Nuclear deterrence theorizes that a nuclear-empowered state can deter attacks against it or its allies since a strike against them could be met with nuclear retaliation. However, doubt is cast upon the characterization of nukes as peacekeeping tools when the alleged existence of nuclear weapons is used to justify military strikes. Further, nuclear rhetoric shapes threat perceptions and undermines cooperation. This reveals a contradiction: deterrence claims nukes promote peace and stability, but the suspicion of nuclear weapons becomes a catalyst for conflict. The political existence of nuclear weapons intensifies the security dilemma and incentivizes proliferation. This directly concerns NATO, which endorses deterrence logic yet faces escalation risks from nuclear rhetoric. Reviewing tensions in deterrence emphasizes the importance of disarmament and its reframing as a collective and equal process rather than one imposed on select states.
The selective application of nuclear allegations and disarmament campaigns validates disarmament skepticism by entrenching global power dynamics. NATO is explicitly structured around nuclear deterrence, including extended deterrence arrangements from the U.S rooted in commitments from 1954. Nukes are framed as essential for NATO security but are unacceptable threats when pursued by states outside of it. This inconsistency suggests nuclear legitimacy is politically determined rather than universally applicable.
Nuclear allegations have justified pre-emptive strikes by framing attacks as defensive maneuvers necessary for security. U.S. President Donald Trump’s strikes on Iran reflect this rhetoric. Evidence and expert input indicate it is unlikely Iran has nuclear weapons or is weeks away from obtaining them, despite Trump’s claims. Iran has uranium enriched to approximately 60% while nukes require 90% enrichment. While Iranian enrichment efforts certainly exist, and Iran’s large stockpile of 60% enriched uranium could technically reach 90% enrichment, the cessation of enrichment at 60% has been interpreted as intentional signaling by Iran. Ceasing enrichment at precisely 60% communicates that Iran has pursued enrichment to the furthest extent it can without producing weapons-grade uranium. Further, maintaining enrichment capabilities and large stockpiles suggests that – while they may stop at 60% now to honor commitments – Iran is capable of nuclear armament if provoked.
Similarly, then-U.S. President Bush’s 2003 claim that “Hussein is still violating the demands of the United Nations by refusing to disarm” to justify his ‘War on Terror’ occurred 12 days after the head of the UN Special Commission on Iraq and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency reported they didn’t find evidence of alleged weapons programs.
Both cases, Trump in Iran and Bush in Iraq, use poorly substantiated nuclear allegations to justify interventions. Attacks justified by nuclear allegations undermine deterrence logic, since nukes cannot simultaneously be framed as instruments of international peace while their existence as ‘weapons of mass destruction’ serve as a catalyst for war.
The dual standard transforms disarmament from a universal goal into a selective process that enforces global power hierarchies. In this transformation, strikes and accusations claiming to promote disarmament actively undermine it by enhancing political mistrust and insecurity that incentivizes nuclear proliferation and limits diplomacy.
These ‘pre-emptive’ strikes validate concerns of targeted states regarding threats to their sovereignty by Western powers as they’re forcefully prevented from acquiring the same weapons the West has. When targeted states feel threatened, efforts to increase their own security – including by pursuing nuclear armament – are interpreted as acts of aggression which prompts retaliation, which increases the threat perception that the targeted state originally acted on. This cycle demonstrates the intensification of the security dilemma. Further, the cycle reduces capacity for meaningful diplomacy, and the credibility and durability of treaties are limited by states’ mutual distrust.
Nuclear rhetoric to justify or enable questionable political and military actions has also been demonstrated by Israel and Russia. Israel has long framed Iran’s nuclear ambitions as an existential threat to garner American support and execute domestic political maneuvers to continue operations in, or neglect commitments to, Palestine and the West Bank. For NATO, this means America is drawn into regional conflicts that pose escalation risks without consensus from, or clarity on expectations for, allied states. Turkey is put in a particularly difficult position – albeit potentially one of opportunity for mediation – as its regional interests and alliance commitments conflict. Further, America being drawn to war in the Middle East may decrease its capacity to allocate resources to Ukraine, thereby increasing Europe’s need to provide aid to Ukraine.
Additionally, Russia has deployed nuclear rhetoric throughout the war on Ukraine, recently accusing the UK and France of planning to provide nuclear arms to Ukraine to obscure its role as the aggressor in its prolonged illegal full-scale invasion. Russian claims that Ukraine is building a “dirty bomb”, widely dismissed as false, further illustrate how nuclear claims can be used to construct pre-emptive justifications for military or political action (e.g., updated nuclear doctrine lowering thresholds to permit nuke deployment). These nuclear claims have undermined global peace and collaboration by enabling and escalating non-peaceful political and military actions in Ukraine. While the most important actors to consider amidst Russian escalation and attacks in Ukraine are Ukrainians, Russian rhetoric and escalation also have several implications for NATO. First, disinformation undermines a collective, truthful understanding of the war, which disables citizens’ – and policymakers’ – abilities to make relevant political demands. Second, decreased Russian nuclear thresholds incentivize the creation or expansion ofNATO states’ nuclear programs and the reduction of nuclear use-thresholds to match the nuclear capability and willingness of Russia. Third, as NATO claims the future of Ukraine is in NATO, allied states are inclined to supportUkraine to secure the safety of a strategic ally (i.e., geographical buffering between Europe and Russia), but also to signal to other Eastern states that their potential alliance with NATO would be met with support, even in the face of Russian aggression. Fourth, the escalation and continuation of violence in Ukraine poses security and posturing threats to neighboring NATO states (e.g., Russia violating Polish airspace) and increases resources expensed to support Ukraine. More broadly, the ability to make nuclear claims de-incentivizes disarmament by enabling states to manufacture self-serving crises and undermining the mutual trust necessary for successful disarmament agreements.
Ultimately, nuclear allegations and rhetoric undermine nuclear weapons supposedly stabilizing function. Nuclear politicization enables allegations of nuclear programs to justify intervention, and the selective approach to disarmament worsens the conditions, incentivizing armament and undermining collaboration. Insofar as nukes are considered legitimate security tools by NATO and its allies, but treated as unacceptable elsewhere, disarmament efforts will likely continue to be interpreted as disingenuous. Recent U.S. strikes on Iran demonstrate the instability of deterrence in practice as they contribute to growing uncertainty over the credibility of the U.S.’ extended deterrence commitments. Since, when strikes are based on contested claims and executed as unilateral action, they risk sparking mistrust even amongst allies. The legitimacy of deterrence ought to be critically reflected upon as NATO confronts the limits of the contradictory framing of nukes as peace-keeping tools and weapons of mass destruction. Broadly, the perception of nuclear weaponry must shift from an exclusive security tool to the source of suffering and a barrier to peace, undermining human security rather than promoting state security. Disarmament ought to be reframed as a collective and equal process rather than one imposed on select states.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons
