For centuries, Türkiye has been a major player in the West’s economic, security, and international trade strategies. This has allowed Turkish governments to continue organized and popular discrimination and oppression against Armenians in Turkiye, which began before the Armenian Genocide of 1915 which Türkiye’s official position is to deny. Currently, an iteration of this situation is playing out in relation to NATO, which may put Türkiye in the surprising position of being a protector to Armenia and Armenia’s long-time patron Russia as the hostile actor.
In both 2007 and 2020, the Armenian government published security memoranda detailing their country’s biggest security challenges, and how to respond to them. Both documents identified the country’s most pressing challenges as regional territorial conflicts and violations of sovereignty. While the Russian-Ukrainian wars of 2014 and 2022, the Russo-Georgian 2006 war, and subsequent frozen conflict are obvious threats, the Azeri invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupation of some nearby Armenian villages beginning in 2020 were identified as the most immediate concerns. Indeed, Armenia considers these Azeri acts a direct threat to its territorial integrity and possibly even to its national survival. Both memos detail the Armenian security establishment’s plans to protect itself in the face of these challenges through participating in global treaty mechanisms.
Initially, Armenia’s aim for international protection came from long-established historic ties, allying itself entirely with Russia. However, Russia perpetrated two invasions of regional neighbors. As well, Russia refused to support Armenia when Azerbaijan invaded, backed by Türkiye. This led the Armenian government to reevaluate this strategy and seek a new treaty-defined relationship with Europe, instead of one with Russia based on historical ties. For example, beginning in 2020, Armenia has sought to participate in the EU-led infrastructure programs of TRASSECA and INNOGATE.
In 2024, leaked documents revealed Belarus played an important role in facilitating Azerbaijan’s 2020 invasion of Armenia. Many of the artillery and drones used by Azerbaijan in the incursion were sold to them by Belarus in secret, a transaction facilitated by the Kremlin. This ran directly counter to treaty guarantees that should have protected Armenia’s interests. At the time, both Armenia and Belarus were members of the CSTO Group (Collective Security Treaty Organization) formed in 2002 as Vladimir Putin’s rival to NATO. Following this disclosure, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced Armenia’s intention to withdraw from the CSTO.
Although sufficient in itself, Russia’s betrayal over Nagorno-Karabakh was not the sole reason for the change in Armenian policy. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Prime Minister Pashinyan declared Armenia’s intention to “diversify our security sector” away from Russia. He characterized the country’s objective as maintaining relations with Russia without identifying it as an “ally”. His position was that Armenia should expand upon its current domestic political, economic, and national security cooperation with NATO without actually joining it. Most of Armenia’s security establishment shares this view. NATO membership would not be possible for Armenia for one inescapable structural reason: it depends on Russia to transport volumes of international trade, which Russia would undoubtedly block should Armenia officially join NATO.
Türkiye plays an outsized role in determining Central Asian security policy, both because of its NATO veto power and its military presence in all nearby territories. Therefore an establishment of relations between Armenia and Türkiye is essential for Armenia. Despite domestic nationalist backlash, Pashinyan’s government has pursued this. Surprisingly, Armenia’s defeat by Türkiye -backed Azerbaijan in 2020 has increased both parties’ willingness to establish such ties. Since 1992 Türkiye had made any possibility of normalization with Armenia contingent on Armenia “returning” Azerbaijan’s so-called lost territories. Since Azerbaijan conquered them in 2020, Türkiye has dropped this condition without imposing any others. A renewed relationship between Türkiye and Armenia that is at least amicable, and primarily on Türkiye terms, is far more important to Armenian than Turkish security.
In 2021, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appointed the Turkish foreign minister and Pashinyan appointed the speaker of the Armenian parliament as leaders of negotiation teams. As of 2022, the two agreed to open the Turkish-Armenia border to trade. Pashinyan’s domestic anti-corruption reforms increased tensions with the Kremlin. When Putin sought to use Russian assets in Armenia, as well as propaganda and financial incentives to remove Pashinyan, Erdogan provided financial ties and authorized diplomatic efforts to buttress his domestic position.
The benefits to Armenia of closer ties with NATO are clear. But NATO has a lot to gain as well. Armenia represents a new ally strategically located next to two regions of high global concern: the Middle East and the South Caucasus. It has strong social, economic, and political relations with two hostile powers: Russia and Iran. In an era of renewed competition between major powers, a new NATO ally so closely linked to one of their biggest enemy regimes would provide great strategic value. Further, NATO and its leading Western members would benefit from the new intelligence opportunities this would provide and increased access to domestic political infrastructure in Iran and Russia. NATO currently provides “advice and assistance” to Armenia in internal democratic, institutional, and defense policy as well as as well as informational and infrastructural support for internal security, battling corruption, and maintaining the rule of law. As far back as 1994, NATO set up a team to help Armenia introduce civilian control of its defense ministry. This initiative has largely been successful.
Given recent regional events, Armenia’s primary security objective is to protect its sovereignty through treaties and other cooperative agreements. Arguably, what would best satisfy all interested parties is an agreement between NATO and Armenia which Türkiye supports. This would both recognize Azeri control over the occupied territory, owing to realpolitik necessity alone and commit NATO to use economic, diplomatic, or other means to protect Armenia’s further territorial integrity. What it should avoid is seeking a complete rupture between Armenia and Russia’s economic and security web. If this balancing act could be achieved – which is no easy task – it would address Armenia’s pressing security needs and interests and significantly strengthen NATO’s role and resources in the region.
Photo: “Inauguration de la plaqué mémorielle du génocide arménien, Place d’Arménien, à Saint-Maurice-de-Beynost. Inauguration of the memorial plaque of the Armenian genocide in Saint-Maurive-de-Beynost.” (2015), by Benoit Prieur via Picryl.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
