Since the early 1950s, Canada has consistently deployed elements of the Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in support of NATO operations. All military acts, be they waging war or preparing for it, are in furtherance of political objectives. In this vein, Canadian force commitments to NATO – both actual and those earmarked for planning purposes – have historically fluctuated due to three dominant factors: changes in political leadership’s perceptions of international threats (accompanied by corresponding increases and decreases in defence spending); allied pressure encouraging increased force commitments; and the conviction that reducing commitments would lead to a corresponding loss of influence with NATO allies. These factors underpin Canada’s military contributions to the alliance today and will continue to do so in the future. Indeed, given the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, a weakening American commitment to NATO, and a shift in Canadian policy to lessen the country’s reliance on the United States, the consistently-held motivations underlying the country’s active participation within NATO are set to endure. The paragraphs below elaborate on this theme by placing Canada’s historical and present-day force contributions to NATO in context, all with the aim of understanding how – and more importantly, why – Canada should expand its NATO deployments.
After the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the result of negotiations in which Canadian diplomats played a leading role, the country’s political leadership was initially hesitant about sending Canadian forces back to Europe. In fact, the consensus amongst NATO’s twelve founding member-states in 1949-50 militated against establishing forces-in-being in Europe. As Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky note in Canada in NATO: 1949-2019, “The working model for a security crisis in Europe was still largely that of World Wars I and II: there would be a mobilizing response when called for, especially, as the treaty spelled out, when a member was attacked” (Jockel and Sokolsky, 32). There was also a corresponding belief within Canadian circles that NATO actually allowed for decreased defence spending, given that the alliance’s twelve members would be pooling their resources and capabilities (Jockel and Sokolsky, 33). These assumptions were upended as the Soviet Union’s August 1949 atomic weapons test, communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 led to increased western perceptions of a looming great-power conflict.
Concerned that the Korean War was a communist strategic feint and a prelude to Soviet aggression in Europe, and coupled with the fact that despite American nuclear superiority, the United States did not have sufficient weapons stockpiles nor the delivery systems to convincingly deter the Soviets from sending the Red Army into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany, still occupied by the French, British, and Americans at the time), NATO military planners sought commitments from member-states to bolster conventional deterrence in Europe through standing force deployments. After much internal debate fueled by pressure from allies and centred on considerations of Canada’s standing within the alliance, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent opted to send a Canadian Army infantry brigade group (27 Canadian Infantry Brigade) and an RCAF air division (No. 1 Air Division) to Europe (Maloney, 21 and Bercuson, 124).
NATO had asked Canada for more. As military historian Sean Maloney points out, in the summer of 1951 NATO planners requested that Canada deploy two full Canadian Army divisions, a commitment that, given Canada’s resources and ongoing commitments in Korea and for North American defence, was tantamount to increasing the Army’s size by five times its post-Second World War demobilization strength (Maloney, 20). In the end, the Canadian Army brigade group coupled with the RCAF’s No. 1 Air Division was accepted by NATO staff, with the provision that in the event of hostilities with the Soviet Union, Canada would send two more brigades, thus increasing the Canadian deployment to a full division in wartime (Maloney, 20). There was a naval component to Canada’s initial NATO contributions as well. It was expected that in any war, the Soviets would wage an anti-shipping campaign in the North Atlantic Ocean much as the defeated Germans had done. To help counter this anticipated threat, the RCN intended to reprise its wartime role in the North Atlantic as an anti-submarine, convoy-escort force (Milner, 205).
With land and air forces permanently deployed in Europe and naval forces earmarked for training missions and wartime deployment in the North Atlantic, Canada’s force commitments to NATO generally remained consistent during the 1950-60s, until another drastic change in the assumptions held by the country’s political leadership led to a significant reduction in Canadian NATO deployments.
The tumult of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s early tenure, wherein Canada’s military – and seemingly political – commitment to NATO decreased, was fueled in part by the Prime Minister’s desire to decrease defence spending, but also an updated assessment of the international situation and Canada’s place within it. In the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, relations between the United States and Soviet Union were defined by the spirit of détente, wherein the superpowers sought a decrease in bilateral tensions through increased consultation, accommodation, and missile reduction negotiations. Certain members of the Trudeau government viewed détente as the beginning of a permanent re-ordering of the international system away from the tensions of the early Cold War, thus reducing the need for Canadian troops in Europe and allowing for a more independent foreign policy. The Prime Minister also held the conviction that NATO’s European member-states were capable of defending themselves without Canadian forces (Chapnick and McKercher, 135), an opinion that was hardened by the European Economic Community’s (EEC, the precursor to the European Union) protectionist trade practices against Canadian agricultural exports (Bothwell, 286).
After much internal debate, the Trudeau government significantly reduced Canadian capabilities under NATO command, including slashing the authorized strength of the Army’s NATO brigade from 6,000 personnel down to a meagre 2,800 (Maloney, 236). Not only were such reductions politically sensitive within the alliance context, but it should also be noted that during the Canadian Army’s approximately twenty years of deployment within the FRG, Canada’s allies had come to value the operational role filled by the brigade. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the time, United States Army General Andrew Goodpaster, noted that the Canadian brigade “is one of the most effective army formations in ACE [Allied Command Europe] … SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] strongly supports the retention of the present Canadian contribution in Europe … Canadian land and air components play an important part in the defence of NATO and consequently of North America and Canada. There is no military justification for further reduction” (Maloney, 236).
Despite the operational value of Canada’s comparatively small contribution to European defence, the political consequences of Trudeau’s reductions were arguably more significant for Canadian interests and highlight the enduring reputational and political motivations behind Canada’s force commitments to NATO. The withdrawal of Canadian personnel stoked fears within European circles that this was merely a first step before American forces were also withdrawn. Indeed, as Mitchell Sharp, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), remarked in April 1973, “the continued presence of Canadian forces has important political overtones. It is evident that Canada’s forces in Europe do not play a critical part in the overall strategic equation. However, as a symbol of the credibility of the North American commitment, they remain very important from a political standpoint” (Jockel and Sokolsky, 125). More important for immediate Canadian interests were the connections drawn between the country’s decreasing NATO commitments and European trade relations. Although FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt did not explicitly link Canada’s standing force deployments with the potential success (or lack thereof) of Canada improving its trade relations with the EEC, this connection was hinted at, and Schmidt highlighted to Prime Minister Trudeau the public relations value of Europeans, and West Germans in particular, seeing Canadian forces deployed on the ground, ready to participate in NATO’s collective defence. SSEA Sharp certainly recognized an implicit connection. Desirous to lessen Canada’s economic and political overreliance on the United States as the Nixon Administration temporarily levied a surcharge on imports (Chapnick and McKercher, 128), SSEA Sharp remarked at the time that “As you know, Canada is making a special effort to develop a satisfactory relationship with the new enlarged European Economic Community. To the extent that we can continue to play a positive and constructive role in NATO, I am convinced that our participation in the alliance cannot but assist us in establishing a good working relationship with the EEC” (Jockel and Sokolsky, 130).
With the political winds in Ottawa blowing towards improving Canada’s standing with European allies, and coupled with the collapse of détente in the late 1970s, Canada’s force commitments to NATO received a boost in late Trudeau era, although the country’s commitments never returned to their early Cold War-era levels. Roughly a decade later, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Canadian Army and RCAF deployments in central Europe formally concluded in August 1993, when the NATO brigade returned to Canada.
Although the great-power threat to Canada had disappeared, Canada continued to contribute to NATO operations during the 1990’s and 2000’s, with these commitments arguably fueled by alliance politics more so than ever. Encouraged by a desire to demonstrate Canadian resolve, but also motivated by an ideological commitment to the rules-based international order that defined the age of the Pax Americana, Canada participated in NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, including contributing more than 1,000 personnel to NATO’s Implementation Force in Bosnia (later renamed Stabilization Force), sending 18 aircraft and launching 10 percent of NATO’s sorties against Serbian forces during the 1999 air campaign, and contributing 1,400 troops to NATO’s Kosovo Force (Jockel and Sokolsky, 182-184, 186).
The 9/11 terrorist attacks undoubtedly increased political leadership’s perception of international threats, and Canada famously contributed personnel to NATO’s operations in Afghanistan, including contributing troops for operations in Kabul and assuming command of the International Security Assistance Force for six months in 2004. In 2005-06, Canada then deployed roughly 1,900 Canadian Army personnel to Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, which took the form of a combined-arms battlegroup and a provincial reconstruction team to spur development efforts. Though Canada’s assumption of operational leadership positions and troop deployments to Afghanistan did not bear fruit in terms of creating a democratic, stable Afghanistan in the long-term, what was arguably the more enduring goal behind Canada’s force commitments – a demonstration of the country’s resolve to be an active member of NATO and bear the appropriate burdens – was achieved. Indeed, Jockel and Sokolsky note that even Canada jumped onto the bandwagon of criticizing smaller allies for not assuming greater responsibilities within Afghanistan, with the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence noting in 2007 that “Some NATO allies (other than the U.S., the U.K. and the Netherlands) have shown themselves to be unwilling to serve on the battlefield in Afghanistan … Some of our allies are doing a lot of saluting, but not marching” (Jockel and Sokolsky, 191).
After the Afghanistan mission ended in 2014, Canada’s political leadership continued to prioritize force contributions to alliance operations. The RCAF conducted roughly 10 percent of NATO’s airstrikes in Libya in 2011, and between October 2014 and February 2016, 6 RCAF CF-18s launched 1,378 sorties against Islamic State targets in Iraq and Syria. Even after Prime Minister Justin Trudeau withdrew the CF-18s from the operation, the number of Canadian personnel in Iraq actually increased as the CAF took on more logistics responsibilities and training duties with Iraqi forces (Jockel and Sokolsky, 211, 225-226).
At the time of this writing, Canada continues to contribute forces-in-being and participates in a variety of non-combat logistics and training programs to bolster the collective defence of NATO member-states and its strategic partners. Before considering these present-day contributions, it is important to contextualize them given the CAF’s ongoing challenges with recruitment, retention, and major shortages of trained personnel – not to mention lackluster defence spending levels.
As of 31 January 2024, the Trained Effective Strength of the CAF (meaning those CAF members sufficiently trained and qualified in their respective combat and non-combat trades), numbers 52,835 Regular Force and 22,024 Reserve Force personnel. Broken down by armed service, the Canadian Army’s regular force numbers 28,624, while the Army’s primary reserve sits at 16,817 personnel. The RCN has a total of 8,561 regular force personnel, with 3,045 in its primary reserve. Figures for the RCAF stand at 15,650 personnel with an additional 2,162 reservists.
A comparison of these figures with the CAF’s authorized strength of 71,500 for the Regular Force and 30,000 Reserve Force members highlights the CAF’s broad personnel challenges. Indeed, even if the CAF’s total strength as of 31 January 2024 is taken into account, which includes personnel not at their ‘Operational Functional Point’ and ready for deployment if necessary, Canada’s military has a shortfall of 15,500 personnel. When comparing these figures to the fact that at its peak, Canadian Army and RCAF strength in central Europe in the pre-Pierre Trudeau era peaked at roughly 10,000 personnel, the inability of Canada to embark upon a similar level of commitment at the present becomes clear.
Despite its limited capabilities, the CAF still manages to fulfill several important roles within NATO. For example, as of April 2025, the CAF has deployed approximately 1,900 members annually to assist in Operation Reassurance—the largest overseas mission the CAF participates in. Launched in 2014 after Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, Operation Reassurance represents Canada’s contribution to the largest reinforcement of NATO collective defence in Europe since the Cold War. As part of Operation Reassurance, Canada serves as the Framework Nation for NATO’s multinational brigade in Latvia, with roughly 1,900 CAF personnel rotating through the country every year; this number is set to increase to 2,200 by 2026. By serving as one of four Framework Nations alongside Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Canada has taken on an important leadership role that has produced positive reputational benefits with Latvia in particular.
The CAF’s present-day NATO contributions extend to the sea and air domains as well. The RCN actively participates in the multinational Standing NATO Maritime Groups, comprised of SNMG1 and SNMG2. Canada has contributed to both groups and recently led SNMG2 before transferring command to the Turkish military in December 2024. RCN vessels earmarked for NATO provide a variety of military combat and support functions, and naturally contribute to promoting the image of solidarity amongst NATO member-states. Additionally, in September 2022, the RCAF established Air Task Force Prestwick, based at Glasgow Prestwick Airport in Scotland, to serve as a key logistics hub supporting NATO operations and facilitating aid deliveries to Ukraine. At present, this team includes three Hercules transport aircraft as well as larger RCAF CC-177 Globemaster III cargo jets to provide military and humanitarian support to Ukraine, and transported over 20 million pounds of goods by the end of 2023.
Despite these responsibilities undertaken at a time of serious manpower and material deficits for the CAF, Canada’s commitment to NATO has consistently come under criticism from allies for failing to meet the 2 percent of GDP defence spending goal, first articulated in 2006 and later formally pledged in 2014 in the wake of Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine. Despite arguments presented by Canadian leaders that defence-spending levels are not fully representative of Canada’s contributions to NATO, the 2 percent pledge is the highest-profile measure of member-states’ commitments to the alliance at the present time.
Although Canada has historically and presently fills valuable operational roles within the alliance, Canada’s commitments – be they the Cold War-era brigade in the FRG or present-day naval patrols in the Mediterranean – could reasonably be taken on by NATO’s larger member-states. This reality, however, does not mean that Canadian contributions are not worth keeping. Given today’s increasingly unstable international system where long-held economic, political, and military relationships are being broken and reforged, the expansion of Canada’s actual and planned force commitments to NATO is arguably more important than at any other point since 1949.
Canadian commitments have historically increased at moments of particularly high levels of international tension. Given Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, its grey zone attacks on member-states, and extreme uncertainty regarding the United States’ military and political commitment to NATO, the moment is ripe for Canada to significantly enhance its contributions to allied security. Not only can the CAF play a more important role in deterring Soviet conventional action in eastern Europe if the country’s political leadership chooses to do so – thus alleviating certain burdens from other allies – but more importantly, increased deployments will be of major symbolic value. In the event the Trump Administration reduces its force levels in Europe or withdraws altogether – which is a very realistic possibility – European allies will require substantially more forces to fill gaps left by the Americans. It is in Canada’s interests to develop capabilities today to rapidly fill those gaps should they arise.
Aside from an increasingly unstable international system, Canada’s ongoing transition away from over-reliance on the United States will be well-served by increased defence spending levels and greater contributions to European security. As Prime Minister Mark Carney has stated, the previous era of Canadian attachment to the United States cannot continue. Given the Trump administration’s tariffs and vocalized threats to Canadian sovereignty, Canada is currently in the opening stages of a pivot away from the United States and back towards Europe, a reversal of the America-focused trend begun in the era of the world wars. Canada is looking to bolster its European connections and develop increased economic ties with European partners, most of whom are leading NATO member-states. As we have seen with the example of Pierre Trudeau’s cuts to Canadian deployments during the Cold War, although there is no explicit connection between Canadian force commitments and trade relations, an implicit relationship has existed in the past and undoubtedly continues today. Increased willingness to bear costs on Canada’s part can do much to symbolically demonstrate Canada’s seriousness and help produce tangible economic and political benefits. More commitment to NATO’s collective defence can only help, not hinder, the new government’s intended trajectory away from over-reliance on the United States.
Before Canada can muster the additional capabilities needed to enhance its operational role in Europe, defence spending needs to be substantially and rapidly increased, no matter the short-term inefficiencies or bureaucratic waste that may accrue from such a policy. As close observers will have noted, despite Canada’s sacrifices in Afghanistan and ongoing deployments in Europe, defence-spending levels are currently the primary indicator of member-states’ commitment to NATO to both American and European audiences. Considering that Canada’s ultimate political objective should be to grow its relationships with European member-states, increasing defence spending and rectifying the CAF’s ongoing recruitment and retention difficulties is the first step in pursuit of this goal. Increasing the country’s defence spending levels is the keystone in the entire arch of Canada’s policy towards NATO. Doing so will not only result in immediate political and reputational gains with NATO allies, but this step is necessary if the country’s political leadership chooses to take on greater operational responsibilities.
Once increased defence spending levels take effect and bear fruit, Canada thankfully has a plethora of historical examples and current deployments to guide deliberations on how the CAF can contribute more to NATO’s collective defence. In any future conflict with Russia, the RCN will be needed for convoy-escort and anti-submarine operations. RCAF pilots will be a welcome addition to the fight for air superiority over a Baltic battlefield on which Canadian Army personnel are fighting to keep Russian brigades from occupying Latvia, and Canadian personnel in western Europe will be needed to move supplies to the front lines and help train allied forces to the highest standards possible. Even if these scenarios do not take place and Russia is deterred in perpetuity, an increased CAF presence across Europe will help alleviate burdens from allies and can only help showcase Canada as a sovereign, independent, and valuable international actor.
Photo: A Canadian Leopard 1 tank in Kingston, Ontario (2011) by Skaarup.HA via Wikipedia Commons.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
