The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has recently endorsed its first ever Commercial Space Strategy, acknowledging a new reality: no government can match the speed and massive scale of the private space sector. Today, NATO is increasingly relying on private satellite companies to support core military space functions, yet NATO has acknowledged that commercial engagement varies significantly across member states; this inconsistency raises questions about coherence in how private firms are vetted and space technologies moves between NATO members. Canada is home to firms well-positioned to meet NATO’s emerging requirements. This article argues that Canada should modernize its space governance framework through updated export controls, a dedicated space security policy and formalized NATO partnerships. With these policy reforms, Canadian firms like MDA Space and Telesat can position themselves as foundational contributors to NATO’s emerging commercial space architecture as it is being built. At the same time, the federal government can leverage that industrial presence to shape the governance norms on vetting, technology transfer and procurement standards that will define NATO’s commercial space architecture moving forward.
Space security has become as strategically vital to conventional defence as land, sea, or air. At the 2019 Leaders’ Meeting in London, NATO member states declared space a fifth operational domain alongside air, land, maritime and cyberspace. Space provides NATO’s ability to navigate and track forces, maintain sturdy communications, detect missile launches and ensure effective command and control. Yet the domain is increasingly threatened. Adversaries are developing and operationalizing counter-space technologies that could threaten member states’ access to and freedom to operate in space. As government space programs struggle to keep pace with the speed of technological change, NATO and its allies have turned to the commercial sector to fill critical capability gaps, and avoid costly duplication between public and private space investments, making the governance of that commercial relationship a matter of NATO-wide security.
In the opening hours of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a cyber attack disabled Ukraine’s Viasat satellite network, disrupting military communications; SpaceX responded within days by delivering Starlink terminals that restored battlefield connectivity and became central to Ukraine’s “command and control”. As analysts have discussed, the situation in Ukraine demonstrated how commercial satellite constellations can provide a “strategic advantage” during modern warfare. To harness this innovation, NATO launched SPACENET, a dedicated network designed to connect space industry experts directly with military planners. However, while the strategy is clear, the governance is not. NATO currently faces a “coherence” gap, where each member state manages its own commercial relationships and security vetting through different national frameworks. This lack of consistent ruling for technology sharing risks creating vulnerabilities: a commercial vendor vetted under one member state’s framework may not meet another’s security standards, while inconsistent export controls could expose sensitive satellite technology to adversaries. According to the NATO 2030 Young Leaders Report, until NATO and its members align their policies, the integration of these private assets might remain fragmented which risks undermining the interoperability that collective defence depends on.
Canada possesses a circumscribed but globally competitive space industry that, while lacking independent launch capability, is well-positioned to meet NATO’s commercial space requirements in radar, robotics and satellite communications. MDA Space, a long-time pioneer in space robotics, continues to lead in radar technology with its RADARSAT Constellation, which provides essential maritime surveillance and disaster management data. In late 2025, the Canadian Space Agency recognized this leadership by awarding MDA a contract for a replenishment satellite to ensure continuity of these vital radar services. Another key Canadian space company is Telesat, which is one of the world’s most notable commercial satellite operators. In December 2025, Canada announced a strategic partnership with Telesat and MDA Space to deliver the Enhanced Satellite Communications Project – Polar. This project will provide the Canadian Armed Forces with secure, high-speed Arctic communications, a capability that is also a top priority for NATO’s “Northlink” initiative: a framework aimed at strengthening NATO communications and surveillance infrastructure across the Arctic. Despite these national leaders, Canada lacks a comprehensive space security strategy that explicitly positions these companies as formal NATO suppliers. A dedicated framework would build on these existing international ties, formalizing Canadian industry’s role within NATO’s commercial space architecture and expanding the share of allied defence demand that firms like MDA and Telesat are positioned to capture.
This article argues that closing this framework gap requires deliberate policy action. To transition from a passive beneficiary of space data to an active shaper of NATO security, Canada should adopt the following three policy reforms.
First, Canada should develop a national space security policy that explicitly ties domestic industry to NATO’s goal of interoperability. While the “Our North, Strong and Free” defence policy correctly identifies space as an “integral domain” for modern defence, it stops short of creating a roadmap for how Canadian companies can serve as pre-positioned, dual-use contributors to NATO’s space architecture — ensuring that both the orbital infrastructure and the ground segment needed to activate it are integrated into allied systems before a crisis emerges, rather than improvised under operational pressure. A dedicated policy could provide the Canadian space industry with clarity to invest in NATO-standard technologies from the outset.
Second, the federal government should modernize export control rules under the Export and Import Permits Act. Canada’s current and recently expanded Export Control list, under Item 5506, applied new strategic technology controls to “all destinations except the United States,” meaning NATO allies face the same regulatory barriers as non-allied states; this framework was not designed with intra-alliance commercial space cooperation in mind. Updating the Export Control List to account for shared commercial-defence technologies within NATO could close that gap and ensure that Canadian space firms can rapidly export the very sensors and communications tools that NATO is currently seeking.
Third, Canada should pursue a formalized leadership role in NATO’s commercial space partnership frameworks, building on Canada’s existing integration into NATO agencies like the NATO Communications and Information Agency and seeking an agenda-setting role that active institutional participation can unravel over time. A Canada-designed framework, if adopted alliance-wide, would embed Canadian vetting standards into NATO’s commercial space architecture, ensuring that firms building to Canadian standards are structurally advantaged in allied procurement from the start. Early Canadian leadership here would position firms like MDA and Telesat as pre-vetted, preferred suppliers as NATO’s commercial space demand grows, creating long-term tailwinds for Canadian industries seeking to benefit most from NATO’s commercial space demand.
For decades, Canada has been a quiet consumer of allied space infrastructure. The norms governing the commercialization of military space are now being written in real time, and the window for Canada to shape them is open. Converting industrial strength into strategic influence requires three reforms this article has outlined: modernizing export controls under the Export and Import Permits Act; establishing a national space security policy that formally positions Canadian firms as alliance suppliers; and seeking an agenda setting role in NATO’s emerging commercial space governance structures. Acting now gives Canada an opportunity to ensure its robust space industry becomes an essential component of NATO security for the next generation.
Photo: Licensing: Artist’s concept of the GHGSat-C10 (Vanguard) satellite in orbit. (Credit: GHGSat), via https://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/multimedia/search/image/19462
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
