For many young people, the internet has always existed. Unlike previous generations who witnessed the arrival of social media, smartphones and online news, today’s youths have grown up alongside technology. Consequently, platforms such as TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, Telegram, and X have become the primary sources of information for young people. And, having spent their lives online, many young people believe that they are well equipped to recognize misinformation, fake content and AI-generated media. Yet, this confidence may be precisely what makes them vulnerable to one of the greatest challenges confronting democratic societies today: Russian-based disinformation.
A common assumption among younger generations is that technological familiarity translates into digital literacy and that they would therefore be able to spot misinformation. However, being able to navigate social media algorithms, identify online trends, or distinguish between authentic and AI-generated images does not mean someone understands how information itself can be manipulated. This is especially true as modern disinformation campaigns are increasingly designed to exploit the habits and assumptions of people who are constantly online, thus making sure that technological fluency does not guarantee a user’s resistance to manipulation. Today’s disinformation campaigns, most notably those coming from Russia, are carefully constructed to exploit emotion, enforce existing biases, and create confusion within even the most “experienced” internet users.
While disinformation itself has long been a part of politics, especially those involving foreign relations, Russia has increasingly become one of the greatest modern contributors of global disinformation. Russia’s contemporary strategy differs from “traditional” propaganda. During the Cold War, propaganda typically sought to persuade individuals to accept or adopt a specific political narrative. Russia’s goal in today’s age is therefore not to convince people that the Russian way is the right way, but rather to create confusion, polarize society and undermine trust. Russian information operations frequently disseminate multiple, often contradictory explanations surrounding the same event in order to achieve this goal. For example, following their invasion of Ukraine, pro-Kremlin networks spread false narratives arguing that NATO and the US are trying to encircle Russia via Ukraine or that NATO and the West are at War with Russia. Russia promotes these narratives because they know that the sheer act of flooding the online space with a high volume of conflicting and false information makes uncovering the truth or the real facts of the conflict increasingly difficult to do. Russia is able to achieve its goal through these campaigns as they force citizens to begin questioning much of the information that they are consuming. Forcing people to question what is real or fake brings people to a state where they don’t know who or what to trust online. This leads to the erosion of people’s trust in democratic institutions, especially as these campaigns often promote negative narratives about government actions. Russia’s goal with their disinformation is therefore to undermine truth in society.
This strategy of information manipulation is one being used across the globe; in 2024, 90 different countries recorded incidents of foreign information manipulation. Most of these foreign threats come from China and Russia, but what is particularly interesting is that these attacks tend to peak during election periods. A key attack period occurred during the 2024 European Parliamentary elections, where key countries such as Ukraine, Germany, Poland and France were primary targets of Russia’s attempts to amplify divisive narratives through coordinated online disinformation campaigns. These campaigns were often seen exploiting contentious issues such as immigration, energy security, defence spending, or just general support for Ukraine. However, their overall objective is more than simply interfering with foreign elections by spreading false information, but to use this information to polarize and create instability among the populations of democratic societies.
To achieve this, Russian disinformation campaigns increasingly target younger audiences, whose political identities are still developing and whose media consumption differs significantly from previous generations. As social media has become the primary source of information, they increasingly receive news through algorithms rather than editors, influencers rather than journalists, and short-form videos rather than traditional reporting. Social media platforms prioritize engagement above accuracy, rewarding content that provokes outrage, fear, or emotional reactions. Russian disinformation exploits precisely these dynamics, allowing misleading narratives to spread organically through recommendation algorithms instead of appearing as overt foreign propaganda.
Perhaps what is most concerning is that the consequences of these campaigns are not always political radicalization. While extremist content certainly exists, one of the stronger side effects of modern disinformation is political apathy. Constant exposure to conflicting narratives can leave young people feeling exhausted, cynical, and uncertain about what is true. As trust in journalism, governments, and democratic institutions declines, many disengage from politics altogether. If every source appears biased and every institution appears corrupt, political participation itself begins to seem pointless.
Because democracies derive their legitimacy from informed and engaged citizens, lower political participation, declining trust in institutions, and increased polarization weaken democracies from within. Therefore, Russia does not need young Europeans to support Moscow. It merely needs them to lose confidence in their own democratic systems. This strategy is seen through Russia’s war on Ukraine, where its military operations have been accompanied by an international information campaign centred on shaping public opinion on its own war of aggression against Ukraine. And, since many young people are chronically online, scrolling aimlessly through social media or going down information rabbit holes, they come across Russian disinformation efforts without even knowing it. Even if individuals initially recognize that the content they are consuming is false, repeated exposure to disinformation can gradually begin to normalize the misleading information being promoted. While Europe may remain the primary target of Russian disinformation operations due to its proximity to the war in Ukraine, these campaigns are still targeting audiences in North America, and their objectives remain the same across the globe: to erode confidence in democratic institutions and weaken political support for NATO, which ultimately seeks to undermine the cohesion of the alliance.
Because today’s youth are tomorrow’s voters, policymakers, journalists and political leaders, influencing how they perceive democracy, elections and NATO has the opportunity to influence the political landscape for years to come. Therefore, information warfare is more than influencing individual elections; it’s about influencing the next generation. For NATO, this represents a growing security challenge, as disinformation is not a fight fought within borders, but one fought across the globe, posing a threat to weaken societies by undermining trust in elections, institutions and public discourse.
Ultimately, the greatest challenge facing today’s youth in NATO is not learning how to use technology, but learning how to question it. Simply growing up online does not provide immunity to information manipulation. On the contrary, confidence in one’s own digital abilities can create a false sense of security that sophisticated disinformation campaigns are designed to exploit. And, as Russia continues to weaponize information against democratic societies, NATO’s security will depend not only on military preparedness, but on whether its citizens can be resilient in the face of disinformation. Because if the next generation loses confidence in democratic institutions before they even begin casting their ballots, disinformation campaigns like those coming out of Russia will be able to achieve their greatest objectives. Protecting democracy therefore requires more than defending borders; it requires ensuring that people are well informed and can distinguish truth from manipulation before the false information takes hold in their minds.
Image: “Computer Screen Reading Fake News” (2017), by mikemacmarketing via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY 2.0.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
