missions and training with RCN surface combatants and with Allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. With the growth and threat posed increasingly by advanced anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, such as China’s DF-21D and DF-26, or Russia’s Bastion and Kalibr systems, these developments pose a new level of threat to surface ships and underscore the need for Canada to bolster its submarine capabilities in a rapidly shifting global naval landscape. With 153 of the world’s 407 active submarines in the Indo-Pacific region, and projections that could grow to 300 by 2030, the urgency for Canada to modernize its submarine fleet is critically clear.
Conclusion
Canada must urgently modernize its submarine fleet, particularly with under-ice capabilities, to maintain strategic autonomy and meet its international obligations. The ageing Victoria-class submarines, plagued by persistent maintenance must be replaced with more advanced, reliable and versatile submarines capable of operating in diverse and increasingly contested environments such as the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific regions. The rising influence of revanchist powers, combined with the effects of climate change on the Arctic, underscores the critical role that submarines play in safeguarding Canada’s maritime sovereignty, enhancing NATO and NORAD cooperation, and addressing new hybrid security threats. If Canada does not act boldly delays could result in a critical capability gap, leaving Canada vulnerable in a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment. The global naval landscape is shifting and submarine capabilities are growing in strategic importance, necessitating making it essential for timely procurement and deployment of new submarines to secure Canada’s defence posture and to maintain its role as a reliable contributor to international security.
Photo: “A Computer Graphic Image of a Successor class submarine” (2013), via Flickr and Defence Imagery. License under C.C 4.0.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
