Foreword from the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the NATO Association of Canada publication: *Canadian Defence at 150 and Beyond*

Earlier this year, in an address to Parliament about Canada’s foreign policy priorities, I spoke about the need to preserve the rules-based, multilateral international order, and harness it to confront the challenges we face in this century. As the most successful military and political alliance in history, NATO is central to the postwar global security and defence architecture.

Since its creation in 1949, NATO has strived to uphold the common values enshrined in the Washington Treaty: peace, stability, democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. At its core, NATO’s priority is, of course, collective defence. But, since its founding, the security situation its members face has evolved immensely. Today, we are confronted with entirely new, more complex and multifaceted threats. Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberattacks, and threats to energy supplies are forcing NATO to evolve in its thinking and in its approaches. As a country that counts on NATO as a pillar in its security and defence policy, we will continue to support the Alliance to ensure that it remains flexible and agile, and able to use its integrated military and political acumen to continue to address these threats. This goal drives Canada’s efforts on NATO transformation, reform, and partnerships with non-NATO countries.

There can be no clearer sign that NATO and Article 5 are at the heart of Canada’s national security policy than our current military deployment to Latvia as a Framework Nation in NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence. Canada’s new defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, will allow the Canadian Armed Forces to continue Canada’s tradition of contributing to a more stable and peaceful world.

The Canadian Armed Forces have demonstrated that they are among the most agile and deployable armed forces within the Alliance. Our recently announced peacekeeping strategy will make a real difference in dealing with the ever-evolving nature of conflict, cementing our leadership in providing specialized military expertise around the world, including through NATO.

Crucially, through our new Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (2017-2022) and the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations, we are putting women’s perspectives front and centre in our peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts. We know how crucial including women is to ensuring a lasting peace, and preventing sexual harassment and violence within the military and against civilians. This work would not have been possible without the invaluable input of several leaders championing this agenda, especially our Ambassador to NATO, Kerry Buck, and Major-General Tammy Harris, deputy commander of the RCAF.

I applaud the NATO Association of Canada for its tireless work to promote the importance and relevance of NATO within Canada, engage students and youth, and build people-to-people bonds between Canadians and other Alliance members and partners.

Sincerely,

The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, PC, MP
Minister of Foreign Affairs
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Introduction

The Honourable Hugh Segal, OC, OOnt
Chairman of the NATO Association of Canada

This year, we had the pleasure of celebrating Canada’s 150th year of continuous Confederation in a state of relative peace, security, and prosperity. This long, undisturbed, and ordered existence is unheard of in most of the world outside of Canada’s borders, where acts of violence and major upheavals were, and unfortunately still are, commonplace. While no country’s history is perfect, and Canada’s multi-decade marginalization of First Nations is an example of where we underperformed our own ideals, there is a great deal to celebrate.

That Canada has survived two World Wars, and Korea, where our contribution punched above our weight and then some, reflects the enduring Canadian commitment to the defence and security of Canada, our allies, and a world safe for democracy and the liberal democratic order. This is a commitment that has been activated through Canada’s role in the founding of NATO, the UN, and all of those institutions created in the wake of the Second World War. Most importantly, this is a commitment that continues today, and must continue into the future, through Canada’s multilateral engagement with its allies and with the world.

If the memory of those who gave their lives is to be honoured, Canadians today must not take for granted the peace and prosperity resulting from Canada’s contribution to the current international order. Education and engagement are key components of keeping the next generation of Canadians aware of why Canada must continue its meaningful commitment to defence and security. What Canadian women and men in uniform, along with diplomats and elected leaders accomplished in engagements from Vimy to Normandy, from Korea to Cyprus, and from Bosnia to Afghanistan, was neither easy or simple. But it was right and necessary.

Canadian Defence at 150 and Beyond is an anthology featuring distinguished experts in the field of Canadian security and defence. It looks at how the state of Canada’s security and defence is situated in a unique international setting, where dangers and opportunity are equally present. In three sections, multiple perspectives are presented on topics ranging from Canada’s role in NATO and the defence of Canada’s Arctic regions, to the role of women in the Canadian Armed Forces.

Canada's 150 was also marked by the release of an updated defence policy, highlighting a Canada that is Strong, Secure, and Engaged at home and abroad. Canadian Defence at 150 and Beyond directly addresses the implications of a Canada that is strong at home, secure in North America, and engaged in the world.

As Chairman of the NATO Association of Canada, I am delighted that Canadian Defence at 150 and Beyond represents a continuing NAOC tradition of enlightening, educating, and explaining in support of an informed citizenry. The next 150 years of Canadian security will be neither simple nor easy. An informed citizenry is best able to hold any government accountable for a failure of vision, preparedness, or courage - all vital elements of a strong Canada whose influence and importance translates into policies that are respected, and strategic capacity that matters.
Few countries throughout history have had geography exert such enormous impact on their foreign policy as Canada has. Its single land border with the United States combines with the longest coastline in the world to make Canada responsible for defending a perimeter exceeding 205,000 km, while modern technology extends the requirements of defence into the realms of cyber-space. What is Canada’s role in such a world, and how does its history bear any relevance to this role?

Canada cannot answer these questions through ad hoc decisions devoid of any long term strategic foundation. Were geography still able to protect Canada, a long term strategy would still be required to establish some general principles of predictable conduct, by which Canada can realize a set of objectives reflective of some conception of the national interest. Consequently, three vital objectives of such a Canadian grand strategy will be outlined, each with profound implications on Canada’s place in the world. The question now becomes how such a strategy would look and what considerations would be paramount in its formulation?

Defence of Canadian territory since World War II would not have been possible had Canada not accommodated itself to the strategic objectives of the United States—at times by necessity, at others by choice. An obvious asymmetry in power between the two nations should leave no doubt over which of the two parties will more frequently make concessions in this relationship. It is undoubtedly in Canada’s interest to rely on the United States, through tacit consent or institutionalized agreements such as NORAD, in certain areas of defence, particularly strategic nuclear deterrence. What Canadian officials must avoid is letting dependency on the United States in areas such as nuclear deterrence translate into an an avoidable de facto cession of sovereignty in areas including Canadian airspace and the Arctic. Territorial defence, however, is only one component of Canada’s national interest—not its totality. Canada has undertaken several commitments and obligations to uphold and protect the values of democracy and rule of law internationally. Doing so has a different set of requirements than does the defence of Canadian territory. Strategically balancing these imperatives requires a long term grand strategy that identifies areas where Canada’s power and interests require it to act unilaterally in the defence of its territory or ideals—in the event of a domestic consensus—and where Canada’s interest can best be satisfied by acting in concert with traditional allies. This will provide Canada the autonomy necessary to defend its territory in areas of vital interest (such as the Arctic) while concurrently enabling a continuing tradition of multilateral cooperation with allies.

Circumstances surrounding Canadian history which cannot be listed in a short contribution have rarely forced Canada to treat territorial defence as an existential matter.1 Once Canada became responsible for conducting an independent foreign policy in the 1930’s, it quickly recognized the extent to which geography permitted the United States to provide for the defence of Canadian territory. The threat posed by having a single power dominate the European continent led Canada to ratify the Ogdensburg Agreement, which signed into existence the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in 1940, and provided for active cooperation with the United States in defence of the continent. Despite being signed as an immediate measure to safeguard the North American continent under conditions of possi-
ble German domination of Europe, Ogdensburg made explicit the permanent nature of this cooperation. Even then, there was recognition amongst Canadian leaders of how important securing American assent to a permanent role in guaranteeing continental security was. Canadian diplomat Maurice Pope aptly assessed the importance of ensuring the United States’ sustained commitment to Canadian defence in 1944 by stating “if we do enough to assure the United States we shall have done a good deal more than a cold assessment of the risk would indicate to be necessary.” While the United States also acquires a strategic advantage from access to Canadian territory, there is no better testament to generations of Canadian officials recognizing the importance of their security relationship with the United States than NORAD. Canada’s history in NORAD—the concessions made, the benefits accrued and the danger revealed in having NORAD substitute for political discussions with the United States on matters of strategic significance, such as missile defence—is emblematic of Canada’s general relationship with the United States, given the disparity in power between the two nations.

Throughout the years, Canada has been liable to finding itself in positions where it had no choice but to submit to American demands that would have been carried out irrespective of Canadian consent. Consent was understood to represent a means by which Canada gained influence over unilateral American decisions implicating the continental defence of North America. Such tendencies are especially manifest in areas such as strategic nuclear deterrence. Tacit Canadian acquiescence in having the United States incorporate its ballistic missile defence (BMD) system into NORAD’s command and control (C2) reflects Canadian understanding of this reality. Today, Canada’s participation in the U.S.’s missile defence program still dominates headlines as a symptom of the asymmetrical Canada-U.S. relationship. However, those long claiming the sole source of Canadian influence over American decisions derives from Canada acceding to the will of the United States are sorely mistaken. Were this to be true, Canada would have already become a de facto client state of the United States.

Despite a growing disparity in power, this unique relationship between the two states meant that Canada was and continues to be reassured that the United States would effectively guarantee the defence of Canadian territory. Shock generated by the recent ‘revelation’ of Lt. Gen. Pierre St-Amand on Parliament Hill that “the extant U.S. policy is not to defend Canada” is a reflection of this. Since the capabilities of the United States have often been so far in advance of what Canada could conceivably acquire or field, it often made sense to simply let the United States proceed on its preferred path, as Canada accommodates itself accordingly. Ironically, little else endangers Canadian territory more than expecting the United States to automatically assume its defence.

Canada’s latest Defence Policy, released in June of this year, recognized territorial challenges in areas such as the Arctic, while simultaneously projecting a role for the CAF that is seemingly inextricable from the consensus of its allies. The policy keenly repeated how Canada’s procurement and acquisition projects, many of which remain incomplete and delayed, are tailored toward “inter-operability” and “integration” with allies. This impetus derives in part from Canada’s history of independently conducting foreign policy since the 1930’s, where participation in world affairs was often defined exclusively by involvement in multilateral operations, and through membership in international organizations. Canadian values are conducive to framing Canada’s contribution to the post WWII order in terms of multilateral ‘peacekeeping’ operations, in tandem with allies who share a commitment to defend similar values. But if Canada permits foreign policy to be dictated almost exclusively by the consensus of its allies it risks compounding what Minister Sajjan calls a “capability gap” in an area of cru-
cial national interest: the ability to defend territorial integrity. Canada must continue investing in capabilities on par with key NATO allies for the very reasons given by the policy, and to also ensure a necessary degree of autonomous action.

There is no doubt Canada enforces its moral authority internationally by its participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Canadian officials, however, should remember that NATO is a collective security arrangement intended to deter potential aggressors through the principle of “an attack against one is considered an attack against all”. Ad hoc decisions to participate in NATO or UN operations should not become the sole function of Canada’s foreign policy, especially when taken for their immediate expediency instead of long term implications. Ad hoc decision making risks embarrassments such as the one Ottawa has sought to avoid when it will soon host a ministerial meeting on peacekeeping without, according to an anonymous U.N. official, “having made a real contribution to peacekeeping.” Without clearly defining long term objectives to the public that go beyond reiterating democratic slogans and general principles of conduct, Canadian foreign policy might be at great risk of being reduced to providing allies with consent.

Today, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) suffer serious shortcomings that harm Canada’s ability to enforce its territorial claims, amongst other issues. These shortcomings are not unrelated to Canada’s willingness to allow Americans to assume greater burdens. Canada is presently involved in territorial disputes with the United States and Denmark—both NATO allies. The resolution of either of these claims will likely preclude force and not pose significant risks to Canada. Of much greater worry is a Russian military capable of seriously threatening Canadian territory, especially in the Arctic. Such threats make Canada’s ability to act alone in limited scenarios extremely important, otherwise it risks endangering its sovereignty in these areas. In 2008, then Defence Minister Peter MacKay confidently claimed “when we see a Russian bear approaching Canadian air space, we meet them with an F-18, we remind them that this is sovereign Canadian air space, and they turn back.” That F-18 cannot today meet a Russian Su-35 on equal footing, especially if their encounter is isolated. It is an unreasonable expectation for Canada to match Russian military might, but this does not mean certain feasible actions, including the purchase of F-35 aircraft, do not facilitate Canada’s ability to defend its territory when confronted with a ‘near peer’ or a stronger power in any limited engagement. With Canada’s present capability gap expanding, it is less difficult to envisage the defence of Canadian airspace and North American continental security in general being dependent on the readiness of the United States Air Force.

Geography guarantees the permanent risk to Canadian sovereignty if the United States by default assumes more responsibility for continental security. Needlessly acquiescing to American decisions under the assumption that there is no other way to gain influence over them sets the trajectory for Canadian path dependency. It is vital that Canada avoid such a dependency on the United States because of the dangers entailed in no longer being capable of autonomously guaranteeing its own sovereignty. The immediate losses and the future precedent this would set will seriously harm Canada’s national interest. Almost equally harmful to Canadian interests is abdicating a traditional role in multilateral peacekeeping and other such operations. Involvement in them has accrued Canada much international authority in multilateral forums, particularly at the U.N., though Canada needs to resist the temptation of allowing the United States to become the effective guarantor of Canadian sovereignty, while also ensuring that Canada’s tradition of operating as a peacekeeper does not reduce Canadian foreign policy to the mere expression of consensus amongst allies. Not doing so might indeed further encourage Canada to let the United States assume greater exclusive responsibility for North Amer-
ican defence. Each factor has a set of requirements that do not coincide in every aspect. It is therefore of great importance not to permit Canadian capabilities and attention to concentrate on either territorial defence or allied multilateralism at the expense of the other.

The permanency of each predicament means no single solution can be implemented to forever alleviate the burden these issues have placed on Canadian foreign policy. Regardless, a prudent long-term foreign policy should not strive for permanent solutions. In formulating a long-term strategy designed to give a direction to Canada’s foreign policy, the three following components must be considered as objectives, not solutions, to these predicaments.

First, history reveals that when Canada possessed its own highly developed domestic capabilities (made possible by appropriate investments in areas of defence), it acquired a degree of leverage over the United States, or any country unable to compete with Canadian industry. Recall how Canada’s near sale of its Avro CF-105 Arrow to the United States ended with an abrupt cancellation of the entire Avro Arrow program by then Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. What potential advantage Canada could have derived from having crucial ally nations, including the U.S. and U.K., as customers of a vital capability, was sacrificed when settling for the eventual purchase of CF-104 aircraft from the United States. The case of the Avro Arrow also demonstrates how Canada can potentially accrue leverage over even the United States, through reasonable and sustained investments in domestic research and development in areas of strategic significance.

Second, Canada must resist the domestic politicization of foreign policy issues, particularly when they have a direct impact on Canada’s strategic superiority relative to potential adversaries. The F-35, for example, has a painfully protracted history in Canadian domestic politics. Political temptations must be tempered by recognizing that the F-35 is a strategic acquisition and not a campaign platform. Such manoeuvres in no way enhance Canadian interests. Additionally, since Canada will never achieve parity with the United States, it must find a mechanism for ensuring that an inevitable dependence on the United States does not translate into a de facto cession of Canadian sovereignty.

Finally, one effective method is for Canada to pursue as a strategic objective—though not a solution—the embedding of bilateral American commitments into existing international institutions (UN, NATO), thereby ‘internationalizing’ issues that would otherwise be dealt with on a bi-lateral basis, where the United States maintains the insurmountable advantage of military, diplomatic and political clout. This idea is devoid of complete novelty, as Canadian officials sought to intertwine NORAD with the organizational structure of NATO, and thereby ‘internationalize’ the defence of North American airspace upon NORAD’s inception. American assent was ultimately lacking. Despite being driven by predominantly tactical concerns, doing so would have gained Canada some leverage over otherwise unilateral American actions, by imposing a structural cost for such action.

In a time where the United States has increasingly sought to augment its scope for unilateral action by reneging in on international commitments, Canada faces an uphill—but not forlorn—struggle in securing American acquiescence to altering current commitments under NORAD, let alone internationalizing the terms of those commitments. As difficult as it may currently be, having the United States embedded in international institutions is one method by which Canada can simultaneously prevent complete American hegemony in North America and promote and protect democratic Canadian values and interests through international law. The leverage gained by Canada through successfully doing so would only be reinforced by resuming the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil. These weapons would of course make Canada a likelier target in a nuclear
exchange but would simultaneously strengthen the credibility of Canada’s independent deterrent, which would be augmented by keeping command and control arrangements of these weapons secret. Note that these proposals should not be taken as the only applicable ones. In the absence of any perceptible Canadian foreign policy strategy, they are meant to be a call to begin conceiving one in accordance with perceived Canadian national interests, whatever form it may ultimately take. Fortunately, key similarities between Canadian and American national interests mean unilateral American actions in protection of the North American continent are likely to simultaneously benefit Canada. It is equally unlikely that the United States will ever be restrained by any obligation other than the protection of its sovereignty when it feels the need to act unilaterally in defence of its territory. Only through a modernized force structure outlined by the defence policy can Canada prevent from becoming what Minister Freeland in a speech this June referred to as a “client state” of the United States.\(^5\)

Without formulating a conceptual grand strategy to give a general and predictable direction to ad hoc Canadian actions, Canada’s foreign policy strategy risks remaining nonexistent and necessary.

NOTES

1. Canada only formally established a Ministry of External Affairs in 1909 and did not manage what would be considered an independent foreign policy until after the Statute of Westminster (1931) effectively granted British Commonwealth dominions autonomy in the conduct of their foreign policy (the British Empire previously provided for the defence of its dominions).


4. NORAD’s past and its probable future trajectory are both suggestive of an eventual Canadian concession to agree to participate in some form in the ballistic missile defence program (incorporating U.S. BMD C2 into NORAD means Canada is to an extent already a participant). Regardless of NORAD’s history it still would be in Canada’s interest to do so because NORAD provides Canada a level of defence (most importantly at the nuclear weapons level) it could in no way achieve with its own resources.

5. Lee Berthiaume, “‘U.S. policy is not to defend Canada’ from ICBMs”, *CTV News*, September 14, 2017. http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/u-s-policy-is-not-to-defend-canada-from-icbms-1.3589571. It is worth noting, as St-Amand did, that in the “heat of the moment” the United States will likely intercept an incoming ballistic missile heading towards North America. Geography probably prevents the United States from taking the strategic risk that a missile is in fact targeting Canada – the trajectory of a missile after boost phase would make it difficult to know whether the United States or Canada is the intended target until it is perhaps too late to react.


The ongoing and well publicized dispute between Bombardier and Boeing, which resulted in the Liberal government suspending talks on the purchase of an interim fighter aircraft capability, further damages Canada’s acknowledged need to modernize, amongst other things, its air force.

The internationalization or ‘institutionalization’ approach has also been suggested by, amongst others, Jonathan Paquin, in Canadian Foreign and Security Policy: Reaching a Balance Between Autonomy and North American Harmony in the Twenty-First Century.

This is not to suggest that the internationalization of defence and security issues would completely deter unilateral American action. Canada’s relation to the United States means that merely increasing the cost of unilateral American action, especially in North America, would alter American cost calculations.

Withdrawing from the 2016 Paris Agreement on climate change and initiating a renegotiation of NAFTA are two examples of the current administration’s proclivity towards undermining existing international agreements. See Touraj Riazi, “Why it’s too late to scrap the Iran deal”, Canadian Centre of Strategic Studies, (2017), https://www.ccss-cces.com/blog/2017/10/23/why-its-too-late-to-scrap-the-iran-deal/.

Introduction

What explains the character and extent of Canada’s contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) Battlegroup Latvia, a commitment on a different continent, thousands of kilometres from Canada’s shores? The answer can be found in Canada’s deep and continuing commitment to the transatlantic alliance. For Canada, NATO has been first and foremost about security, particularly European security. While Canadians have at times facetiously observed that Europeans like to fight their wars down to the last Canadian, the EFP is yet another example why Canada, irrespective of the government of the day, is a ‘closest realist’: an unwaivering commitment to peace and stability in Europe is integral to Canadian grand strategy for reasons of national as well as collective interest.

In this context it is not surprising to see Canada as the framework country for Latvia, contributing more than 450 of the 1,138 foreign NATO member country troops in the land domain, consisting of a headquarters component and parts of a battlegroup with a Canadian infantry battalion as well as reconnaissance and support elements. That amounts to almost 10% of the total non-indigenous troop strength contributed by NATO allies to the EFP in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Canada’s commitment in troop strength, as well as command and field units, in terms of total numbers may not be comparable to Canada’s Cold War deployment to Germany, but on a per capita basis Canada’s commitment to the Baltics in general and Latvia in particular actually surpasses the proportion of Canadian troops stationed in Europe during the Cold War. At sea, where Canada has consistently contributed a frigate to NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1) as part of Operation REASSURANCE. In the air domain, Canada’s rotating contribution to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission takes the form of four fighter jets. In addition, Canada contributes to assurance and deterrence throughout Central and Eastern Europe in a variety of other ways. For example, although not a NATO mission, a Canadian military training unit of some 200 personnel was deployed to Ukraine in 2015.

These Canadian EFP deployments and other collaborative measures are in response to the new situation confronting NATO nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War. And yet, they are only the latest tangible manifestations of support for transatlantic security in a history of what can be judged to be a highly successful Canadian commitment to NATO that goes back to the very beginning of the Alliance, of which Canada was one of the founding members.

Canada’s Path to and Support for the EFP

When representatives of the original twelve members of NATO signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, the U.S. Marine Band played two selections from George Gershwin’s Porgy and Bess: "It Ain’t Necessarily So," and "I Got Plenty of Nothin'." As then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson dryly observed in his celebrated memoirs, Present at Creation: My Years at the State Department the choice of music "added a note of unexpected realism." For the Canadians “present” at this “creation” though, the new Atlantic Alliance already reflected a decidedly realistic approach to the country’s foreign and defence policy objectives.
Canada has traditionally seen it as vital to its interests the prevention of any single power from dominating Europe—first Germany, against which Canada went to war twice, and then the Soviet Union. As one harsh critic of Canadian engagement in NATO once put it, “In many ways Canada’s role in NATO was a form of atonement for our lack of broad foreign policy objectives after the First World War.” Having tried to retreat into isolationism after 1918 only to be dragged back into another European war in 1939, Canadians said in 1949 “never again,” and thus were prepared to join in, to address the Soviet threat before it got out of hand. As one articulate Canadian diplomat put it during the negotiations that led to the North Atlantic Treaty, “[this link across the North Atlantic seems to me to be such a providential solution to so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great length and even incur considerable risk in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place in this new partnership.”

Though much doubt attended its birth, the seemingly always “troubled” and fractious Alliance has defied its sceptics and continually puts to the lie to predictions of its imminent demise. As it was at the “creation’ and throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s and post 9/11, which saw the Alliance play a role in Afghanistan, to today’s new threats; Canada remains prepared to go to great length and even incur considerable risk in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place in the now enlarged NATO partnership.

Canada can do so because it has capacity. In authorized troop strength, Canada fields the eighth-largest military in NATO. Canada ranks among the top 20 militaries in the world. Although within NATO Canada ranks in the bottom third on military spending as a percentage of GDP, Canada consistently ranks around 15th in the world in total military expenditure. In NATO, only the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy spend more on defence, all of which are more populous and have larger economies than Canada. On a per capita basis, only the United States, Norway, United Kingdom, Denmark, Netherlands, France, Germany, and Greece spend more than Canada. Canada is roundly criticized for spending too little on defence, but as these figures and Canada’s contribution to the enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia shows, such crude reductionism is misleading; in fact, Canada is one of only five NATO member countries that maintains a full-spectrum military, it is prepared to deploy that capacity in support of collective defence, regional stability and international security. The capacity that Canada offers is popular, robust, competent, and well-equipped. After all, Latvia and Canada spend about the same percentage of GDP on defence, and neighbouring Estonia is widely held up for spending 2% of GDP on defence, yet, that spending has very different yields than Canada’s military expenditure. For militaries, quality and quantity are complementary, and context matters. Defence is ultimately about balancing cost, capability, and commitment. Canada’s mantra has always been not to get hung up on expenditure, and to focus on capability and commitment instead, since Canada consistently outperforms on both.

But why should Canada spend on the military at all? What explains the level of military spending in Canada? And why would Canada incur the financial and political cost of deploying troops to the Baltics, notwithstanding its continued strong support of NATO and desire to remain an active member of the Alliance? These questions arose in the Canadian public discourse as the government deliberated on how to respond to the request from NATO allies, including the United States, that elements of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) take an active, significant and visible role in the EFP intended to reassure and bolster Baltic security. Canada, after all, is still dealing with the consequences of its prolonged and costly engagement in Afghanistan, while at the same time dispatching forces to deal with the threat from the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. As with other allies, including
the United States, it should not be surprising, therefore, that this specific Canadian deployment was not made without some measure of controversy even if, as in the past, a significant and welcomed commitment was eventually made and, in fact, was never seriously in doubt.

And yet, as we have written about elsewhere⁷, in the larger public policy context governments cannot easily escape the dilemmas, problems and paradoxes of defence spending, especially for unanticipated foreign deployments. On the one hand, funds spent on defence are then not available to enhance economic prosperity and social well-being. In domestic politics, there is little electoral payoff to spending on defence relative to the disproportionate payoff for spending on economic growth and social programs. That explains why as a percentage of GDP and overall government expenditure, democracies spend not just very little on defence, by and large, they actually spend (significantly) less on defence than other types of regimes. On the other hand, NATO collectively accounts for about 75% of global defence spending. Ergo, democracy needs to be defended; but because democracies tend to be disproportionately prosperous, they can afford to outspend other regimes on defence without breaking the bank. In fact, military spending among democracies is not just instrumental but also strategic: In the case of Russia, for instance, sanctions hamper the economy while the security dilemma has Russia spending more on defence, which has a compound deleterious impact on regime’s ability to spend on economic and social issues and thus on its legitimacy in the eyes of a population that bears the brunt of the consequences.

NATO is commonly understood as a military alliance whose overarching purpose is collective defence. Further, NATO is a means to regional, international, and transnational security and defence governance. Since its inception, however, NATO has also been a mechanism to overcome two insidious collective-action problems.⁸ One is the incessant risk of US isolationism, such as the current wave potential retrenchment under the premise of Offshore Balancing that would see fewer US troops stationed abroad and a greater emphasis on favoured regional powers to check the hostile ones.⁹ Canada has an interest in keeping the United States engaged, as do all other NATO member countries. But only a handful of members have headquarters and field capacities analogous to the ones Canada can bring to bear; so, Canada may not be conspicuous by its presence in the EFP, but it would certainly have been conspicuous by its absence. Making a credible commitment of its own is also a way for Canada to entice the United States to stay engaged in NATO and in the region. The Americans are much more likely to commit when the burden that commitment brings is shared among allies. Like all countries, the United States pursues its self-interest and has always done so. It has always been “America First.” America is so relatively powerful that it can afford to make unilateral decisions whilst most allies cannot: multilateralism becomes the default option. By way of example, Canada would never go to war or deploy on its own: it does so always in coordination with allies, the United States first and foremost among them. America’s clout means that decisions made in Washington reverberate disproportionately with allied countries. Commitments to collective defence, such as the EFP, are thus also a way for allies such as Canada to temper US unilateralist inclinations because they afford Canada a greater say over the means and ends of a mission. In the words of NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay (1952-1957), the purpose of the alliance is “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”

Yet, Germany is now the EFP framework country for Lithuania. Indeed, the other institutionalist rationale for NATO has long been to solve inherent commitment problems in the form of easy-riding (not free-riding, as we explain in Leuprecht and Sokolsky, 2015) among member countries tempted to spend too little.
on defence and contain the temptation of over-
reliance on the US security umbrella. That risk
is real: during the initial years of the millen-
iurn, European NATO allies reduced their de-
defence budget by some 50 billion Euros collec-
tively.

NATO missions require the unanimous con-
sent of all member countries. Member countries
such as Canada care about the North-Eastern
flank for at least three strategic reasons. First,
Canada’s prosperity hinges directly on trade,
notably its ability to export resources across the
world. So, any threat to trade and open trade
routes runs counter to Canada’s interests, in
part because countries that are at war tend to
consume fewer resources and thus depress de-
mand for trade.

Second, aside from Canada’s bilateral relation-
ships with the United States and its transatlantic
NATO partners, Europe is Canada’s most im-
portant multilateral partner. For strategic rea-
sons, then, Canada is intent on a stable, united,
prosperous, harmonious, and powerful Europe
in general, and European Union in particular.
Any threat that compromises the sovereignty of
any European and EU member state is thus a
direct threat to Canadian interests. Strategically,
then, it is thus much more efficient and effective
for Canada in the short and medium-term
to incur the financial and political cost of a
modest contribution to reassure a NATO mem-
ber ally on the North-Eastern flank, relative to
the cost and consequences of local and regional
instability.

Third, since the Ogdensburg Declaration of
1938 and the Kingston Dispensation of 1940,
the United States and Canada have pursued a
continental grand strategy whose objective is to
keep security threats and instability away from
North American shores. That explains why the
strategic culture of the United States and Cana-
da is inherently expeditionary. Canada’s grand
strategy is premised on two seemingly contra-
dictory dimensions of its strategic culture. The
first is that Canada has historically embraced an
expeditionary approach when it comes to de-
defence policy and the posture and deployment of
Canadian military power. “From Paardeberg to
Panjwai,” as eminent historians Bercuson and
Granatstein have written, “Canadian govern-
ments […] have believed that one of the key
missions of the Canadian military is to deploy
abroad.” These deployments have served the
national interest because, in imperial wars,
world wars, the Cold War and myriad limited
conflicts that have characterized the post–Cold
War and post 9/11 period, Canada has contrib-
uted extremely useful and highly regarded forces
to the efforts of allies to contain global
threats and lesser challenges posed by regional
instability to the security and stability of the
West and, therefore, to Canada. As such, Cana-
da’s national interest was served.

But in addition to meeting a common threat,
forces have been dispatched overseas to send a
message and, by so doing, to guarantee Ottawa
“a seat at the table” along with a sense of status
and prestige. This expeditionary strategic
culture allowed Canada – which was never re-
garded, nor saw itself, as a great power – to


show larger nations (e.g., Britain and the United
States), international organizations, such as the
United Nations, or allied nations such as the
members of NATO that Canada is ready and
able to put a shoulder to the wheel when military
forces are needed to defend allies, deter aggression,
or keep or enforce the peace…. Doing so wins
Canada diplomatic recognition, political ac-
ceptance, entrée into arrangements, treaties, and
alliances that are important to Canada and Ca-
nadians, and a voice on how future international
policies will be pursued…

This approach to allied commitments guaran-
tees that Canada “will always prefer to under-
take less of an effort than its great-power part-
ners want it to, but not so little as to be elimi-
nated altogether from their strategic decision making.”

In the vernacular, the EFP is often characterized as a speedbump or a tripwire. If the sovereignty of any NATO member country were compromised, that would pose an existential threat to all of the framework countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada. In contrast to climate change or cyber-threats, NATO member countries have a collective interest in ensuring the territorial integrity of member countries. Yet, NATO troops confront an adversary that has as orders of magnitude the number of troops stationed on the other side of the border. Moreover, unlike NATO, that adversary has the advantage of being a unitary actor, whereas NATO functions more like a federation. In fact, three of the four framework countries are federations, and the fourth has a devolved unitary system of government. If NATO wanted to deter against all-out invasion, many more troops would be required. Instead, defence policy in general, and the EFP in particular, need to be understood as an insurance policy: you buy the amount and extent of coverage you need for the risk you anticipate. The EFP was never designed to provide all-perils coverage; instead, it is meant to provide specified perils coverage against sovereignty violations of a NATO member country’s air, sea, land, and even cyber domain, especially irregulars in the form of “little green men” as NATO likes to refer to those that appeared in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.

Conclusion

As the now enlarged Atlantic Alliance faces a revived Russian threat, particularly to the “new” allies on its now more easterly frontier, NATO appears to be in the process of a “re-creation” consistent with its founding purpose of providing for the collective defence of all its members. But, as in the past, this will entail a good deal of political and military uncertainty and complications that will challenge the management and unity of the Alliance, demanding adjustments and compromises. Yet it should not be forgotten that the Cold War and post-Cold war success of NATO was due in no small part to the fact that a flexible response has not only been its long-standing strategic doctrine, but has profoundly shaped the way the Alliance approached all its seemingly intractable and inherently contradictory problems of a strategic and, above all, political nature. True to the messy nature of democratic government itself, this collection of democracies has managed to surprise and confound its critics by continually adopting a series of initiatives that placed political considerations and at the centre of its strategic calculations. Amongst those wise policies was the importance attached to military contributions from its members, no matter how limited they be in relative terms. This approach provided Canada with a security community to which, by any assessment, it could (and did) make a successful, significant and appreciated military contribution.

Thus today, not surprisingly, in the concrete manifestation of Canada’s contribution to reassurance in the Baltics in general, and in Latvia in particular, we are witnessing a continuation of Canada’s commitment to NATO, once again dispatching forces to Europe, lending its albeit modest—yet not inconsiderable—capabilities and highly sophisticated military expertise to bolster the stability and security of a region that remains essential to Canada’s national interests.
If the rationale and character of Canada’s present contributions to the EFP can be explained, what does this suggest about the durability of these commitments? If the past is prologue, then there should be little doubt that Ottawa will continue to support NATO’s collective efforts on the Alliance’s eastern frontier. Even if specific Canadian contributions are replaced from time to time by those from other allies on an agreed-upon rotational basis, Ottawa will remain engaged in Baltic security as long as the threat remains and as long as the Alliance, its frequent internal disagreements notwithstanding, remains ultimately unified in its determination to provide collective security for all its members. This unique combination of flexibility and unity has sustained NATO and Canada’s commitment and ability to contribute to European security whenever and wherever it has been at risk.

Biosketches

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NOTES


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12 Justin Massie, “Why Democratic Allies Defect Prematurely: Canadian and Dutch Unilateral


Acknowledgements

Security challenges abound in Latin America and the Caribbean: the population of the region is by no means "free from fear." In fact, the chance of being murdered is higher in that region than anywhere else on the planet. In countries that formally at peace, such as El Salvador, Honduras, Venezuela, Colombia, or Brazil, rates of violent deaths are higher than in many others where civil war rages. Much of that violence is tied to the cocaine trade, which also feeds corruption that threaten the legitimacy, the capabilities, and the stability of several states in the region.

The extent to which those severe problems matter for Canada, however, is very limited. The United States act as a buffer that prevents the ripple effects from the region's crisis of public security from reaching Canada. In fact, the United States itself is largely immune from the consequences of a crisis that reaches all the way to its border with Mexico.

The small and declining size of its cocaine market, in the context of what appears to be a very effective management of its illegal drug markets, as well as limited economic, strategic, and political interdependence with the region further limits the security challenges that the region could pose for Canada.

Insecurities and their driver(s) in Latin America and the Caribbean

Today, the Western Hemisphere south of the US border is at once eerily peaceful and shockingly violent. No Latin American or Caribbean country is currently involved in an international war or military operation. The region is nuclear free: no state has developed or acquired nuclear weapons, and none harbours a nuclear program. Since the Second World War—which only Brazil joined, as a marginal player—only three international conflicts have shaken the region: the Soccer War, between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, in which about 3,000 soldiers lost their life; the Falkland/Malvinas War, between Argentina and Britain, in 1982, which killed about 1000 soldiers; and the Cenepa War, in 1995, which made less than 100 victims.

Beginning in the 1950s, the Cold War fully played out in the region, with bloody military coups—most of them supported if rarely engineered by Washington—insurgencies—most of them also supported though not engineered by Cuba—right-wing death squads, widespread use of torture, large-scale massacres and—a Latin American contribution to the repertoire of political repression—the "disappearance" of thousands of civilians. By the end of the 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet Union, only Colombia remained politically at war with itself, and almost exclusively because cocaine revenue kept the guerrillas and their paramilitary enemies well financed.

Today, war and political violence have vanished from the newscasts. Several border disputes remain unsolved—Argentina-Britain, Bolivia-Chile, Peru-Chile, Nicaragua-Costa Rica, Nicaragua-Colombia, Venezuela-Guyana—but, aside from the occasional rhetorical flurry, no one is preparing to invade a neighbour or to repel a foreign incursion. Most frontier regions are lightly populated and borders porous and poorly defended and illegal migration, though significant—from Central America to Mexico, Bolivia to Brazil, Venezuela to Colombia—barely registers in the region's political agendas and gener-
ates no significant backlash.

International terrorism is similarly absent. A horrendous terrorist attack on the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), in Buenos Aires, killed 85 people in 1994 and, despite the formidable lack of efforts on the part of successive Argentinian governments, the growing weight of evidence suggests that Hezbollah, possibly with the support from Iran, may have had a hand in the attack. Still, and while a cottage industry has developed, in the wake of the bombing, around the presence of Islamist extremists in the tri-border area between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, no other terrorist attack linked to global Islamist networks or organizations has taken place since.

Following September 11, 2001, "failed," "collapsed", and "fragile" states have been worrying Western decision-makers and driving military and foreign aid programs towards state-building, security sector reforms, peacebuilding and stabilization. The fear was that "uncontrolled spaces" could be taken over by terrorist organizations and turned into platforms to train radicalized soldiers and plan attacks against Western countries. In these "hybrid polities," violence, extreme poverty and despair—especially among young males—were seen as potential drivers of mass migration and radicalization.

Latin America is not immune from such state failure; chaotic Venezuela and ever-shambolic Haïti certainly qualify. The governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—Central America's "Northern Triangle"—have undeniable capabilities in some areas, but they have proven unable, for decades, to get a grasp on the extreme levels of violence that plague their societies. A similar "governance schizophrenia" afflicts several Caribbean countries—Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, for instance—whose high rankings on the Human Development Index is at odds with even higher standings on global homicide rate scales. Even Mexico, a member of the OECD with a modern economy, the most resilient manufacturing sector in North America and highly capable governments has recently seen some of its largest cities shaken by massive waves of violence.

Strikingly, however, this public security crisis is completely disconnected from any form of political radicalization. With the quickly-fading exception of Colombia, what "uncontrolled spaces" or "brown areas" do exist, whether in hinterlands or in poor urban peripheries, are the realm of criminal organizations and gangs, not of political organizations planning terrorist attacks. Insecurity, however, feeds migration or, at the very least, the desire to migrate: a third of the Northern Triangle respondents to a major survey by Vanderbilt University said that they have considered migrating in the last twelve months (Insight Crime, 2017 10 04).

Both directly and indirectly, much of the violence is tied to drugs, essentially cocaine production and trafficking control of production and transformation facilities, as well as trafficking routes and retail distribution networks is heavily contested and the agreements and "pacts" that competitors reach with one another are often fragile. Disruption efforts by the police and the military, in the context of a war on drugs that continues to rage, make the governance of those markets extremely unstable, feeding turf wars and succession battles. Indirect consequences are almost as bad. The large amount of rents generated supports the consolidation of large criminal networks and the diversification of their activities; it feeds large corruption flows that weaken police and states' administrative capacity, discredit political institutions, and hollow out democratic processes. In smaller economies like Central America's and the Caribbean, but also in countries like Bolivia or Paraguay, or at the state or municipal level in larger countries such as Mexico or Brazil, the raw economic power of criminal organizations directly threatens the integrity of governments themselves. Finally, with an extremely volatile
economy and with a political leadership desper-
ate for resources to sustain what political sup-
port it can muster, even a country as large as
Venezuela can see its political and military sys-
tems become largely criminalized.

The scale of the violence that results is extraor-
dinary. Latin America and the Caribbean are by far the most violent regions in the world. In its latest ranking of lethality, which looks at all vio-

ten deaths, whether or not they are caused by
wars, the Global Burden of Violence report
puts Syria in first place, but Honduras and Ven-
ezuela second and third, before Afghanistan,
which is itself closely followed by El Salvador,
Belize, and Jamaica, all of which rank well
above South Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, the DRC of
the Central African Republic (Global Burden of
Violence, 2015: 58). In its previous report
(Global Burden of Violence, 2011: 53), which
looked at violence between 2004 and 2009, El
Salvador came first, followed by Iraq, and then
by Jamaica, Honduras, Colombia, Venezuela,
and Guatemala.

In Latin American and the Caribbean, no one is
engaged in arms races, nuclear or not, govern-
ments are at peace and political competition is
essentially devoid of violence, but more than
100,000 people are nonetheless violently killed
every year, creating an environment of con-
sistent and extreme insecurity for the vast ma-
jority of the population. The question is, to
what extent does that violence represent a
threat that extends beyond the region itself to
reach the very northern end of the hemisphere.

** Threats for Canada? **

The criminal violence that prevails in much of
the Americas south of the United States, and its
debilitating effects on some of the region’s po-
litical systems are unlikely to impact Canada's
security, for a number of reasons.

First, and in spite of more than 25 years of ac-
tive engagement with the region, levels of inter-
dependence between the region’s economies
and Canada's remain extremely limited. The
stock of investments is significant (around 25% of
global assets) but, for about two-thirds, it is
holed up in a few Caribbean tax heavens, from
where it could move at the flip of a switch. The
rest—mining and financial interests, for the
most part—is heavily concentrated in a small
number of countries (Chile, Peru, and Mexico),
most of which are stable and escape from the
criminal violence that plagues the continent.
Trade is similarly limited, except with Mexico,
which is one of Canada's main trade partners,
although it still represents less than 10% of the
country’s overall merchandise trade. Canadian
economic interests in the most fragile states of
the region—Haiti, Venezuela, Central America’s
Northern Triangle—are negligible. What hap-
pens there, in other words, is unlikely to have
much impact here.

Second, the United States continental mass
stands between Canada and much of the region.
Winter aside, with a significantly larger labour
market—including a well-oiled infrastructure
for illegal migrants—large and well-established
communities of Latin American origin—
Mexicans and Central Americans, in particu-
lar—and much more widespread use of the
Spanish language, the United States, particularly
its Southern half, represents a much more ap-
pealing option for migrants from the region.
The United States acts as a kind of wetland that
absorbs most of the waves of immigrants that
are driven from the region by the violence and
instability that plague it.

In addition, however, border controls, effective
police deterrence and increasingly restrictive
immigration policies have prevented the United
States itself from being seriously affected by the
predicament of its Southern neighbours. It is
now well documented for instance that net mi-
gration flows from Latin America to the United
States have dropped to zero: while huge num-
bers of people still cross the border (close to
300 million per years), the number of Latin
American that stays in the North has not been increasing significantly in recent years.

Closer still to the security challenges that we discuss here, the violence that plagues the region simply does not cross the border. Clearly, drugs and those who carry it penetrate the United States, but violence does not follow. In fact, the American cities that dot the border with Mexico have been, over the last ten years, among the safest in the whole country. When Ciudad Juarez, was going through hellish gang wars triggered by the Mexican government's offensive against the cartel that controlled the cocaine cross-border trade, its sister city right across the frontier, El Paso, had one of the lowest homicide rates of any city in the United States. A similar situation prevailed on the Pacific Coast, with idyllic San Diego immune from the violence that wracked neighbouring Tijuana.

The third reason for Canada's imperviousness to the violence and instability that prevails in Latin America and the Caribbean lies in the peculiarities of the latter, specifically in the central role that cocaine plays in the region's current plight. There is growing evidence that the relative importance of cocaine in Canada's illegal drug market is quickly diminishing. According to Statistics Canada's latest report on police-reported crime, arrests for cocaine possession and for trafficking have dropped respectively by 46% and 40% between 2006 and 2016. By contrast, arrests for heroin possession and trafficking have increased, respectively, by 216% and 126% over the same period (Statistics Canada, 2017). It is true that Mexico also exports heroin, however, according to Canadian Border Agency Report, that country does not rank among the four most important sources of heroin seized in Canada over the last ten years (Global News, 2017 08 01), which suggests that the product used here probably comes from Asia, most likely Afghanistan. In other words, the Canadian drug market appears to be increasingly detaching itself from the trafficking chains that tie it to Latin American criminal organizations.

As in the United States, moreover, it appears that violence does not follow drugs in Canada. While consumption levels stand as high or higher than in much of Latin America for most illegal drugs, including cocaine, the trade has never been associated with a significant amount of violence. The country's 611 homicides over the whole of 2016 (Statistics Canada, 2017) represents barely more than a typical long weekend tally in Brazil, leaving aside the fact that a large proportion of those homicides have nothing to do with crime or drug trafficking. Canada's drug markets, in other words, are managed remarkably peacefully.

**Conclusion**

Canada shares a hemisphere with some of the most violent and insecure countries in the world. None of them can be said represents a military threat for their neighbours and, up to now at least, the instability and deadly violence that prevail among them has no significant bearing on Canadian security.

Three buffers protect Canada: the limited economic interdependence that exists between it and the region; the presence of the United States; and the characteristics of Canada's drug markets and of its management. While the three appear relatively sound, caveats should be introduced about each of them.

The only country of the region with which a degree of interdependence exists is Mexico. Up to now, and in spite of the critical moments that the country has lived at the height of the latest drug battle, in the mid-2000, the country's institutions have proven to be resilient. With violence increasing again, the very real possibility that the NAFTA lifeline could be cut by the Trump administration, significant uncertainty regarding the process and the outcome of the forthcoming national elections, and with a capital reeling after a massive earthquake, institu-
tional resilience will be under severe stress, and could be found wanting. If it were the case, the extent to which the US buffer could absorb all of the resulting instability is far from clear.

The uncertainty introduced by the Trump administration's immigration policy could in particular transform the dynamics of northern migration for migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean. The current outflow of migrants, mostly of Haitian origin, from the United States into Quebec and South-eastern Ontario could be the first signs of a change that could make Canada a much more common destination for the people pushed out of the region by violence and instability.

Lastly, drug tastes are fickle and the continuing existence of a black market for cannabis, following the legalization of adult use, may raise the interests of well-capitalized Latin American criminal organizations. In addition, the Mexican traders of "black tar" heroin that grabs a significant portion of the illegal US market for opioids may be tempted to bring their relatively safe product into a Canadian market where the dangers of fentanyl are becoming clear.

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**NOTES**


In a 1947 address at the University of Toronto, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent spoke broadly of many problems facing Canada after World War Two. Chief among them was the need for Canada to uphold and defend the core values of freedom and liberty in the face of rising tyranny from the Soviet Bloc. For St. Laurent, international organizations such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and later NATO, were central to achieving those objectives. In some ways, those core commitments have persisted. In some important ways, they have not. If there is a truism in Canadian foreign policy, it is that Canada has typically addressed questions of peace and security through multilateralism and membership in various organizations, where emphasis lies with rule of law, economic prosperity, and national unity.

In recent years we have seen deviations from that path, as Canada fluctuates between cooperation and confrontation. During the Cold War, Canada’s relationship with Russia was marked by ideological hostility, strategic containment, and deterrence. In the post-Cold War era, we have witnessed a more activist, ad hoc, and certainly more direct confrontational strategy that has left Canada less room to engage constructively. Just as the Soviet Union served as the bad “other” in St. Laurent’s days, so too has Russia become the “bad other” for this generation’s prime ministers. The certainty, resolve, and determination of the Cold War era has given way to reactive policies that pitch Russia as a revisionist state determined to rebalance the strategic order. When it comes to relations with Russia, Canada has less room to maneuver than ever before. Much of that can be attributed to a lack of strategic foresight and ill-advised decisions to put NATO on an offensive footing as it slowly encroached on Russia’s spheres of influence.1 Consider that in 1987, the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney released a Defence White Paper identifying the Soviet Union as the single largest security threat facing the West. Pitching the Evil Empire as an expansionist and persistent violator of human rights helped justify the subsequent purchase of several British made submarines, in response to the presumed threat from the Soviet adversary lurking beneath Canada’s coastal waters. Even Mulroney’s predecessor, Pierre Trudeau, made the decision to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a country that the Soviets would not leave for another nine years. But when the Warsaw Pact dissolved and the Soviet Union collapsed, thereby unleashing a torrent of ethnic and nationalist violence from the Balkans to Central Asia, Conservative and Liberal governments alike were swept up in a wave of changes that would bring Russia and its former satellite states into closer, sometimes uncomfortable, contact. Initially, dialogue and cooperation with Russia, rather than confrontation, would be the order of the day.2

For example, in 1991 the two Germanys reunited, and in a cooperative gesture, it was agreed that no nuclear missiles would be stationed in the former East Germany. The Visegrad Group, and eventually the Vilnius Group, would obtain full membership in NATO, ensuring that Canada would help provide security guarantees for those Central and East European countries previously part of the Soviet Union. At the time, NATO’s enlargement was largely seen as a mechanism for denationalizing the militaries of these states and ensuring their civilian control. New members would be security makers, not security takers. Canada would find a seat at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an organization that provided a

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window on the unstable security situation in Russia’s near abroad.

Looking back, we can see clearly that the Conservatives under Brian Mulroney and the Liberals under Jean Chretien were caught off guard by this monumental shift in geopolitics, forced to recalibrate the government’s security posture, and rethink how Canada would engage the world, and Russia in particular. While Canada’s NATO contributions would witness a net decline in terms of troops deployed in Western Europe, many of those soldiers would see action in NATO’s out-of-area operations – first in the Balkans and eventually in other regions left stranded in the wake of the Soviet collapse. UN peacekeepers would be deployed in a variety of failed states, many former clients of the Soviet Union, from West Africa to the Horn of Africa, and from the Middle East to Central Asia. Mulroney’s commitments to cooperative security, fashioned clearly in the mold of international liberalism, sought to strengthen dialogue in the North Pacific in the face of an increasing Chinese presence and a weak North Korea.

Jean Chretien would continue this form of cooperative engagement, working hard to strengthen both the G8 and the G20 in which the Soviet Union’s primary successor state, the Russian Federation, and Canada would participate as equals. By the time Paul Martin came to power as Prime Minister, Canada’s commitments to UN peacekeeping were clearly on the decline. Indeed, for the next 15 years, the bulk of Canadian forces abroad would almost exclusively be tasked under NATO command with an emphasis on war fighting rather than conflict prevention in those areas of strategic importance to Russia: the Balkans, Libya, and Afghanistan. NATO assets would be deployed in a more ad hoc fashion in Iraq and Syria as well. Canada’s contributions to these missions would become particularly important when Jean Chretien and his successor Paul Martin decided to engage Afghanistan’s shaky government in support of a comprehensive but misguided state-building project right in Russia’s backyard.3

After Stephen Harper became Prime Minister, his anti-communist stance helped propel him to majority government status by generating popular support from those Canadians who fled Eastern Bloc nations. Indeed, in several speeches to those groups, his message was consistent. First, there was the constant refrain of previous Liberal policy failure – policies considered too soft towards Russia and communism – by criticizing Pierre Trudeau’s efforts to launch a peace mission toward the end of his career, while neglecting the fact that all Liberal governments had stationed Canadian forces in Europe over several decades. Then there was the clear reference to Canadians who fled communist states. Finally, there was the oft repeated slogan of taking a “principled stand” in a world divided by “good and evil” and “black and white.”4 It was during this time that we witnessed a decline in Canada’s commitments to global governance and a willingness to seek out like-minded allies in lieu of working within the United Nations. Within this period, we also observe the dismantling of the Pearsonian-internationalist agenda deeply embedded in the then Department of Foreign Affairs.

A more confrontational policy would begin to match the rhetoric starting with claims that the country was poised to become an energy superpower. Arctic exploration would become a serious contender for a new policy domain under the rubric of expanding and hostile Russian interests. Perhaps because of the media’s portrayal of Russia as a threat to Canada’s Arctic, the Harper government ignored the fact that Russia was the only Arctic state sympathetic to Canada’s characterization of the Northwest Passage and was, like Canada, unenthusiastic about expanding Arctic Council membership to non-Arctic states. Indeed, Russia acted more as a “team player” in the Arctic than the United States. In this regard, the roots of the Harper government’s perceived fear of Russia in the
Arctic and its policy objectives would be consistent with its ideological stance that overlooked some realities which were not consistent with that world view.

These changes were further amplified by Canada’s response to the conflict in Libya in 2011, in which Canadian Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard led the NATO air campaign against pro-Gaddafi forces, despite Russian opposition. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine was invoked for the first time to intervene in the escaling conflict in Libya. China and Russia supported UN Security Council Resolution 1973, authorizing the use of force, with the understanding that NATO’s role would be extremely limited. Instead, NATO used the resolution to support the destruction of Muammar Gaddafi’s forces on the ground, establish a no-fly zone, support an arms embargo, and impose economic sanctions on Gaddafi’s crumbling government. Those actions infuriated Russia and were seen as one of the main reasons that Russia, along with China, refused to allow UN intervention later in Syria.5

While some portrayed the destruction of Gaddafi’s forces as a duty to act, others saw it as premeditated intervention precipitating a wave of destruction across the Western Sahel, rendering Libya and several of its neighbours too weak to function. Going to great lengths to defend what was clearly an uncertain victory, Harper noted:

*History shows us this: that freedom seldom flowers in undisturbed ground. And so, while few nations exceed our home and native land in its passion for peace, a generous spirit will not blind us to injustice. Still less shall ‘modest stillness and humility’ make us indifferent toward oppressors.*6

Vladimir Putin, the Prime Minister of Russia at the time, defined the UNSCR 1973 as "defective and flawed," resembling "a medieval call for the Crusades."

Despite much deserved criticism for failing to follow through on Libya, the Harper government took a similar “humanitarian” stand while justifying Canada’s involvement in the Syrian civil war. Russia had long supported the government of Bashar al-Assad politically, with military aid, and since September 30, 2015, through direct military involvement. In 2012, Stephen Harper called on Russia to stop blocking efforts to impose sanctions on the "murderous" Syrian regime of al-Assad. The Prime Minister singled out Russia by name in Parliament during Question Period to contribute to international efforts to impose binding sanctions on the Assad regime.

With the shoe now on the other foot, it was Harper’s turn to express ambivalence towards UN Charter Law, since Russia relied on its veto to ensure NATO could not intervene. In reality, few Western leaders had the appetite to send ground forces into Syria. There was, however, Western consistency in supporting nominal allies on the ground such as the Kurds, and to grind away at Assad’s forces indirectly by providing training and arms for these and other “freedom fighters.” Under Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau, Canada would participate in the U.S.-led coalition bombing of Islamic State militants in support of the Kurds, who are now poised to become an independent nation.7

If the crises in Libya and Syria demonstrated incongruities in Canada’s confrontations with Russia, Ukraine posed a new set of problems. Even before the Harper government came to power in 2006, the promotion of democracy in Ukraine was a long standing area of focus for the Canadian government.8 With the onset of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, Canada-Russia relations permeated all aspects of Canadian defence policy, including a decision to deploy Canadian trainers to Ukraine and NATO forces to the Baltics, coupled with sanctions against the Russian government for its role in the Crimean and Eastern-Ukrainian conflict. As coverage of
the unfolding crisis in Ukraine shifted focus away from the protests in Kiev and the installation of a shaky and inexperienced government, a dominant narrative began to emerge. It was a narrative rich with irony, mixed with hysteria and moral outrage, driven by a singular underlying theme. It is reminiscent of John Foster Dulles’ Cold War mindset that saw the Russians as only capable of acting in bad faith. For anyone with a Twitter account sifting through all the fascinating messages sent by those reacting in Washington and Ottawa, there was a clear disconnect. In a statement dripping with irony, John Kerry tweeted: “You just don’t, in the 21st century, behave in 19th-century fashion by invading another country on a completely trumped-up pretext.”

By the time the Ukrainian crisis was in full swing, the Conservatives had clearly staked out their position, siding for the most part with the American narrative, though it was not the only one. Angela Merkel, the only western leader engaged in meaningful diplomacy during the Ukraine crisis, recognized the foolishness of arming Ukraine, taking to task US Senator John McCain for suggesting so. The Conservatives, and later the Liberals under Justin Trudeau, seized every opportunity to portray Russia as expansionist, unpredictable, and uncooperative. Diplomacy was left to wither on the vine. Canada’s confrontational stance was best expressed in a 2017 speech by Liberal Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland, who suggested that Latvia faced an “existential” threat. Given that Latvia’s Russian speaking population is close to 26%, it wasn’t clear if she was referring to a threat from within or externally. Heavy-handed and simplistic in tone, the speech was consistent with past Harperian refrains. The pandering to a domestic audience was on full display.

The difficulty is that Canada is now bound to a commitment that will reap few dividends for Canadians at home. For Ukraine, a country that has received over half a billion dollars in loans and aid from Canada, there are real benefits to having the West exert continued pressure on Russia. For one, Kiev cannot afford to have the United States and Canada lose interest in Eastern Ukraine in the same way the West lost interest in Crimea. Nor can Kiev afford to have the sanctions regime crumble amid its own tenuous restructuring. Owing billions of dollars to the West, Kiev needs all the attention and resources it can muster to avoid economic and political failure. Canada, which has strongly come out in favour of the Ukrainian government, despite concerns of corruption and rule of law, is in no position to offer its services as a mediator to the conflict. Under the Harper government, Canada was instrumental in drafting the original Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) agreement that became the Minsk agreements, despite its vehement anti-Russian stance. There is even less room for Trudeau to maneuver, due to his renewed commitments to training Ukrainian soldiers and deploying several hundred troops in the Baltic states under NATO command. Such policies are at odds with the Trudeau agenda to rejuvenate multilateralism, its commitments to diplomacy, and its claims of bringing peace and stability to the world.

Though the Trudeau government terminated its air operations in Syria against the Islamic State under Operation Impact, it inherited and adopted much of the policies and world views from the preceding Conservative government. Canada maintained its support for US airstrikes on Syria, seen by Russia as part of a coordinated effort to strangle and collapse one of its closest allies in the Middle East. Trudeau notably stated that Bashar al-Assad should not be included as a party in diplomatic efforts and dialogue for peace in the Syrian conflict – a position dismissed by Russia. Even though sanctions largely proved to be an ineffective instrument in forcing Russia to abandon its policies on Syria and Ukraine, Canada expanded its sanctions regime under Trudeau.
Like other NATO members, Canada became concerned with large-scale cyber threats commonly linked to Russia’s security apparatus. No substantial evidence was made public, but Russia was accused by the US intelligence community of attempting to influence the results of the 2016 presidential elections. Relying on the testimony of its international allies, Trudeau’s government contended that the upcoming 2019 Canadian Federal election could be subjected to interference through cyberspace. Chrystia Freeland argued in Parliament that cyberattacks would undermine Canada’s vulnerable democracy, and should be met with countermeasures, which under NATO Charter Law would be illegal if considered offensive rather than defensive. Freeland also advocated for the passage of a Magnitsky-like legislature which sharply deteriorated Russia’s trust for Canada. The Ambassador of Russia to Canada characterized this effort as a hurtful political maneuver that would only hinder goodwill and bilateral cooperation between the two states.1

Almost 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Canada’s commitment to a hostile doctrine towards Russia has become branded by path dependence. It will yield few benefits as the lack of trust between the two states now inhibits substantial cooperation in the Arctic, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Without a change in course in which diplomacy and not confrontation wins the day, we can only expect further deterioration in those critical areas that bind the two countries together.

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2 Ibid.
3 Ironically, when Donald Trump made a decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, it was apparent that for the Americans to succeed, both Russian and Iranian support would be needed to bring stability to Afghanistan. Since Trump was pressured reluctantly to put more sanctions on Russia and take a hard line stance on Iran, America has few countries they can count on in the region. The push back from entrenched interests was immense.
5 The Canadian mission began with the deployment of the frigate HMCS Charlottetown, to help evacuate Canadians from Libya. In March 2011 Canada joined Britain, France, Italy and the US with six CF-18s to enforce a no-fly zone and engaged militarily with Libya. The mission, called Operation Unified Protector (OUP), later included Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain. The NATO-led operation was also supported by Jordan, Qatar, Sweden, and the UAE. By August 2011, the Libyan National Transitional Council, with NATO support, had taken over the country and removed Gaddafi from power.
7 By the summer of 2017 a deconfliction zone would be established to ensure American influence over almost half of Syria - a strategy that echoed in many ways the US decision to dismember Iraq in the lead up to invasion in 2003 through UNSC Resolution 688.

In August 2017 a specially built Russian tanker, Christophe de Margerie, carrying liquefied natural gas (LNG) sailed through the Arctic without an icebreaker escort shortening by 30% the time a ship normally takes from Norway to South Korea. Though this was more about a potential than an immediate change in trade movements, it reflected in a dramatic way the possibilities that the warming Arctic waters might offer, ones that could have a profound impact on trade, economics, and strategy. For Canada specifically, this further illuminated the seminal importance of the North and the Arctic.

Whereas the significance of this region is not something new to Canadians there seems to be an added urgency. Canada is not alone in the Arctic and recognizing this it has been a member of the Arctic Council since that organization’s inception. Further Canada has cooperated and “debated” Northern and Arctic issues with several of its circumpolar neighbours. Ottawa has even had disputes with a most friendly fellow NATO member, Denmark which, through its control of Greenland, has made vast claims to the Arctic. There are matters still to be resolved over tiny Hans Island between Copenhagen and Ottawa. And of course, there have been long historical disputes with the United States over the Northwest Passage that are too numerous to list in a short contribution.

The greatest possibility for confrontation and perhaps conflict, however, in the North and the Arctic is with Russia. True, some years ago though, then Foreign Minister, Stephane Dion declared that the two countries have reasons to cooperate and avoid military confrontation. Indeed Russia has profound interests in the Arctic and there are legitimate reasons why Moscow would wish to protect such concerns. The problem is that there are particular Russian modalities and motivations that considerably complicate matters.

First, Russia has the longest Arctic coastline in the world and claims long continental shelves that include the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges. Although other countries bordering the Arctic also claim these, the Kremlinassertively contends these ridges belong to them – vast tracts that would give the Kremlin control of more than an additional million square kilometres of seabed.

Second, no other country has as significant a population in the region as Russia. Roughly 9 million Russians live in scores of cities and settlements in the North — a number unmatched by any other Arctic neighbor.

Third, Russia has invested economically far more in the Arctic than any other state. About 20 percent of Russia’s GDP and nearly a quarter of its exports are generated in this region. Moreover, the Arctic’s vast energy potential, with roughly 20 percent of the world’s hydrocarbons only magnifies its economic significance for Moscow. Should energy prices rise and the West lift sanctions, Moscow would very likely sharply increase its hydrocarbon extraction efforts in the Arctic.

Fourth, Russia has an unmatched and growing military presence in the Arctic. It is where it bases its powerful Northern Fleet, significant numbers of its nuclear ballistic missile submarines, and the world’s most powerful fleet of heavy icebreakers. When Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new national security strategy for the country on December 31, 2015, it preserved the significance of the Arctic while em-
phasizing the importance of Russian international prestige and leadership.\textsuperscript{9}

More than that, the strategy presents remarkably ambitious international and domestic goals, including a huge modernization of the Russian military.\textsuperscript{10} The national security strategy (NSS) blueprint continues to assign a high priority to strengthening Russian military capability, including projection of force. Heath Payne and Mark Schneider have argued with considerable justification that the NSS “is a blueprint for Moscow’s reestablishment of a militaristic, authoritarian state that gains its legitimacy through the blatant promotion internally of nationalism and fear of an imminent Western threat”.\textsuperscript{11}

Much of this, as noted, focuses on the Arctic. In 2016 the bombastic and provocative Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin, not surprisingly, quipped that, “the Arctic is a Russia Mecca”.\textsuperscript{12}

In 2017, Russia began its biggest military push in the Arctic since the collapse of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{13} The editor-in-chief of Moscow Defence Brief, Mikhail Barabanov declared that, “the modernization of the Arctic forces and of Arctic military infrastructure is taking place at an unprecedented pace not seen even in Soviet times”.\textsuperscript{14} Russia, which is the only country that has nuclear-powered icebreakers (with a total fleet of 40, 6 of which are nuclear) will build 3 new heavy nuclear icebreakers. Further, an icebreaker will be deployed with Russia’s Northern Fleet in the Kola Bay, giving it unique capabilities, and additionally the fleet will receive two cruise missile-armed ice-capable corvettes.\textsuperscript{15}

It is also worth noting that despite the Arctic’s very fragile and difficult eco-system and Moscow’s glaringly poor record as a custodian of the environment, Russia has moved far ahead of other members of the Arctic Council (comprised of eight states) in exploring and extracting energy in the region. A recent study by the Council on Foreign Relations demonstrates that one of the nearly sixty large oil and natural gas fields discovered in the Arctic, forty-three are in Russia, eleven in Canada, six in Alaska, and one in Norway.\textsuperscript{17} In a sense, given the extreme dependence of the Russian economy on energy and particularly hydrocarbon exports, it is not surprising that Mr. Putin and his government have made a military buildup in the Arctic a strategic priority. Energy, is in Mr. Putin’s view one of the very best cards that he has to play. He is playing this card however within a larger Russian policy game that is based on dangerous imperial delusions, namely of superpower restoration via expansion, provocation, and maneuver.

It is important to appreciate though that despite such volatility we are not in a new Cold War and the world democracies are not facing a massive military threat from a superpower with tens of thousands of tanks and vast numbers of aircraft ready to march across Europe or intent on devastating North American cities in an ideologically driven war fought for the purpose of imposing some universalistic doctrine.

Moreover, Russia today is definitely not a superpower (with the sole exception of nuclear weapons) and it is highly unlikely that it ever will be one. It has a GDP that in nominal terms is only that of Italy’s (and just slightly larger than that of Canada) and one that on a per capita basis is comparable to that of Barbados.\textsuperscript{18} It faces enormously difficult demographic problems with a rapidly aging population among its one hundred and forty three million citizens. Moscow is also confronting seemingly intractable ethnic issues with tremendous tensions in the Caucasus.

Furthermore, Russia is plagued by a now stagnant uni-dimensional economy that is in desperate need of fundamental structural reform if it is to be competitive in a modern international system. With an economy so utterly dependent on resources, which also comprise the vast majority of its exports (the remainder coming largely...
from sale of weapons, particularly to rogue states), Moscow, as noted, is very keen on increasing the extraction of hydrocarbons for that would bring it both enhanced revenue and international leverage.

Russia thus requires vast quantities of energy and constant international “successes”, for it is choosing not to be a genuinely modernizing (with the exception of its military) and reforming state that would afford its long-suffering citizens the opportunity to truly benefit from its unparalleled natural resources and vast human talent. It is in reality a polity with an increasingly stagnant economy, ever-growing sharp restrictions on human rights, and rule by a cynical kleptocracy. Transparency International rightly continually ranks the country as one of the most corrupt in the world. Instead of real change, what Mr. Putin has pursued is a kind of “political magical realism” (PMR) that in some ways is similar to the “magical realism” used in literature; however, here, instead of a clever literary device, we have delusional politics and policies.

There is too frequently an evasion of rational political and economic policy in favour of political fantasy and a ludicrous Putinist personality cult resulting in a political order that is both repressive and risible. Yet, it is important, however, here to also appreciate that characterizing Mr. Putin’s behaviour as “delusional” does not imply some irreversible clinical pathology but evinces instead a political indulgence fueled by a still disorganized opposition at home and, quite significantly, by feeble responses to Russian aggressiveness abroad.

There is a danger then from Russia as Moscow pokes and provokes in the Arctic, but at first blush it would seem that Canada has a very effective triple layer of protection to guarantee its interests and sovereignty. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance of democracies that has enjoyed remarkable historical longevity, is one of these layers. Second, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) adds to the transatlantic Alliance a defence agreement with Washington, one that has the dual Canadian/US goal of assuring effective aerospace warning, air sovereignty, and the overall defence of North America. Third, Canada, as a successful modern state and a member of the G-7, has its own significant military capabilities as well as great economic potential.

Sadly, the “triple layer” is not nearly as potent as it seems. There are significant problems with both NORAD and NATO. It is an axiom in international relations that weakness, particularly when it comes to the use of “hard power” can be provocative. Ineffective use of “hard power” too often emboldens the target. The American military is potentially by far the most powerful in the world. But capacity is not the same as actual power. If the United States is not prepared to offer the necessary leadership in coordinating and mobilizing its own and allied power, in either NATO or NORAD, no other country or countries can provide an adequate substitute. Effective power again incorporates both “hard” and “soft power” working in tandem and mobilizes capacity across the spectrum.

The United States under President Obama showed extreme reluctance to use military force which at one level is highly commendable but his willingness to only “lead from behind” - in essence an absence of leadership - did not mobilize in any effective way either the elements of hard power or the vast array of soft power that America possesses. Now, President Trump’s “emphasis on “America first” and his repeated criticism of NATO has cast further doubt on the potency of the NORAD and NATO protective layers for Canada.

Though there are signs that NATO as a whole is increasing defence expenditures, what Canada has to invariably conclude from the above is that there are serious questions about the relia-
bility of the United States as an ally in the Arctic, especially in certain potential confrontational situations. Consequently, if Canada is to safeguard its sovereignty and national interest, it has to reinforce the third layer of defence, namely self-reliance. Faced with increased Chinese assertiveness in Asia, Australia for instance, has decided to significantly boost its air defences. Canada needs to act similarly regarding our north and the Arctic Ocean.

In a sense, Canada must improve the effectiveness of both its “hardware” and “software.” In terms of the former, Ottawa will need to make significant additional expenditures and preparations that should include purchases of additional advanced aircraft, surface vessels, among them powerful icebreakers, and modern subs with Arctic capacity. The 2017 Defence Policy released in June continues to emphasize the importance of the Arctic and significantly describes Russia as an Arctic adversary. Further, the defence policy indicates that Canada will increase military spending by 70% over the next decade. Canada however needs to ensure that there is wise increased spending which would emphasize qualitative superiority including the purchase of fifth-generation fighters that provide a systemic advantage. In terms of “software”, Canada should enhance domestic consensus on the need to respond to Russian delusions of empire and specifically Moscow’s increasing assertiveness in the Arctic. While Ottawa should continue to foster strong diplomatic and military support among our NATO allies and continue to work within the Arctic Council, it should also signal unequivocally to Russia that it is willing to strongly defend Canadian sovereignty and national interest in the Arctic.

Just as there are no painless sanctions, (though effective sanctions are perhaps the best means to obviate the need for recourse to military force), so there is no deterrence on the cheap. It is by reinforcing all three layers of defence, but especially the third one, that Canada would best be able to reduce the possibility of miscalculation and misperception that so often historically have led to international conflict. It is a most effective way as well to remove temptation from Russia and to introduce a kind of “reality check” into Mr. Putin’s delusional imperial dreams. That in turn would go a considerable distance to reducing the risk of conflict. The “hardware” must be accompanied then by the “software” of clear and resolute policies and statements which also have the benefit of demonstrating Canadian leadership. Let us not forget that Mr. Putin in the past has shown himself of being capable of cooperation and compromise, but only when all of his other options are unequivocally removed.

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6 Ibid.


During the last two decades of its 150 years, Canada, along with its NATO partners, have had to adapt to a phenomenon largely buried during a century of state-on-state conflict: the violent non-state actor. On the one hand, Canada and NATO have confronted actors such as warlords in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the Islamic State in the Middle East and elsewhere. Actors of this sort are emblematic of the adversaries Canada and its allies were likely to face after the Cold War as described in 2006 by Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier: the challenge is “not with the [Russian] bear, but a ball of snakes”.

On the other hand, to respond to such enemies, Canada and NATO member states have relied upon another violent non-state actor: the Private Military and Security Company (PMSC). One can argue that Canada’s employment of PMSCs made the Afghanistan mission operationally sustainable and politically palatable. Other analysts have made similar assertions regarding PMSC usage by other NATO member states.

This chapter makes two main points. One is that as this state-PMSC interaction occurred, Canada and like-minded states worked iteratively through their initiatives and their diplomatic activities to structure the PMSC industry around two predominant features: 1) a defensive approach towards the application of violence and 2) a prevalent emphasis on offering manpower rather than the utilization of the major weapons systems characteristic of states. In essence, PMSC reliance became both normatively bound and normalized. The chapter’s second point recognizes that this interaction has caught the eye of the bear – Russia. This is evident in Russian policy announcements and military thinking vis-à-vis security privatization. However, the chapter stresses that Canada and NATO member states would be well advised to not place this Russian approach in the same conceptual and functional box as its own PMSC usage. This is because Russian security privatization is nested in hybrid warfare/new generation warfare/Gray Zone conflict.

**Framing PMSCs**

While there have been many regulatory attempts, both domestic and international, meant to frame the PMSC industry since the late 1990s, arguably the undertaking of greatest consequence has been the 2008 Montreux Document. The document’s contributions, negotiated amongst states under the auspices of the Swiss Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross, are threefold. First, it stresses that PMSCs do not operate in a legal vacuum; existing international humanitarian law applies. Second, it suggests best practices that states and other interested parties might follow in their dealings with firms. Third, and most important for this chapter, it provides a definition of the PMSC that sets the industry in a defensive mould: “PMSCs are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves”. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.

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Canada, NATO member states, and NATO itself have been substantial supporters of the document. Amongst the initial 17 state signatories...
were six NATO countries: Canada, France, Germany, Poland, the United States, and the United Kingdom. At the time of writing, 54 states have signed onto the document, a number including all 28 NATO member states save Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey. NATO itself became a signatory in 2013.

Using Canada as an example, Canada’s Privy Council’s Office and Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada agreed in 2008 that the Department of National Defence should develop PMSC-centric policy. The result was the National Defence Directive on the Selection and Use of Private Military and Security Contractors on Deployed Operations. The Montreux Document’s defensive-minded influence is evident in the list of PMSC activities covered by the directive:

- Guarding and surveillance of assets (e.g., movable objects, buildings, facilities);
- Manning of check-points;
- Protection of persons;
- Escorting and protecting convoys;
- Advising on matters of security and protection;
- Operation of observation and/or weapons platforms…;
- Handling of dogs in support of military operations; and
- Training of military, paramilitary and police units (in military and security skills such as use of firearms, protection of persons or property, conduct of military operations, etc.).

This defensive policy orientation also reflected how the Canadian military was employing PMSCs at the time in Afghanistan. For instance, the PMSC Tundra Group provided security for Canadian forward operating bases. In the urban milieu, two other firms, Hart Security and Blue Hackle Security, served the Strategic Advisory Team in Kabul and the Joint Coordination Centre in Kandahar in a protective manner.

Though both the Montreux Document and the Canadian directive mention the operation of weapons systems or platforms, it is important to identify that NATO member states have pointedly under-utilized PMSCs in this regard. Put differently, they have encouraged PMSCs to follow labour-centric, rather than capital-centric, approaches. As I have argued elsewhere, states favour their own usage and control over these weapons systems for both functional rationales and reasons of prestige.

Consider some NATO-centric examples. In the Canadian case, the military significantly bound its reliance on firms for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) services in Afghanistan. Firms providing leased UAVs conducted the take offs and landings whereas military personnel did the flying and data collection. These UAVs were unarmed so offensive action was impossible. In the US case, during the intervention in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) determined the types of weaponry PMSCs could possess. The CPA prohibited so-called “Special Category Weapons” described as follows: “explosives, improvised explosives or incendiary devices, grenades, rockets, shells or mines and any means of discharging such items, crew-served weapons of any kind, and Man Portable Air Defense Systems of any kind”. The illegal possession of crew-served weapons risked a 30-year imprisonment minimum. Finally, NATO, through its guidelines on demilitarization, dismantling, and disposal, has made it very difficult for firms to acquire such weaponry through second-hand trade/resale endeavours: “Executing those services will eliminate the military capabilities of said military items, defence articles, and defence systems to preclude unauthorized use, to destroy the military advantages inherent in certain types of property, to render innocuous that property which is dangerous, to protect national interests, and to preclude the compromise of security requirements”.

Russia and Security Privatization
Russia’s approach towards security privatization beyond its borders has been opaque. Certainly, the usage of PMSCs by NATO member states, the United States in particular, has not gone unnoticed in Russia. In 2013, General Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, reflected upon recent changes in conflict and so identified “private military companies” as an important phenomenon therein. Nevertheless, the political approach has been ambiguous. On the one hand, President Vladimir Putin suggested in 2011 that “such companies are a way of implementing national interests without the direct involvement of the state”. A year later Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin mused about whether Russia should embrace the international PMSC industry or follow its own route: “We are thinking about whether our money should go toward financing foreign private security [and] military companies, or whether we should consider the feasibility of such companies in Russia itself”. On the other hand, parliamentary investigations and legislative attempts meant to authorize and legalize international security privatization efforts have come to naught since then. However, the Russian government has taken steps to harvest expertise and capabilities, whatever their organization. On 9 January 2017, Law No. 53 came into force. It indicates that any one who is a reservist or who has completed military service (not an insignificant amount of the population) can be considered as part of the Russian military so long as that individual “prevents international terrorist activities outside the territory of the Russian Federation”. The ambiguity continues in terms of how Russia conceptualizes firms and utilizes them in practice. Russian military doctrine presents “private military companies” as nevertheless non-military armed forces (despite Law No. 53 above). Because they do not have the cachet or profile of state military forces, they are categorized as components of hybrid warfare (very much a Western conception) or of New Generation Warfare (drawn from Russian thinking). Put differently, such actors potentially permit the state to achieve objectives below the threshold, or without the presence, of state military effort. They fit well into the longstanding notion of Gray Zone conflict with states seeking “strategic gradualism” rather than immediate effect, but they are representative of contemporary dynamics and opportunities. Russian military thinking presents “private military companies” as catalyzing uncertainty amongst an adversary and other audiences. In practice, Russia employed companies such as Wagner against Ukraine in order to confuse and support an already obscured Russian military presence. Russian private military companies operated in Crimea and the Donbass where they conducted “missions that could not be performed by the Novorossia militias or regular Russian military forces for military or political reasons”. In Syria, the operations of companies allowed Russia to place more emphasis on the official state presence rooted in air power.

Overall, one can make three observations about the Russian approach. First, Russia is not averse to using these companies in an offensive manner. Second, Russia has permitted these companies to use heavy military equipment. Reports suggest that companies in Syria used battle tanks and other weapons systems, thus making them much more akin to state-sponsored para-militaries. Third, this approach deviates considerably from the practices and expectations followed by Canada and NATO member states. For these states, PMSCs allow for a division of labour through which state military forces can concentrate upon offensive tasks whereas PMSCs can focus on defensive tasks. When employed in situations in which Western state military forces are not predominant, PMSCs are considered as maintaining the status quo through their promotion of “liddism”, described as “keeping the lid on [a conflict or challenge] rather than reducing the heat”. In the Russian case, however, companies are to usurp the status quo and to apply violence proactively.
Concluding Remarks

In light of the activism of Canada and its NATO partners vis-à-vis violent non-state actors in recent years and the different Russian approach taken towards this phenomenon, at least in terms of armed commercial companies, there are two issues to consider going forward. One is that NATO member states should not conceive of Russian “private military companies” activities as synonymous with their own PMSC usage. While Russia has taken note of this usage in contemporary conflict, its conceptual stance and functional approach are decidedly different. They are tools of subterfuge rather than of the status quo. In countering hybrid war tactics, or new generational warfare, or in responding to Russia in the so-called Gray Zone, NATO member states will have to take this into account. The other issue to consider concerns the control of organized violence. Managing, if not eliminating non-state violence, has been an ongoing state enterprise since the Treaty of Westphalia. Today, the world will likely see a great deal more disorder if the “private military company” concept employed by Russia usurps the PMSC. As such, promoting the Montreux Document in order to achieve a Russian signature would be a beneficial initiative, certainly for NATO strategically, but more importantly for world peace and stability. Indeed, Russia did have an interest in the Montreux Document at one time. Though it was involved in its negotiation, it did not sign, arguably as a response to Western criticism of its August 2008 conflict with Georgia. Pushing for Russia’s signature, therefore, has considerable logic.

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4 The full title is The Montreux Document On pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict.


Irregular threats” are generally correlated with non-state radical movements waging "primitive" guerrilla warfare or terrorism such as A-Qaeda or Daesh. Another pattern that usually comes to mind is that of state actors conducting subversive or counter-insurgency campaigns as an extension of their conventional policy 'by other means'.2 Still underestimated, a third type of irregular challenge has been emerging, and is associated with state actors such as Russia, the People's Republic of China, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Over the past 30 years, these actors have developed, independently or in isomorphism, a new form of irregular strategy that differs from the first two categories mentioned above. While integrating past methods, they go beyond "first" and "second-generation" asymmetrical techniques practiced during the Cold War and elevate the use of irregular approaches to a brand new level:

Without giving up first-generation irregular warfare (guerrilla/terrorism) and second-generation irregular warfare (IW by proxy), Russia, China and Iran have also been developing what could be called a third-generation irregular approach: a powerful 360° influence strategy consisting of using every single means and options available, while minimizing the use of violence; something more about irregular strategy than irregular warfare; a hybrid approach not subjected to conventional principles governing the Westphalian paradigm, one that is at the core of these countries' international policy, and one shaping all of its facets.3

Globalization and, more specifically, complex interdependence4 created the perfect environment for the emergence of this mutant strategy, by promoting a greater "redistribution of global power"5 while allowing for a stronger questioning of Western supremacy. In this particular context, emerging or re-emerging states have seen asymmetric strategies as the best way to compensate for the many deficiencies they face vis-a-vis their western counterparts in the military, technological, and economic fields. This phenomenon was already identified in the early 2000s by institutions such as the US Department of State: "It is precisely because of our overwhelming capability to overcome conventional threats that our enemies will attempt to defeat us through other means".6 Put another way, resorting to a-symmetry - as in an absence of symmetry - results from attempts to cancel dis-symmetry – i.e. the imbalance of power.

An important characteristic of states turning to asymmetric strategies is reliance on Westphalian principles such as national sovereignty and non-interference, while circumventing these same principles when it suits their interests. In contrast to standard Westphalian actors like the United States, Japan or France7, they operate as “trans-Westphalian states” in the sense that they derive benefits from the status of a “normal” state but tend to test the limits of the system whenever possible and advantageous. As observed in the “Red” actors case studies report, the "trans-Westphalian" model is found “generally, but not solely, in Asian and Eurasian countries that have experienced a pre-Westphalian organization but have adopted, by choice or by force, the Westphalian model during the modern and colonial era”.8 China, Russia and Iran are archetypal in that respect but an increasing number of state actors are also following their path.

All of these parameters create the conditions for the emergence of an unprecedented form of irregular warfare: a multifaceted "hybrid"
irregular strategy. Captured in Russia’s Gerasimov Doctrine, China’s Unrestricted Warfare concept, and Iran’s Mosaic Warfare Doctrine, this crossbreed model consists of synergizing all available means and options to achieve key objectives without necessarily resorting to costly direct kinetic confrontation. The goal is to gain a better position over Westphalian rivals by challenging them in non-traditional manners. It is therefore a relatively low-risk and low-cost strategy capable of offering great profits that other states including India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey or South Africa are likely to emulate in the foreseeable future.

The asymmetric strategies being implemented by state actors such as China, Russia, and Iran are based on a 360° structure, that is to say, they are multifaceted strategies encompassing all available instruments ranging from nuclear or military weapons to the most subtle influence techniques such as traditional diplomacy, strategic communications, or the use of diasporas. Their rational is to confront "conventional" powers on "alternative rings" where the superiority of the latter can more easily be nullified. To further level the playing field, these strategies also cultivate ambiguity. Amorphous in nature, these full-spectrum strategies are designed to undermine Westphalian actors by “sowing confusion, chaos, and distrust,” and wearing down the will of their populations. That is what “grey zone” strategies are about.

The concept of "grey zone strategy" is particularly useful for analyzing and understanding measures put in place by trans-Westphalian actors. In 2015, David Barno and Nora Bensahel found that the promotion of these kinds of informal wars has augmented in recent years among international actors. The authors emphasized that “their defining characteristic is ambiguity – about the ultimate objectives, the participants, whether international treaties and norms have been violated, and the role that military forces should play in response”. In 2017, Nora Bensahel added an additional element of understanding by arguing that ambiguity is not only a characteristic of irregular strategies, but an element that trans-Westphalian states deliberately cultivate in order to disorient their opponents, and thus avoid direct friction that could lead to open conflicts. She refers to Hal Brands, for whom the purpose of these amorphous strategies “is to reap gains, whether territorial or otherwise, that are normally associated with victory in war. Yet grey zone approaches are meant to achieve those gains without escalating to overt warfare, without crossing established red-lines, and thus without exposing the practitioner to the penalties and risks that such escalation might bring”. In this respect, trans-Westphalian approaches are both cautious, opportunistic and, therefore, highly pragmatic strategies.

The fact that these strategies are implemented in "grey areas" should not be interpreted as meaning that they never involve overt kinetic violence, but rather that they combine different approaches to remain under the radar of the international community. In that respect, they are designed to exploit the haziness of international standards, notably with respect to what legally constitutes violence and warfare. The Westphalian definition of what constitutes an act of war is contained in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which states that: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”.

From this legal view point, things such as the use of nuclear capacity, the invasion of sovereign territory by conventional forces or the financing by a state of a terrorist organization, are actions that can unequivocally and universally be considered acts of war. In spite of this, the definition, however consensual, remains subject to multiple interpretations and, consequently, to many passageways that trans-Westphalians are
prompt to exploit in order to promote their agendas.

In fact, as Jason Rivera notes, trans-Westphalian states play out the many ambivalences of international norms while taking care, wherever possible, not to transgress them overtly: “This is not to say that actions within the gray area are legal according to international law, rather, there is a lack of consensus in terms of how nations choose to interpret their legality”.18 This is reinforced by the failure of the international community to legislate in certain fields which, as a result, become fields of predilection for trans-Westphalian states. For example, the International Court of Justice’s efforts to condemn state actors supporting insurrectional movements in third countries has not deterred Moscow from lending its support to pro-Russian insurgents in Ukraine, while managing to make it impossible or at least difficult to determine its illegality. The same is true of cyber-attacks for which China, Russia or Iran are often suspected, but for which it is extremely difficult to establish lawful responsibility and, consequently, to put in place retaliatory measures, whether in the form of direct reprisals or international sanctions. In addition to being asymmetric, these approaches are also furtive and mostly veiled, which make them difficult to detect at first sight.

Difficult to detect but certainly not untraceable, grey zone strategies largely benefit from the carelessness of Westphalian states and their inability to decipher these unconventional manoeuvres. In other words, 360° strategies escape the radars of Westphalian countries mainly because the latter have a hard time understanding a *modus operandi* that departs from their own codes of procedure. Accustomed to short-term, linear, legal, highly bureaucratic and essentially overt approaches, conventional actors fail to decrypt these long-standing, ‘out-of-the-box’, polymorphic, ever morphing, and full-spectrum strategies. They are, however, quite traceable to anyone who takes the trouble to observe and analyse them in their strategic entirety, and over the long run. A common mistake is to focus only on their violent manifestations – the tip of the iceberg – while failing to connect them with their soft and non-kinetic bottom ends, such as the use of public diplomacy, mass media or cyber-influence.19

In sum, a sophisticated form of irregular challenge has developed rapidly in recent years, associated with state actors such as Russia, the People's Republic of China, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, that holds the potential of considerably complicating the lives of Western conventional players in the years to come.20 They have adopted a multifaceted policy which has been described as a “grey zone”, “asymmetrical”, “hybrid” or “short of war” strategy. The world has been witnessing the emergence of this stealthy 360° influence strategy for some time, which adopts a multifaceted non-conventional approach to international affairs, while minimizing the use of direct violence. Such policies can be said to revolve around irregular *strategy* rather than irregular *warfare*, as such a hybrid and pervasive approach is not subjected to conventional principles governing the Westphalian paradigm. While general attention is still largely focused on violent radical non-state threats such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, this new form of irregular challenge has been maturing, and although not necessarily connected with armed conflicts, is more and more likely to thwart the interests of Western players such as Canada.

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1 Dr. Pahlavi authored several studies on the Islamic Republic of Iran and the various facets of its regional and international strategy. He recently co-authored a monograph on the 1979 Islamic revolution (Pierre et Christian Pahlavi, Le Marécage des Ayatollahs : Une histoire de la révolution iranienne de 1979, Paris, Perrin, collection de poche Tempus, 24 mai 2017, 672 pages)”


8 Ibid: 16.

9 Bill Gertz, “Russia, China, Iran Waging Political Warfare”. (Washington Free Beacon, November 2014).


18 Jason Rivera. op. cit.


20 Ben Connable, Jason H. Campbell, Dan Madden, Stretching and Exploiting Thresholds for High-Order War: How Russia, China, and Iran are Eroding American Influence Using Time-Tested Measures Short of War. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. (2016).
Canada’s reputation has traditionally benefited from a considerable amount of international goodwill. Largely due to its Pearsonian legacy of multilateral diplomacy and peacekeeping, Canada was often stereotypically portrayed as the moral authority in international politics, or the “good global citizen.” There is no doubt that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s popularity has increased Canada’s visibility on the world stage. In the realm of foreign and defence policy, the focus of this article, the Liberal government is rekindling with pursuits that have in the past been the hallmarks of Canada’s international reputation, such as multilateral diplomacy, NATO, and peacekeeping.

But perhaps the Trudeau government has been best known for its focus on gender and diversity. When Prime Minister Justin Trudeau appointed a gender-balanced Cabinet after his 2015 election, the accomplishment was framed as self-evident: “because it’s 2015” was the answer he gave to justify his choice. His message resonated with recent trends on social media, where there have been several campaigns about the lack of diversity on panels (there is a website called “Congrats! You have an all-male panel!”) and the underrepresentation of women in various international fora.

Supporting and highlighting the expertise of women in what are traditionally male-dominated forums is paralleled by the greater scrutiny placed on national armed forces with regard to diversity, and of international organizations where women are under-represented at leadership levels. Examining how social roles may differ depending on your gender is not relegated to women alone; there are implications for power, the distribution of resources, and influence. This article thus considers the representation of women, as well as identifies how national militaries like the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and international organizations such as NATO navigate gender in policy and operational planning. We argue that in the Canadian context, there has been considerable NATO influence in support of diversity over the past decade, with the Alliance becoming a full partner of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in 2007. The combination of international guidance and support, implemented by buy-in from leaders at the national level, has resulted in significant commitments in the Canadian context.

Women in the Military

Research on women in the armed forces supports how the increased integration of women improves military capacity and overall effectiveness.¹ These findings are essential, as international threats have emerged with the recruitment and inclusion of women by non-state armed groups² such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC),³ and Daesh.⁴ As the operational and social benefits of increasing the number of women in national armed forces or irregular armed groups have become clearer, scholars have paid more attention to gender roles in war across historical and geographical spaces.⁵ Even an institutionalized military alliance like NATO, an organization some would see as an unlikely contender for gender reforms, adopted the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Policy on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (NATO/EAPC Policy) to

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include gender considerations within its strategic and operational processes.

There is no question that these emerging international security concerns have national effects. In Canada, similar language can be found in efforts by the CAF to be more inclusive of women. Despite conventional wisdom suggesting Canada has been a leader in this regard, a recent study conducted by NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Program demonstrates particular challenges regarding reporting efforts, meeting target representation goals, and the failure to acknowledge gender differences in the recruitment and retention policies of the CAF. As the 2015 Deschamps Report noted, military culture has proven an inhibitor to women’s participation in the past; it is a culture that is said to be “highly sexualized” and “hostile to women.” In response, CAF leaders have drawn from benchmarking, policy recommendations, and guidance from the NATO/EAPC Policy to increase women’s representation and participation. More recently, the CAF has developed the Canadian Armed Forces Diversity Strategy, in an effort to recognize and respond to the changing cultural and demographic landscape of the population it serves.

While women have been underrepresented in the CAF relative to Employment Equity standards at around 15% of the armed forces, their recruitment and participation have a long history, dating back to the Northwest Rebellion (1885) and Boer War (1902). Though women were only allowed to serve as nurses, the Second World War saw women gain greater access to the job market, with 45,000 women employed. Work by the Royal Commission on Women and the Human Rights Tribunal in the 1970s and 80s culminated in 1989 when all military trades became open to women with the exceptions of submarines, which opened in 2000.

**Gender in Canada and in an Alliance Context**

The changing international security landscape that NATO operates within, in tandem with governmental and civil society calls for diversity, have provided a strong foundation for the adaptation of the CAF. International security organizations such as NATO have a significant influence on their member states, and correspondingly on states’ foreign and security policies. NATO allies remain sovereign in their decisions but work towards common goals and adopt policies that are meant to improve cohesion, interoperability and effectiveness. It is through these policies and NATO doctrine that perhaps gender norms have had their greatest impact on national efforts.

Lana Obradovic, for example, suggests that states’ accession to NATO has affected the timing of gender policy change in particular. She suggests this may be due to the NATO/EAPC Policy’s call for change with NATO allies through the adoption of specific actions and measures to determine progress in the implementation of UNSCR 1325. One can argue there is a normal process of socialization that occurs within an alliance setting, which has helped harmonize member states’ attitudes and practices when it comes to gender norms and pushing for the greater inclusion of women. This increased inclusion and participation of women occurs both within the alliance headquarters as well as the member states that comprise it.

Even in Canada’s case, where the earliest and biggest policy changes are best explained by domestic politics and court challenges, the influence of NATO and UNSCR 1325 is undeniable in recent years. To illustrate, if one looks specifically at Canadian efforts in support of the integration of women into the CAF, critical junctures can be highlighted. Most formal barriers to female participation in the CAF were removed in 1989 as a result of the Brown et al., v. Canadian Armed Forces human rights tribunal case. However, a moderate increase in the re-
presentation of women in the CAF - and importantly, decreased attrition of the women who have joined - can be observed since the creation of the NATO/EAPC Policy. Canada’s alignments with NATO requirements can be observed in the form of Annual Reporting at the alliance level and the development of a National Action Plan at the domestic level. In the 2014 Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325, we can see that the adoption of the NATO/EAPC Policy in 2007 reinforced Canada’s decision to adopt policy frameworks and working mechanisms to support the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

In terms of a brief background, in 2000, the United Nations Security Council recognized that gender analysis was important to better understand conflict dynamics. Through UNSCR 1325 and follow-on resolutions, both decision-makers and military commanders were urged to think about how conflict dynamics impact men and women differently. This kind of analysis, if done properly, can lead to major changes in the way programs are delivered and how military operations are carried out, not to mention how they are framed for public consumption internationally. While Canada signed on to UNSCR 1325 in 2000, it was not until 2010, three years after the implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy, that Canada produced its first Canada National Action Plan (CNAP). In the CNAP, Canada has committed to integrate gender perspectives across all government departments by assessing the implications for women and men.

We can point to other evidence that NATO influenced CAF policy changes with regard to gender by tracking the Department of National Defence’s (DND) recent efforts. Canada’s active participation in NATO’s gender mainstreaming initiatives, which include Canada’s representation at the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, the submission of Canada’s Annual National Reports compiled by NATO’s International Military Staff Office of the Gender Advisor, and finally, Canada’s commitment to UNSCR 1325 through the submission of progress reports in NATO-led operations, all support this claim. CDS General Johnathan Vance’s commitment for the creation of three Gender Advisor positions in accordance with NATO’s approach to implementing UNSCR 1325 has further demonstrated Canada’s efforts to comply with NATO guidelines. These three Gender Advisors are meant to advise the CDS and military leadership on how to incorporate a gender perspective in operational planning and missions. The stated intention of incorporating gender considerations into the practices of the CAF has translated into a series of reforms. Many have implications for public diplomacy, since Canada is showcasing these changes through the sharing of good practices with other nations and partners within NATO and beyond.

In terms of gender balancing, there has been an increase in activities targeting female recruits in Canada since 2008. Particularly in 2016, there has been a shift in the recruitment efforts of the CAF to address the historical failure to meet Employment Equity goals. The 2017 Diversity Strategy has changed the CAF narrative on gender and inclusivity, but other measures have also been adopted, such as aggressive recruitment targets. The 2017 Canadian Defence Policy Strong, Secure, Engaged also reiterates the CAF’s commitment to have 25% of the CAF comprised of women by 2026.

NATO’s own diversity reports from previous years have informed discussions and policy recommendations on the CAF approach, with DND experts drawing from the expertise of other allies and the data which NATO collects every year on women’s representation across NATO forces.

**Sources of Resistance**

While much progress has been made when it comes to gender mainstreaming, with some
Recent changes partially credited to NATO, there are still sources of resistance within the CAF. Though this is certainly not new, a case can be made that a source of this resistance can be explained by low levels of gender awareness. While military leaders, especially general officers, can be articulate on gender issues, these norms have not trickled down to all rank levels. As such, organizational buy-in is only partial. Indeed, significant cultural change takes time. More significant though, are the overt efforts to undermine these policies. A key example here involves soldiers dubbing the CAF’s sexual violence directive Operation Honour as “Hop on Her.”

Organizational resistance to gender reforms and, more specifically, to an increase in women’s participation in the CAF have also made headlines. Some of the most obvious titles highlight “shortcomings in recruitment and training, equity targets that have been ignored, and policies recommended but never implemented,” “ignorance at the least, and intolerance at the worst regarding employment equity practices,” and “[the military] is an organization whose philosophy hasn’t changed to include women.” Additionally, when conversations began regarding the lifting of the restriction for women on submarines, a military survey noted that sixty-seven percent of submariners opposed having women aboard due to issues regarding a lack of privacy, sexual temptation, and fear of harassment charges. More recently, sexual misconduct in the CAF and challenges regarding the military justice system have made headlines, and there is evidence to suggest that organizational change is unlikely to take place if women are seen as token participants.

Sources of Promotion and Support

There have, however, been recent developments in the value leaders have placed on gender mainstreaming, supporting the claim that participation of both men and women is key to gender inclusivity in security. As previously mentioned, examples include CDS General Jonathan Vance’s 2016 issue of the directive to raise the number of women in uniform by 1 percent each year over the next ten years. If successful, that effort would finally achieve the CAF’s long-standing but elusive goal of 25 percent. This suggests a progression in the organizational values that may exponentially strengthen the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the NATO/EAPC Policy. Furthermore, within the Defence Policy Review Public Consultation document, interest groups such as Women, Peace, and Security Network - Canada have been invited to speak and participate in the 2016 Defence Consultations. The DND’s orchestration of nationwide consultations with the public (#defenceconsults) in 2016, which included events such as IPSOS-run roundtables with stakeholders and experts, as well as an online forum so that anyone could send in detailed written submissions, resulted in the 2017 policy which included significant mentions of gender. The road was paved so that Canadian defence policy going forward will include a gender component.

Conclusion

Although integration and policy efforts are admirable, the challenge remains as to how and why certain negative cultural behaviours persist and marginalize women at both the international and national level. Despite buy-in at the highest ranks, leaders responsible for training and educating soldiers must set a positive example for greater gender awareness to be diffused across the organization. Furthermore, efforts to adapt military culture since 2007 have proven to be critical, combined with efforts for increased women’s representation in the CAF. As for Canada’s role internationally, the continued integration of policies such as UNSCR 1325 and the NATO/EAPC Policy, will also support further progress through gender mainstreaming efforts in operations.
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8 Marie Deschamps, External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces. External Review Authority, 27 March 2015.

9 Which stipulates approximately 25.1% representation.


Meaghan Shoemaker, _Five Eyes Plus Gender Conference Proceedings Report_ (Canadian Defence Academy, 2017) http://cdainstitute.ca/canadian-defence-academy-
As a child growing up, I remember my father telling me a story of how, when his truck or van would break down he would simply pull over, pop the hood and was usually able to fix the problem himself and keep going. A basic understanding of internal combustion engines was all that was needed. He would tell me this story to make a point, he would say, about how far automotive technology has come since he started driving in the 1960s and that now, when our family car would break down, although his habit was the same, once he opened the engine compartment, he was now faced with a perplexing combination of wires, boxes, and hoses of which none were recognizable. In short, the engine had become too complex. He needed to take the car to a mechanic.

I am sure my father was not alone. Indeed, his sentiment is one that I have heard many times since from others and in fact lived myself. I find myself calling someone to fix a flooding dishwasher or carry out a home renovation. These challenges are amplified now with our increasing reliance upon digital technology. The automobile again ties this all together as the first thing an auto mechanic now does with a vehicle is plug it into a diagnostic computer, which then tells the mechanic what is wrong with the vehicle.

These stories are reflective of what French sociologist Emile Durkheim famously referred to as differentiation in which various elements of society specialize and thereby become dependent upon one another. This, argues Durkheim, is the mark of societal development. It has also become a mark of societal complexity. It is this complexity that has created an increasingly acute sense of uncertainty and anxiety in many parts of the world. Things are moving too fast to fully understand. Moreover, this reduction in understanding current developments makes the ability to feel comfortable about the future elusive. In the century and half since Durkheim, shelves have been filled with arguments presenting ingenuity gaps, complexity, and acceleration as possible explanations, all rooted in the rapid advance of technology.\(^1\) Although differentiation creates social integration and an ability to specialize, it also creates an inherent complexity. More problematically, this complexity has started to erode decision making processes fundamental to many democratic countries and this has profound implications for national security. Canada, however, enjoys a unique position from which it can build resilience and indeed prosperity in this age of acceleration.

**Framework and Argument**

Examinations into the impact of technology upon national security are numerous, but also very narrow in scope with many studies focused upon questions of computer network security, the advent of autonomous weapons systems, performance enhancement for soldiers, or the ease in which competing ideas and narratives can be transmitted around the world.\(^2\) However, comparatively little work has been devoted to synthesizing these various outputs. Put simply, most research that examines the intersection of technology and security rarely takes a holistic view and is instead mired in the technical or the narrow focus of a single issue.

Exceptions to this include recent work by Simon Glezros who has examined the impact of acceleration upon society directly and whose work can inform similar studies on national security.\(^3\) In
addition, Henning Laux has similarly examined the deleterious impact of acceleration upon democratic decision making. Both studies are rare examples of a more holistic analysis of the impact of technology upon society and serve as suitable points of departure for a similar study on the impact of acceleration upon national security. In the spirit of holistic explanations for the national security implications of technological advances and their implications for Canada, I offer here a three-pronged argument.

The argument’s first prong, acceleration, is best understood through the analogy of the idea of the power of doubling. In basic mathematical terms, this means taking a number, doubling the value, and then doubling that number, and so on. Through this process, the initial number grows exponentially. In terms of technological advances, this is the conceptual foundation of what is known as Moore’s law. Named after the founder and CEO of Intel, Gordon Moore, it states that the number of transistors hardware designers can fit on a microprocessor should double about once every two years. This statement was made in 1965 and continues to hold to this day. The implications of this acceleration for computer processing are clear and indeed explain how calculations that once took a bank of supercomputers to make can now be done with the latest smartphone. However, the implications go beyond computing in that the acceleration described by Moore’s law means that computers are now enabling things like automation and instant access to information which leads to the second prong of complexity.

Complexity is related to the idea of acceleration because it flows from it. As large numbers begin to double, they do so dramatically. What this means for society in general is that problems become really challenging to understand and solve. The rate of change, in short, is outstripping institutions’ ability to understand them. As Glezos writes, “[t]he chains of ‘ends’ and ‘means’ … are lengthening and multiplying to the point that they are no longer manageable”. This idea is not entirely new and was lucidly expressed in 2000 by Thomas Homer-Dixon in his book *The Ingenuity Gap* where he offers several examples of complex systems, created by us, that we no longer can understand. In the words of Glezos, we truly are living in a time where “the velocity inaugurated with the industrial revolution has accelerated history beyond itself, landing us in the middle of our own future”. This outstripping has led to the third and final prong, that of disruption.

In the simplest of terms, disruption means interference with an existing process. In economic terms, it is about the creation of a product or service that 1) people did not even know they wanted or needed or 2) something that so dramatically alters the way something works that it creates new markets. This disruption then has not only profound implications for what is meant by the concept of work, but also society in general and indeed security. More broadly, disruption can also be described in environmental terms in that changes in the climate test the adaptability of life on this planet. Research has revealed several examples of this by looking at climate shifts brought about by the El Niño/Southern Oscillation. These shifts are strongly correlated with and indeed can predict a certain degree of increased economic strife as well as civil conflict.

I argue here that taken together, acceleration, complexity, and disruption combine to create the anxiety and insecurity that is at the root of many recent events. Be it the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union or the populist wave spreading through political systems around the world, the three prongs of acceleration, complexity, and disruption can serve as a useful framework for explanation.

**Evidence and Implications**

Today, most people can access the internet in some way and the trend suggests that more people are getting connected every year. In fact,
as of 2017, 70% of all people on the planet aged between fifteen and twenty-four years are considered internet users, meaning those with regular access to the internet. Increased connectivity means that ideas can travel faster and farther than before and while the benefits and opportunities are real, so too are risks. Ideas are not value-free and ideas that are destructive to the fabric of society and world order travel just as far and fast as those which are constructive. One need only look to the social media impact of Daesh for a destructive example of the faster and farther reach of ideas.

However, destructive ideas need not be as obvious or acute as the disturbing images founds in pages of Dabiq. Rather, destructive ideas can also percolate over time, piece by piece. The phenomenon of social and on-line media ‘echo chambers’ where users are only exposed to stories that relate to or align with their previously-held values or the increased demand for fact-checking websites like Snops.com, suggest a subtler, more pernicious impact of universal access to information. Indeed, as Henning Laux argues, “increasing variety among the opinion of so-called experts leads to further insecurity”. In short, the cacophony of voices is obscuring what is accurate. This is raising doubt, anxiety, and ultimately insecurity. In an age where everyone can claim to be an expert, who do you trust?

This insecurity begins to touch on questions of what is accurate and what may be less so. It has very real implications for the way in which democracy functions. Put simply, the volume and variety of information imposing itself upon people – including decision-makers – is increasing and overwhelming the very process of making those decisions. “The process of democratic decision-making” writes Laux, “appears to have reached its natural speed limit some time ago”. The institution is being outrun by its ability to act.

Glezos takes this argument one step further and suggests that this outstripping in fact explains the apparent erosion of long-held liberal values. In this information-induced insecurity, we simply long for someone to tell us what to do.

When we authorize increasingly centralized and authoritarian governments, when we do not jealously guard our civil liberties and democratic rights, what are we saying, other than that we accept that we are the problem with politics, that we ourselves are to blame? Give us, then, a ‘leader’ who will provide us with the security we crave.

This craving further amplifies earlier, disturbing trends in general democratic disengagement, the forms of which have been recounted by several researchers over the past several decades. The acceleration, complexity, and disruption brought about by technology simply piles on. It challenges us in knowing what to do.

This willingness to abandon political freedom and increased tolerance for an erosion of liberal values is coming from the fear and insecurity technological advances are bringing about. Although not different from historical responses in past ages to technological and social transformation, the anxiety it breeds is nonetheless real. However, as much as this current age of anxiety can be blamed upon rapid technological change, these same advances are also part of the solution.

The acceleration, complexity and disruption described above also empowers, emancipates, and encourages individuals. The increased connectivity afforded by information technologies and innovative and disruptive tools such as 3D printers are now empowering individual actors – the proverbial local – to influence others in an increasingly profound way. Everyone can create a working prototype and begin to manufacture in their own homes. These same individuals can collaborate – around the world – with
others and connect to both develop and sell their products and services.

This increased individual capability has an emancipatory effect. As technology begins to change how people work it also changes what constitutes that work as automation and artificial intelligence, begin to replace tasks previously performed by us. Although disruptive to say the least, with forward-thinking policies that delink what we do from what we earn, this changing nature of work can have a real freeing effect upon people. The idea of a forty-hour work-week as the benchmark for a full-time job is an assumption based upon the technological advances and social implications of the first industrial revolution. We need to identify new assumptions for this new reality.

Finally, these advances will also encourage people to innovate and adapt as we will all need to embrace the idea of life-long learning and that what we are doing now may not be what we are doing ten years from now. More to the point, this adaptation and innovation will only come about through the acceptance of diversity and inclusion. Indeed, attitudes need to be geared towards the inclusion of others rather than how best to protect or exclude ourselves from others. Innovation and adaptation demands diversity. So how do we do it?

A Four-Sector Plan for the Next 150

Securing the next 150 for Canada cannot be done alone and needs to be a collaborative effort between academics, governments, firms, and individuals alike. Those in the Academy; researchers, professors, and students, need to be willing to recast concepts like security and politics. Where security once meant a freedom from fear, it now must shift towards a more general effort at social resilience. Now that both state and non-state actors have increasingly impactful agency, the focus has to shift from the chimera-like promise of defence to an acceptance of the need to simply be resilient. Resiliency – the knowledge that events will not fundamentally alter one’s values – is real security. Moreover, the idea of politics needs to engage with the question of what does authority looks like today? What does power look like today? More importantly, these questions need to be instilled in our youth, in our classrooms.

Hand-in-hand with this, governments need to be more proactive and see beyond just the next election cycle and instead start to think in a strategic way and begin implementing policies now that will address the disruption of these new technologies. This does not mean resisting or blocking the adoption of automation or learning algorithms, but rather addressing the assumptions that make these technologies so disruptive in the first place. These include policies that encourage growth in inclusive attitudes, which are key to resilient states and willingness to adapt and regulate to ensure standards are maintained.16

From the perspective of corporations and businesses that deliver services or manufacture products, the opportunity afforded by technology to connect should empower them to increase collaboration. This means collaborating not only within and between firms, but by also reaching out to the other sectors of government, the academy, as well as individuals. Partnerships and indeed employment opportunities should be undergirded by the philosophy of selecting in rather than selecting out. Flipping this idea of selection means encouraging life-long learning amongst potential and existing employees and the vivid examples offered by Tom Friedman demonstrate how this can make firms more agile and adaptable to technological change and disruption.17 This again highlights the role that inclusive, rather than exclusive, attitudes and perceptions play in achieving this objective.

Finally, individuals have their own unique roles in this as they need to embrace the concept of adaptation, whether through life-long learning
or the simple concept that what you do and who you know today may not be the same a decade from now. This embracing of adaptation will certainly create uneasiness but the emancipatory nature of this needs to be highlighted. However, the factor of the individual also highlights how interdependent all four factors really are. In the absence of government policy or adjustments by the academy and firms, individuals will be left behind, the consequences of which we can see playing out in the United Kingdom and United States today.

Academies, governments, firms, and individuals need to work together to address the acceleration, complexity, and disruption we face today. We all need to embrace diversity and not build walls. We all need to embrace change, and not try to roll back the proverbial clock. This means life-long learning in place of life-long careers and it means governing with ideas rather dogmatic ideology and stoke solutions, not fear. As much as technology – and its rapid development – has been the cause of this insecurity, so too is technology the foundation for the solutions. Only if we all work together will these solutions be fully realized, leading to a resilient and ultimately secure Canada for the next 150 years.

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12 Ibid. pp. 231.


The administration of Donald Trump illustrates the dangers of rising populism sweeping the political landscape across the Global North. Born from a dissatisfaction with economic sluggishness, growing inequality, and perceptions of excessive global migration, populist movements seek to rebuke the forces of globalization and the political establishment which has abetted them. In response, they offer a brand of nationalist isolationism which has experienced growing support among the electorates of Europe and the United States. The irony is that global challenges facing the international community today from climate change, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and global migration require more and not less multilateralism. Nevertheless, rising populism is leading governments to question the resources they are willing to allocate towards foreign commitments which in the future will have a direct impact on defence policy.

As Western nations continue to struggle to ignite robust economic growth, and support for the populist brand of isolation swells, defence spending can be expected to come under greater scrutiny. Dynamic economic growth has shifted from the developed western economies to the middle-income countries in Asia and Latin America. With the median age of western workers well past their 40s, productivity gains in Western economies will continue to slow and economic growth rates of previous decades will be even more difficult to achieve. This demographic decline reduces government revenue acquired from income taxes while globalization makes it more difficult for governments to collect corporate taxes; both trends leave Western governments with less fiscal space to maneuver. We should expect Western governments’ policy priorities to shift to more social spending and taking care of an aging society. Populist movements have already put pressure on governments to turn inward and focus on improving the home front. This will assuredly put pressure on Western governments to reassess their defence spending.

The rise of populist parties taking power or increasing their foothold in democratic legislatures will affect collective security as we know it. They are rapidly influencing public debates and will bring their isolationist views to prominence in parliaments and legislatures, even if they are not necessarily in government. While it is premature to call this a threat to the peace of the post war global order, the rise of right-wing populism in the democratic Western world will be sure to transform the security architecture of collective defence principles once seen as unshakeable among allies. At the moment when the most pressing threats, security and otherwise, to the safety and prosperity of Western nations require more multilateral cooperation than ever before, the recent rousing of populist isolationism diminishes the prospects that these challenges will be adequately managed. This amounts to a paradigm shift in international relations which Canada must prepare for.

For more than seventy years, the Western world has enshrined and supported the liberal internationalist order of mutual cooperation. From the establishment of global development and trade organizations, international monetary and financial organizations, to collective security arrangements among democratic allies, there has been an overriding principle of pursuing shared interests and common goals through international organizations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s collective defence principle of Article 5, 

Paradigm Shift in International Relations  
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where an attack on one NATO member is deemed as an attack on all NATO allies, is among the most emblematic principles of international cooperation.

The spirit of international cooperation among Western allies that led to the creation of NATO is under threat for the first time since the end of the Cold War. This threat comes from both right-wing populist movements rising within Western democracies and perhaps a more nebulous threat by countries seeking to undermine what they perceive to be a US-dominated liberal internationalist system. Russia under Putin is most interested in seeing the end of the current order. From Russia’s cyber attack on Estonia’s parliament, the invasion and occupation of Ukraine and Georgia, its war game simulation against Poland, and the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s activities throughout Eastern Europe are best understood as a reaction to NATO’s enlargement strategy and promotion of democracy.1

However, Russia’s activities stretch beyond the former Soviet region. Moscow has supported anti-establishment media critical of parties espousing liberal internationalist ideals, including its multilingual Sputnik news sites and Russia Today broadcast television, as well as a contingent of paid internet commentators deployed to influence online discourse.2 There is evidence that Russia may have purchased Facebook ads to influence democratic elections in favour of its preferred candidates.3 With each passing day it seems, new revelations show the depth of Russian interference and meddling in Western government elections to bring populists to power.

Russia has funded and supported populist movements and leaders who want to retreat from global cooperation and liberal internationalism. This includes financial support for France’s EU skeptic Marine Le Pen in her 2017 presidential campaign as well as, at a minimum, rhetorical support for Donald Trump in his 2016 campaign against Hillary Clinton (with mounting evidence of more clandestine involvement). Russia has fostered ties with various insurgent populist parties such as Hungary’s Jobbik party and Austria’s Freedom Party, who are both highly critical of global immigration as well as the European Union.4 Russia Today has regularly hosted Brexit proponent Nigel Farage.

Russia has been playing with what should by all accounts be a weak hand; supporting wars on two fronts while languishing under Western economic sanctions, a persistent slump in oil and gas prices, and a declining population. Yet amidst the fraying cohesion and unity of purpose between Western nations, the twin interventions in Syria and the Ukraine have failed to provoke a substantive response. It is notable that one of the primary drivers of discord amongst the constituent members of NATO and the European Union is the issue of accepting the migrants being driven into Europe by the continuing conflict in Syria. In a perhaps inadvertent stroke of strategic synergy, it is Russia’s involvement in the Syrian theatre which has perpetuated the conflict, all the while pushing more migrants into Europe and thereby fueling nationalist and isolationist sentiments.

The merits of NATO’s grand defence alliance are being questioned by voters and may be the casualty of rising populism. When American President Donald Trump suggested that US defence of Eastern European allies may be in question if NATO members do not increase their defence spending it sent shockwaves across the European continent. While many Eastern European countries know the great value of having a strong NATO to thwart the real threat that Russia continues to pose to their sovereignty, this cannot be said in other parts of the continent. Indeed, a 2015 Pew Research Center survey found that less than half of respondents in each of the European NATO members surveyed were in favour of providing military aid to neighbouring NATO allies were
they to become involved in an armed conflict with Russia.\textsuperscript{5}

The value proposition of having a strong NATO needs to be made now more than ever. While it is true that most NATO members have fallen short of stipulated defence spending targets, and that the US bears the cost of this free riding, this is an issue which should be resolved with discretion, without resorting to public grandstanding.\textsuperscript{6} In that respect, Donald Trump is doing a great disservice to the NATO alliance. The greatest benefit of an expansive alliance such as NATO lies not so much in the increased firepower brought to bear during a conflict, but in the reduced likelihood of such conflicts occurring in the first place. When calculating whether to initiate military aggression, any actor harbouring hostile intentions towards a member of NATO must consider their chances of prevailing over the total strength of the entire alliance. Set against the combined might of NATO, any rational actor would conclude that their probability of emerging triumphant is negligible, and so abandon any thought of military aggression.

The advantages of this arrangement for the world are twofold: that powers hostile to members of NATO do not initiate aggressive action, and that the members of NATO, assured of their own safety, do not feel the need to undertake pre-emptive measures which they might otherwise feel are necessary to achieve a sense of security. If the credibility of NATO’s mutual defence pledge is drawn into question in the minds of voters and policy makers, then agents who wish to restructure the world to their advantage through force will be emboldened, and NATO members with pressing security concerns may feel the need to look to their own defenses.

The great boon that collective security provides to the world will be jeopardized as the community of nations which make up NATO is riven by differing priorities towards disparate threats. On the one hand is the issue of territorial sovereignty, which NATO was specifically created to address. It would be desirable for NATO members to display a unity of purpose in this regard through a sincere commitment to respond to the violation of any other members’ sovereign authority even when there is no immediately realizable benefit to themselves. As discussed above, consensus around this principle is fraying, with former Soviet states directly in the path of Russian aggression and more distant NATO members possessing diverging priorities. Yet cohesion between members of the alliance is being tested by issues beyond territorial defense.\textsuperscript{7} Migration, terrorism, and global warming have become matters of concern for various NATO countries. For inhabitants of North America the dangers posed by terrorist activities are a more tangible concern, making the Russian offer of cooperation against terrorist supporting organizations in the Middle East in return for relenting on other fronts a tempting bargain. Countries such as the Netherlands feel threatened by a potential climate change induced rise in sea levels, while the interests of coal fueled economies such as Poland pull in the opposite direction. Attempts at an EU settlement to distribute the influx of migrants amongst European members of NATO have created another rift. Unity of purpose towards protection of territorial sovereignty will be difficult to restore so long as unity of purpose towards these other matters which disrupt the wellbeing of NATO member states remains elusive.

The disunity and insularity which have been taking hold amongst members of the NATO alliance amounts to a paradigm shift in global security. The rise of populism and the structural reality of western states’ demographics and economic development will require NATO allies to make clear the value proposition of the alliance. The threats to the western liberal order are not diminishing, but evolving. Russia’s financial and propaganda support for populist movements that want to end the liberal internationalist or-
...der has been just as dangerous to the alliance as its physical invasion and occupation of Ukraine and Georgia. NATO needs to be more nimble to address modern threats to the western alliance of democracies. Climate change, terrorism, radicalization, cyber threats, and refugees—name a few of the emerging challenges—all need the western alliance’s unity of purpose to address effectively. NATO will need to make the case to increasingly skeptical and inward-looking publics that it has the requisite resources to address these new and evolving threats.

Notes
Towards a Sociology of Radicalization

Eric Ouellet

Radicalization is oftentimes understood as a psychological process, where an individual gradually accepts and internalizes the use of violence for political purposes. This process is normally supported by other individuals, who actively promote such views about the use of violence, whether they have direct and personal interactions, or indirect contacts through publications and internet material, with those who become radicalized. The radicalized individuals may eventually use violence, with or without the support of terrorist and political networks. Hence, radicalization can be both a matter of recruiting for terrorist networks, and a matter of creating so-called home-grown terrorist groups, as well as “lone wolfs”, engaging in a larger social movement.

This understanding of radicalization is not incorrect per se, especially if seen from the lenses of Western domestic national security agencies. However, it is limited in scope because of the emphasis placed on individual and small group dynamics. Furthermore, the study of radicalization tends to be also very much influenced by psychology-based approaches, emphasizing personal emotional aspects. This combination of national security and scholarly focus on the individual dimensions of radicalization creates an important blind spot to our wider understanding of this phenomenon. Because, ultimately, one can only become radicalized if there are larger social conditions that provide both meaning to such radicalization, and conducive circumstances for its occurrence. As one analyst noted recently, “radicalization does not emerge from individuals but from collective, political interaction”.

This blind spot created by over-emphasizing individual aspects of radicalization is a problem already noted by many analysts. Unfortunately, the sociological study of radicalization remains a much under-developed field of research, as it is too fragmented in its interests and focus. This issue, however, has implications that extend much beyond academic and scholarly circles. Our failure in appreciating the wider sociological dimensions of radicalization has already produced substantive negative consequences.

When NATO troops were deployed in an expeditionary posture in Afghanistan, they were facing a larger radicalization reality that was situated much beyond the realm of psychology and small group dynamics. It became a social and political issue because large segments of a society were supportive of using violence for political purposes. And to be sure, previous deployments in the Balkans were not different in this regard. To put it bluntly, an armed insurgency or a civil war are the result of unchecked large-scale radicalization. This holds true also for domestic insurgencies such as the period of the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland (1969-1997). The “Troubles” were in the making many years beforehand. To echo a small Canadian controversy about radicalization of a few years ago, before a radicalization process mutates into an insurgency, one should “call sociology”.

So far, sociologically inspired research on radicalization tends to focus on particular aspects, or dimensions, but rarely attempts to present a more holistic overview. For instance, some research focuses on policies and communities' reactions to radicalization and counter-radicalization efforts. Others have studied the role of correctional systems in radicalization processes. While some have considered the nexus between Islam, Islamophobia, and radicalization.
One promising area of research that may offer a path towards a more holistic sociology of radicalization is the approach based on social representations. This approach was originally developed by the late Serge Moscovici, a French social psychologist, who was interested in how complex and formalized ideas translate into everyday language and practice. One of his key findings was that a recurrent pattern exists in how ideas found in a small group can become part of a larger day-to-day group discourse, shaping actions and decision-making. In other words, social representations are appropriated, translated, and integrated through a mappable process into the larger group’s worldview. Once Moscovici’s approach is adapted to the study of radicalization, it offers a useful holistic canvass to understand how larger scale radicalization occurs.

Any process of radicalization has an “object”, an idea or a representation aiming at modifying existing views within a community. For instance, the presence of non-Muslim troops in Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War, to fight against another Muslim country (Iraq), was the original object of Al Qaeda's call for violence against the West. The content of the object can be almost anything, in theory, but any object, to be a useful vehicle must fit in pre-existing social representations. Effective calls for violence cannot occur in a void. Al Qaeda, and now Daesh (ISIS), could not have had a degree of success in recruiting without framing their object in the history of the caliphate of the seventh century, anti-colonialism, and the story the Mujahidin resistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

More objective factors such as poverty, overpopulation, environmental degradation and other so-called “root causes” are, in fact, only instrumental factors that can be incorporated into pre-existing social representations. Otherwise, one should expect severe cases of large scale radicalization everywhere there is poverty, which is obviously not the case. The object must also fit and be meaningful inside of a “social project” that creates an ideal future. Hence, an object must link the past, present, and future. It is worth noting that social projects found in present-day forms of radicalization tend to have commonalities: creating a world free of “excessive liberalism”, as found in both Islamic extremism and Western right-wing movements. This can explain, in part, why calls for greater forms of liberalism may be counter-productive in counter-radicalization efforts.

Objects or ideas alone, however, are not enough to create large-scale social representations. One needs the “carriers”, who are the people pushing for change by calling for the use of violence, in the context of radicalization. They can be community leaders or intellectuals of a certain status, but they can also be collective groups such as Bolshevik cells of the Russian Revolution or cells of the Jihadist nebula. They are usually the focus of internal security agencies such as CSIS and the FBI. But from a sociological perspective, carriers cover a much wider range of people, to include all those echoing the narrative in many informal settings and situations. Although big data analysis of chat rooms and internet fora can be useful to measure the impact of those other carriers, having a deeper sense of how informal discussions are evolving in a community remains critical. In such a context, counter-radicalization really means engaging a community to develop and disseminate an effective counter-narrative. From the perspective of the social representation approach, developing tools to better understand the social dynamics of inner debates about the legitimacy of using violence, within a community, is a critical task for the near future. From a NATO perspective, investing in human intelligence capabilities is a wise thing to do.

If the counter-narrative does not take hold, then one is facing a situation where the object is becoming “anchored”, as the new social representation is becoming increasingly entrenched.
The anchoring process itself can be observed by the actions of the carriers, both in the active promotion of the new social representations, and more importantly by the repression of dissident voices. For instance, the presence of Salafist madrasas can be considered as a clear indicator that anchoring is ongoing, as seen in northern Pakistan where young people learn not only about a particular version of Islam, but also about what ideas are to be rejected. In Canada, such behaviors were clearly at play in the time preceding the Air India bombing, where dissidents of the more radical version of Sikh nationalism were actively ostracized. Of course, the hallmark of an anchoring process, in the context radicalization, usually takes the form of propagandizing the deed, where the use of violence plays a central part of establishing the new views.

In these circumstances, de-radicalization becomes significantly more difficult, and requires ongoing concerted police, judiciary, economic, political, and potentially some military efforts. Importantly, if ill-conceived, those actions can reinforce the anchoring process (e.g., systemic police brutality, arbitrary arrests, reinforcement of economic inequalities, etc.). The Bloody Sunday event of January 1972, where many civilians were killed by British soldiers, significantly reinforced the anchoring process in favor the IRA’s cause. From a NATO perspective, one should not under-estimate the powerful and profound effects that collateral damage can cause in reinforcing an anchoring process. For instance, the NATO 1999 air bombing of Belgrade still resonates in Serbia today.

Failure to prevent effectively the anchoring of narratives that support the use of violence for political purposes leads to what is called “institutionalization”. This represents the worst-case scenario, i.e., when police and social actions fail to curtail terrorism and the carriers are successful in changing gear by institutionalizing the new social representation to large segments of a population. This is usually the point where terrorism becomes a full-fledged insurgency, and military forces remain the ultimate guarantor of governance. The movement from terrorism towards insurgency can be gradual, like in Algeria in the 1990s, or very rapid especially when security forces are weak or ill-prepared as they were between 2003-2004 in post-invasion Iraq. Should the military and other forces fail, then a new social order may be established in some or all parts of a country. Political violence has prevailed.

The social representation approach, even if it does not answer all the sociological questions about radicalization, offers a useful higher-level view and wider framework. Radicalization, and political violence, can be seen on a spectrum ranging from individuals’ acceptance in the use of violence to a collective effort to overthrow entire regimes. A sociologically inspired view of radicalization can be useful in various contexts. If NATO is called to ramp up even more its effort in Afghanistan, or in another expeditionary setting (e.g. Libya, Syria), one should expect that radicalization will be an important part of the equation. Furthermore, in the emerging hybrid wars of the 21st century, where information and disinformation become increasingly part of the military landscape, in part to mobilize minorities both in supporting foreign powers’ military actions and in joining in their combat, a sound sociological approach to radicalization seems ever more important than before.

**Notes**

3. James Khalil, “Radical Beliefs and Violent Actions Are Not Synonymous: How to Place the Key Disjuncture Between Attitudes and Behaviors at the Heart of Our
1. Canadian Defence at 150 and Beyond


