Centre For Disinformation Studies Tisya Raina

Canada’s Struggle to Combat Information Disorder


In an age where digital information disorder spreads faster than ever, Canada faces mounting challenges in regulating the flow of misleading content. As a NATO member, its battle against MDM (misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation) is not just a domestic issue—it is an integral part of the alliance’s broader efforts to combat hybrid warfare. The struggle to strike a balance between free speech and national security underscores the growing complexity of information disorder governance across NATO states. As adversarial states continue to weaponize false narratives to destabilize democratic institutions, NATO members, including Canada, must adapt their policies to safeguard information integrity and national security.

Canada’s Legal Efforts to Tackle the Information Disorder

Canada has taken steps to combat MDM,through a patchwork of legal provisions but significant gaps remain. Canada’s regulatory landscape is constrained by constitutional protections for free expression. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms enshrines free speech, making it difficult to implement sweeping MDM  laws without risking overreach. Historically, Canada attempted to regulate false information through the Criminal Code, which once included a provision criminalizing the deliberate spread of false news. However, this provision was struck down in R. v. Zundel (1992) as unconstitutional. While hate speech laws under the Criminal Code still exist, they do not fully address the broader issue of the information disorder.

Other legal tools have been employed to address MDM, but their effectiveness remains limited. The Competition Act targets false advertising but does not extend to political or ideological misinformation. The Canada Elections Act criminalizes deliberate misinformation about political candidates but only applies during election periods. The Broadcasting Act mandates balance in media reporting but does not regulate digital platforms, which serve as the primary vectors of misinformation today. The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) oversees traditional broadcasters but lacks authority over online platforms. Consequently, MDM on social media remains largely unregulated, allowing hostile actors to exploit these platforms to manipulate public discourse.

The NATO Context: Information Disorder as a Security Threat

For NATO, MDM is not merely a nuisance—it is a strategic threat that undermines democratic stability and erodes public trust in institutions. Adversarial states and non-state actors have weaponized false narratives to exploit social divisions, weaken alliances, and manipulate public perception. These efforts target elections, military operations, and global crises, shaping narratives that distort reality and challenge democratic resilience.

Canada, alongside its NATO partners, has faced sustained disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining its credibility on the world stage. Its military presence in Eastern Europe has been a frequent target, with misleading narratives attempting to delegitimize Canada’s role in NATO-led operations. For instance, Russian-linked disinformation campaigns have falsely accused Canada troops stationed in Latvia of committing human rights violations, seemingly aiming to erode support for NATO’s presence in the region. Similarly, misinformation surrounding Canada’s military assistance to Ukraine has included fabricated claims that Canadian-supplied weapons are being diverted to extremist groups. Additionally, narratives questioning the legitimacy of NATO exercises, such as Operation REASSURANCE, have been circulated to portray Canada’s military deployments as provocative rather than defensive. These disinformation efforts not only attempt to weaken Canada’s standing within NATO but also influence domestic public opinion, fostering skepticism about the country’s international commitments and defense policies.

To counter these threats, NATO has established key initiatives, including:

While Canada plays an active role in these initiatives, its domestic legal framework has yet to align fully with NATO’s strategic approach. The European Union has introduced the Digital Services Act, which holds tech platforms accountable for addressing harmful content, including disinformation. Canada, however, has not yet implemented comparable legislation, leaving it vulnerable to coordinated foreign disinformation efforts.

Challenges in Regulating the Information Space

Despite recognizing the urgency of MDM  threats, Canada faces several obstacles. One major challenge is jurisdictional limitations, as social media platforms operate globally, making it difficult for Canada to enforce domestic regulations. Many of these platforms are based in the United States and are governed by U.S. laws, limiting Canada’s ability to hold them accountable Additionally, algorithmic amplification poses a significant risk with opaque recommendation algorithms prioritizing engagement over accuracy, amplifying sensationalist misinformation. Without transparency measures in place, these algorithms will continue to facilitate the rapid spread of false information. Another critical concern is balancing free speech and regulation– overregulation risks infringing on free expression, while underregulation allows harmful narratives to flourish. Striking the right balance is crucial for any legislative effort. Furthermore, public digital literacy remains an area of concern. While NATO and Canada recognize the importance of educating citizens to identify MDM, digital literacy initiatives remain underfunded. Without comprehensive public education efforts, the information disorder will continue to shape public opinion and influence policy debates.

The Importance of Policy and Regulatory Changes

A comprehensive regulatory approach is necessary for Canada to address the growing threat of MDM. Implementing a Digital Services Act would hold tech companies accountable by mandating transparency in content moderation and algorithmic decision-making, thereby curbing the spread of false information online. At the same time, enhancing cyber resilience through deeper NATO cooperation is crucial; Canada must strengthen intelligence-sharing mechanisms with NATO allies to track and counter foreign disinformation campaigns. Collaboration with organizations such as the CCDCOE and StratCom COE would improve Canada’s ability to detect and mitigate emerging threats. Equally important is promoting media literacy and public awareness—expanding digital literacy initiatives in schools and public institutions will equip Canadians with the critical thinking skills necessary to assess information sources effectively. 

Establishing public-private partnerships could help fund and implement large-scale educational programs aimed at fostering a more informed citizenry. Additionally, demanding algorithmic transparency is essential; Canada should work with international partners to push for greater openness in social media recommendation systems, ensuring companies disclose how their algorithms prioritize content. This would enable researchers and regulators to identify and address patterns of MDM amplification. Finally, reforming the Broadcasting Act to include digital platforms would allow the Canadian CRTC to extend misinformation-related regulations beyond traditional media, ensuring that online platforms are held to the same standards of accountability.

As NATO deepens its focus on information security, Canada must refine its approach to combatting MDM. A national strategy that integrates domestic policy reforms with NATO’s broader initiatives is necessary to address both foreign and domestic disinformation threats. By implementing stronger regulatory measures, enhancing digital literacy, and collaborating with NATO partners, Canada can play a leading role in protecting democratic institutions from the harmful effects of information disorder.


Photo: Misinformation (2011) via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-ND 2.0.

Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada

Author

  • Tisya Raina is a University of Toronto student studying Peace, Conflict & Justice. With an interest in the legal landscape surrounding information disorder regulation in Canada and globally, Tisya has conducted extensive research on the legal challenges posed by the proliferation of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation, aiming to inform policy development. Tisya has also served as the Co-Chair of Executive Summit Studies at the G20 Research Group, the world's leading independent source of analysis on the G20 Summits. She has attended the 2023 G20 New Delhi Summit in India and the 2024 G7 Apulia Summit in Italy, where she presented research highlighting the urgent need for action against the information disorder to global leaders and media. Furthermore, as a Researcher for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, she is on a team developing an index to assess global refugee education accommodation, a brief of which is in press.

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Tisya Raina
Tisya Raina is a University of Toronto student studying Peace, Conflict & Justice. With an interest in the legal landscape surrounding information disorder regulation in Canada and globally, Tisya has conducted extensive research on the legal challenges posed by the proliferation of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation, aiming to inform policy development. Tisya has also served as the Co-Chair of Executive Summit Studies at the G20 Research Group, the world's leading independent source of analysis on the G20 Summits. She has attended the 2023 G20 New Delhi Summit in India and the 2024 G7 Apulia Summit in Italy, where she presented research highlighting the urgent need for action against the information disorder to global leaders and media. Furthermore, as a Researcher for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, she is on a team developing an index to assess global refugee education accommodation, a brief of which is in press.