



NEWSLETTER December 2011

INSIDIE THIS ISSUE

New Interns at the ACC	2
ACC Roundtable Reports	4
West African Piracy	5
NATO's Future in the Abkhazia Dispute	9
NATO Study Tour	12
Lessons Learned from Libya	14
Hunger Strikes & Indian Democracy	16

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
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PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE



This Newsletter provides an update on our various activities, as well as a number of insightful articles by our interns. As usual, there have been some departures

and arrivals in the office. Melanie Clarke travelled to the other side of the world to do some touring in Australia before embarking on the next stage of her career plans. Jonathan Preece has begun his law studies at the University of Western Ontario, and David Hong has moved to Washington, DC, for graduate studies. Will Simmons is currently completing an assignment in Ottawa and will move to Washington in January to intern with the Canadian Embassy, and Alex Dhefto has started his graduate program at the Munk School of Global Studies.

Some of our part-time summer student interns have had to cut back on their time now that university courses have started again. We're very pleased, however, that Kavita Bapat and Tom Aagaard are staying on for the Fall term, and Richard Mabley has moved from intern to staff for the time being, to take over Lana Polyakov's responsibilities with the Canadian-Turkish Business Council. You will meet our new interns in this issue.

I am particularly pleased that Kavita and Tom have taken the lead in moving our roundtables beyond Toronto. We have now had three events in Ottawa, in addition to our annual Fall Conferences, and as I write, we have our first Roundtable in Montreal. These events have been organized in partnership with Carleton, Ottawa, and McGill universities, and we are very grateful for their assistance, and also to our Ottawa based director, Wayne Primeau, and our Montreal based director, Dr. Bernd Goetze for their help. We would be happy to connect with other universities in Canada to

expand these events further.

For decades, the Atlantic Council of Canada has been justly proud of an amazing internship program that helps set young graduate and undergraduate students on the path to public service in Canada or abroad, or to careers in NGOs or private business with international connections.

Over the past two years, the ACC has increased its impact on the next generation of Canadians by also implementing an educational outreach program for Ontario's high schools. This program reaches into the classroom and challenges students to think about Canada in a global context. The impact is magnified by the presenters: The ACC's interns deliver this message, allowing students to hear about future career paths and the value of engagement from successful university students. This program creates interest and actively builds an appetite for student involvement.

It also highlights the outstanding quality of the ACC Internship Program and the need to support these young people. With appropriate funding, we can help ensure that Canada's next generation of leaders has the vision and experience to connect Canada and the world.

On Saturday, November 5th, the ACC will be holding a dinner to mark the launching of a funding campaign for our internship and educational programs called, "Developing Canada's Future International Leaders."

Further details will be following shortly but be sure to mark it in your calendars and I hope to see you there!

The Atlantic Council Welcomes its New Interns



Daniel Cunningham is an undergraduate student at the University of Toronto, majoring in Political Science and European Studies. Daniel is currently engaged in a long term research project on Chinese foreign policy. Working in coordination with faculty from the department of Political Science and the Munk Centre for International Affairs, Daniel hopes to further his understanding of the relationship between China's development banking infrastructure and its foreign policy. Daniel has been a contributor to the University of Toronto's leading undergraduate international affairs magazine, *The Toronto Globalist*, as well as a regular contributor to his college newsletter. Daniel had the opportunity to travel through Eastern Europe, where he developed an interest in the Balkans. His areas of study have converged on international security issues and the expansion of supranational institutions of European governance. Daniel also plans to begin his French language studies at the University of Toronto in order aid his long term goal of working in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Daniel plans to pursue a MA in International Affairs or Global Governance following the completion of his undergraduate degree in 2012.

Joelle Ferreira graduated with a BA Honours in English and Peace Studies at McMaster University. She then spent the last year completing her Masters in Political Theory at Cardiff University in Wales where she wrote her thesis on Liberal Multiculturalism in Canada. During her undergrad, Joelle became interested in issues surrounding social justice and community building. In her third year at McMaster, Joelle traveled to Thailand where she had the opportunity to take part in several grassroots projects, which included building a sanitation system in a rural community of Chiang Rai. Her experience in Thailand sparked an interest in volunteering and Joelle has since been a part of volunteer organizations such as Global Youth Network, Out of the Cold Hamilton and UNICEF Cardiff. Joelle specializes in subjects including multiculturalism in Canada, just war theory, conflict resolution and humanitarian development. As an intern, Joelle is looking forward to applying the theoretical knowledge she has gained in Political Theory to global issues.



Allison Gibbons is a current undergraduate student at the University of Toronto, working towards a specialist degree in International Relations with minors in Political Science and French. Prior to beginning a post-secondary education, she had the opportunity to travel and live independently in Marseille, France, which sparked an early interest in European culture and politics. As co-founder of a not-for-profit organization, Learning for Hope, Allison has also had the opportunity to travel and work in Peru, and plans to focus her studies in areas of international social justice and human development. Allison is looking forward to interning with the Atlantic Council this fall, as she hopes to learn more about Canada's role as an important international actor, particularly from a NATO-led perspective on issues of common security and defence.



Irina Hvaschevska recently graduated from Carleton University, Ottawa, with an MA degree in Public Affairs, focusing on European and Eurasian Studies. She spent the last year completing a graduate program in Political Science at Coimbra University in Portugal majoring in international relations and security and defence studies. Her studies triggered Irina's interest in international organizations, especially NATO and its mandate, as well as Canada's defence policy and its place in transatlantic security. Irina has previously worked for the U.S. Mission in Eastern Europe assisting with the U.S. – funded educational, professional exchange and technical programs facilitating economic development in countries in transition. As a result of her travel and work abroad, Irina speaks English, Russian, Ukrainian, and is currently studying Portuguese and French. Through her work at the Atlantic Council of Canada and facilitation of conferences and roundtables, Irina hopes to focus on NATO—Russia-Ukraine relations and importance of CIS countries to the Alliance, and is looking forward to broadening her knowledge of Canada's military involvement and delivery of development projects.



Simon Miles joins the Atlantic Council of Canada after completing an MA in International History at the London School of Economics. His dissertation, titled *Constructing A Diplomatic Niche?*, assessed Anglo-Soviet relations under Eden and Khrushchev during the 1950s. Beforehand, he earned a BA(Hons) in History and International Relations at Trinity College in the University of Toronto. His academic interests center on the Soviet Union and, more contemporarily, the integration of former Soviet satellite states into the NATO framework. Simon speaks French and Russian. He is excited about the opportunity to broaden his knowledge of NATO's present-day activities to complement his studies of its past at the Atlantic Council of Canada.



Nabila Qureshi recently graduated from the University of Toronto with an Honours Bachelor degree in History and Political Science. After taking a summer course in Shanghai and Beijing, she became interested in questions of international social justice, human development, and the international implications of China's political development. Narrowing her academic focus to Asia and the Middle East led her to volunteer with children and Tibetan monks and refugees in India, and to participate in a week long diplomatic trip to Taiwan with U of T. Nabila has also worked as a research assistant, volunteered for Students for International Development, and was a member of one of her school's symphonic bands. She speaks English, French, Bengali, and some Hindi, and looks forward to examining issues of conflict and human security as she interns with the Atlantic Council this fall.

Jason Wiseman, raised in Toronto, is a BAH graduate from Queen's University's Political Science Department where he wrote his thesis on the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Kurdish Question. He is a recent graduate from the IDC Herzilya in Israel where he attained an MA in Government with a Specialization in Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security. Jason has traveled throughout Israel and the Palestinian Territories providing him with an in-depth understanding of the facts on the ground and the future role for Canada and America in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. He specializes in National Security, Counter-Terrorism, Middle Eastern Politics and Transnational Organized Crime. He is looking forward to contributing his knowledge and expertise to the ACC so he can pursue a future career in counter-terrorism and policy making.

Atlantic Council of Canada Fall Roundtable Reports

NATO in the Middle East: The Arab Spring a Critical Perspective

By: Cameron Becker

On Thursday, 8 September 2011, Dr Miloud Chennoufi joined the Atlantic Council of Canada to discuss “NATO in the Middle East: The Arab Spring a Critical Perspective.” Dr Chennoufi, a specialist in Middle Eastern politics, provided his perspective on how the power structures of the Middle East have affected the Arab Spring; and more specifically the increasingly dynamic situation in Libya. Dr Chennoufi spoke to a large audience of eager ACC members in the fourth floor conference room at 165 University Ave, Toronto.

Dr Chennoufi is currently at the Canadian Forces College Department of Defence Studies in Toronto, where he publishes works related to international relations and peace and conflict. His presentation provided the audience with an understanding of the structural framework of the Middle East which ties all regional states to one another. Importantly, Dr Chennoufi explained the role that US interests play in forming this order. It was argued that Western interests have played a strong role in the ongoing formation of the Libyan conflict, but that despite this influence, much about the Libyan National Transitional Council remains a mystery to those in the West.

It was stressed that despite celebration following the fall of Tripoli and the ousting of the Ghaddafi regime in August 2011, Libyan society remains significantly stratified along tribal lines, with a clear separation between those who support the Ghaddafi regime and those who oppose it. Dr Chennoufi was adamant that a democratic Libya still faces many more obstacles. The roundtable discussion provided the

Atlantic Council and its members with a fantastic overview of the Middle East, and the implications of political unrest and Western intervention. Furthermore, Dr. Chennoufi’s presentation offered an in depth understanding of the internal divides and threats facing the Arab Spring opposition groups, which are so often presented as homogenous by Western media sources.



Dr Miloud Chennoufi and ACC President Julie Lindhout

The Atlantic Council of Canada plans to hold more events focused on Middle Eastern topics in the coming months. Dr Chennoufi will be part of a larger panel discussing “Life after Ghaddafi: Prospects for Post-War Libya” at McGill University in Montreal on October 13. Energy Security will be the topic of debate at another Toronto roundtable on October 25.

This roundtable was generously sponsored by Equity Financial Holdings Inc.



The Arab Spring: Syria and the Levant

By: Dani-Elle Dubé

“The Arab Spring: Syria and the Levant,” was held at the University of Ottawa on 20 September 2011. The discussion focused on the impact of the Arab Spring in Syria and the surrounding region, with emphasis on democracy and human rights issues.

Dr Michael Atallah, member of the Privy Council Office of Canada, began the conference by painting a broader picture of Syria and its current “fragmented” state, forecasting that fallout with Lebanon and Palestine might be a result of an unstable Syria.

Professor of International Relations at the Royal Military College of Canada, Dr Houchang Hassan-Yari expanded on the subject of the impact on neighbouring Arab nations. The next big victims, according to Dr. Hassan-Yari, are Palestinian refugees.

Absent from the panel was Mr. Wissam Tarif, an ex-opposition lobbyist in Syria. Mr Tarif was to discuss the state of democracy and human rights in the country. Instead, Mr. Brian Davis, formerly Canada’s ambassador to Syria, was able to step in. He described how the uprising came to be: escalating from small incidents to a broader (but curiously absent from Syria’s major cities) movement. With sanctions imposed by the West, there is pressure to take aggressive military action. However, Davis argued, the great danger inherent in military intervention is the risk of a spill over.

All members of the panel agreed that Damascus-supported non-state groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas would weaken if the Assad regime were toppled.

“The Arab Spring: Syria and the Levant” was the third round table held in Ottawa this year – with more to come in the future.

Same Ship, Different Coast: The Disturbing Evolution of West African Piracy

By: James Marcus Bridger

An All Too Familiar Event

On September 14, armed pirates commandeered an idling tanker, the *Matteus I*, making off with its cargo of crude oil and 23 hostages. While such events no longer make headlines when they occur off the coast of Somalia, this hijacking took place on the other side of the continent, 60 nautical miles from Cotonou, the capital of Benin. The incident is the latest in a string of bold maritime assaults threatening to paralyze oil exportation and commercial shipping in the Gulf of Guinea. Though armed robbery at sea is not new to the region, the last six months have seen the attacks become more systematic and the criminals, more organized. It appears that West Africa's pirates have now begun to mimic the tactics of their Somali counterparts—a development that regional states, multinational corporations, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have all met with great concern. Highlighting this growing danger, Lloyd's Market Association, a London-based group of insurers, recently added the Gulf of Guinea to its "Hull War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils Listed Areas," placing the waters of Nigeria and Benin in the same category as those of Somalia and Iraq. Seeking to examine the intricacies of this oft overlooked security threat, this article intends to do three things: chart the evolution of West African piracy, assess whether or not a "Somalization" is occurring, and assess regional and international plans to combat the growing crisis


From Fishermen to "Freedom Fighters"

The problem of piracy in West Africa extends from Ghana in the north to Angola in the south. The historical epicenter is Nigeria, where pirates have parasitically fed off the country's oil boom since the 1970s. The crime was initially one of simple economic opportunism. The ransacking of docked ships was common, while bolder pirates—equipped with little more than canoes and machetes—would venture slightly further from port in attempts to board and rob slow moving vessels. Over time, however, Nigerian piracy became more professional. Pirates operating in gangs of 20 to 30 began making use of outboard motors and automatic weapons, items that opportunistic fishermen were never able to afford. The clairvoyant-like manner in which certain pirates were able to identify and attack vulnerable vessels led many ship owners to conclude that the gangs were conspiring with port authorities and customs officials.

In the early 2000s, another drastic change occurred, as piracy became infused with political motives. The basic grievance was that the federal government had taken too great a share of Nigeria's petroleum wealth, while distributing little back to the oil-soaked communities of the Niger Delta. Local

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West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea



accusations of corruption in Lagos were vindicated by Transparency International, who consistently ranked Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries on earth throughout the early 2000s. A plethora of militant groups emerged to "readdress" the oil issue during this period, the most significant of which was the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Seen as an effective tool for the "redistribution" of oil wealth, pirate attacks increased dramatically at the turn of the century. From 2000 to 2005, Nigeria's waters were more pirate-prone than those of Somalia. By 2004, Lagos had become the most dangerous port in the world.

Politically motivated attacks on offshore platforms, the kidnapping of oil workers, and the theft of crude oil challenged the traditional definition of piracy, as the crime is only recognized as such under international law if it is committed "for private ends." Certain incidents are clearly socio-political in nature. In 2000, militants stormed a Royal Dutch Shell oil rig, taking 165 employees hostage before releasing them in exchange for profit redistribution talks. Other attacks seem much more motivated by "private ends." Oil workers taken hostage by MEND in 2007 were reportedly released only after an \$800,000 ransom was paid for each victim. The theft of crude oil from refueling ships (a crime referred to as 'bunkering') also brings in a

tidy profit as the cargo is resold on a black market that spans the continent. Piracy expert Martin Murphy concludes that in West Africa, the "line between the political and the criminal is hard to draw." Karen Leigh of *Time* concurs that what has evolved in the Gulf of Guinea is "a combination of brazen criminality and vigilant redressing of economic imbalance."

Go Forth and Multiply

Attacks off the coast of Lagos have declined in recent years, a trend attributed to intensified naval patrols and a 2009 government amnesty offered to Delta militants. As is too often the case in the global fight against organized crime however, a concerted effort to suppress piracy in one area has had the unintended consequence of pushing the problem on to surrounding countries. While neighbouring Benin reported no incidents of piracy in 2010, it has already posted 20 documented attacks this year; a similar trend is also evident in Cameroon. According to J. Peter Pham, the Africa director for the Atlantic Council of the United States, the gangs now operating across the Gulf of Guinea are “composed mainly of, and certainly led by, Nigerians, with perhaps a smattering of other nationalities.” They have shifted their operations into neighbouring states as the authorities there lack the capacity to survey and patrol their own waters. The fact that Benin’s meager coastguard was hours away and powerless to intervene during the *Matteus I* hijacking is telling of this weakness.

Piracy is but one symptom of the region’s lack of maritime order, endemic drug smuggling, human trafficking and attacks against oil infrastructure has earned West Africa’s seaways the label of a “criminal super-highway.” There are now concerns that the pirate gangs may move further west up the Gulf. Officials in both Ghana and Togo have expressed worries and made plans to bolster their nations’ maritime security capacities. As was the case in Nigeria, these states fear that piracy will spread to their waters once their incipient oil industries are further developed. Seaborne attacks against Nigerian oil infrastructure reduced the country’s exports from 2.2-million barrels a day in 2006 to 1.6-million in 2009. At the peak of pirate activity, it was estimated by Royal Dutch Shell that nearly 10% of Nigeria’s daily oil output was stolen. Cameroon similarly saw its oil production output decline by 13% in 2010. In total, oil theft is believed to cost the region some \$3-billion a year. As the menace expands, the export of metals, cocoa, and agriculture products—vital to both local development and world markets—will also come under threat.

A Somalization of West African Piracy?

Most worrying of all, is the prospect that West African piracy will come to mirror that of Somalia in terms of tactics, geographical scope, and levels of violence. While several commentators, particularly within the shipping industry, have raised the alarm that the Gulf of Guinea will overtake the Horn of Africa as the world’s piracy hotspot, very distinct geopolitical conditions prevent the Somali business model from being easily transported to West Africa. To begin with, it is the abject failure of onshore authority in Somalia’s pirate-

prone regions that allows the hijackers to keep their prey anchored for months at a time whilst they conduct ransom



Assault rifles and speed boats replace machetes and canoes

negotiations. The states bordering the Gulf of Guinea, by contrast, are weak, but not failed. While four countries in the region place in the bottom 20 of the *Failed States Index*, their rudimentary security institutions prevent ships being held ransom for long periods. Indicative of this distinction, no ransom demand was made for the hijacked *Matteus I*; the ship was released a week later, after the pirates had made off with her cargo and valuables.

West African pirates may not yet be able to secure multi-million dollar ransoms, but they have begun to ape many of the successful tactics of their Somali counterparts. When confronted by increased international naval pressure, Somalia’s pirates shifted their area of operation away from the Gulf of Aden and out into the wider Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Pirate gangs in the Gulf of Guinea have been similarly expansionist, moving out of Nigerian waters into those of Benin, Cameroon, Togo and Ghana. Attacks have now been launched against ships and oil platforms that are over

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100 kilometers from the coast—the *Matteus I*’s hijacking 111km from land marked one of the furthest offshore grabs in recent West African history. According to maritime risk consultant Michael Frodl, the pirates are moving further out to sea not just to avoid coastal patrols, “but also to take advantage of ships

letting down their guard in waters assumed to be safer.” The limited range of the pirate’s small skiffs used to act as a check on offshore expansion. Following the Somali model however, West African corsairs have overcome this limitation by using “motherships”—converted fishing trawlers that allow supplies and multiple skiffs to be transported further afield for more extended piracy ventures.

Though there does not appear to be direct links between the pirate gangs of West and East Africa, the former have paid close attention to developments in the latter theatre. Frodl notes that Nigerian pirates use the internet to “keep an eye on what the Somalis and other pirates are doing and incorporate inspired changes.”

For example, it was recently noted that West African pirates have forced the captains of hijacked ships to radio authorities that all was fine in order to delay responses by naval patrols, a technique pioneered by some of Somalia's more cunning corsairs.

While cargo theft remains the primary *modus operandi* of the Gulf of Guinea's pirates, there have been recent cases of ransom-based piracy occurring in the region. Though present conditions are not ideal for long-term hostage taking, West Africa's pirates are clearly making attempts to copy the highly profitable Somali business model. The pirates will be further emboldened in this effort if the Gulf of Guinea's weak states experience a further deterioration of their onshore security. The destabilizing impact of drug trafficking has made this a very real possibility, as UN officials warn that "a string of nations along the African coast are rapidly becoming narco-states." If institutional weakness allows ransom-based piracy to take hold in West Africa, cautions Ghanaian National Security Advisor, Gen. Nunoo-Mensahlf, "then the region will be in real trouble."

Solutions on the Horizon?

As was the case in the Gulf of Aden, the need for a robust counter-piracy strategy for West Africa has been loudly proclaimed by regional states, foreign powers and international organizations. The worry however, is that this will amount to little more than platitudes if political will and local security capacity remain in short supply.

The centerpiece of the current strategy calls for joint naval patrols to be conducted by the region's littoral states, a Nigerian initiative which Lagos hopes will be "a real force in the subregion to combat piracy." The first series of multinational patrols was recently launched, consisting of six Nigerian ships and helicopters and two Beninois vessels. It is recognized, however, that the program will need to expand beyond a bilateral relationship. Commandant Maxime Ahoyo, Benin's Naval Chief, argues that if collaboration is not widened, "this phenomenon, which has such long tentacles, will only spread." Ghana and Togo have both expressed interest in joining, an invitation that could conceivably be extended to Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Equatorial-Guinea as well.

Though multilateral maritime security cooperation is a commendable concept, the reality of the current patrols is that they are a largely a Nigerian effort with only token participation from its small neighbours. Nigeria is the only state in the region that possesses frigates, corvettes, and an aerial surveillance capacity. The other littoral nations "navies" are more accurately described as coastguards. Given that a coalition of the world's most powerful navies has been unable to suppress piracy in East Africa, it is highly unlikely that a collection of impoverished West African states with little manpower and equipment will be able to secure a coastal pe-



They've learned from the best

rimeter that spans 12 countries. Foreign assistance is therefore essential.

When Somali piracy first burst onto the world stage in 2008, the UNSC passed Resolution 1816 that allowed foreign naval vessels to combat piracy within Somalia's territorial waters. During the resolution's debate, France tried to extend the mandate's jurisdiction to include the West African coast, but was rebuffed in this effort due to concerns over state sovereignty. Three years later, Benin asked the UN to send an international force to help police the Gulf of Guinea. However, with the naval forces of NATO, the EU, and other maritime powers currently committed to costly operations on the other side of the continent, there is little appetite for a West African deployment. Instead, the UNSC has called on the international community to assist local organizations through "information sharing, coordination improvement and capacity building." If managed effectively, this strategy presents the best option for achieving long-term maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

West Africa has becoming increasingly important to Washington, as it is estimated that the region will supply a quarter of US oil by 2015. Seeking to build up local capacity, both the *USS Nashville* and *HSV Swift* have been sent to train Beninois, Togolese and Ghanaian sailors as part of a US cooperative program known as the Africa Partnership Station. While the program began as a bilateral affair, it has recently expanded in scope. "We are now focusing on a regional basis because the solution is regional," explains Phillip Heyl, the head of US Africa Command's air and maritime program.

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France, which maintains close ties with its former colonies in the region, has also been actively engaged in West African counter-piracy. Aside from assisting with training and equipment, Paris has also deployed its own frigate, the *Germinal*, to help survey the coast and neutralize pirates. Indicating China's growing concern for a secure maritime commons, Beijing also has taken an interest in counter-piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Though not deploying its own ships, as it has in East Africa, China has provided Benin with a \$34-million security grant, of which \$5.5-million will go towards the purchase of new patrol vessels.

Writing primarily about the Somali theatre, this author has long advocated local capacity building as the only sustainable solution to the piracy problem. While the bilateral programs already initiated are a step in the right direction, a more comprehensive strategy is ultimately required. An opportunity has been presented for NATO and the EU to improve cooperation with the multinational organizations of West Africa, primarily the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Regional maritime security could be improved through the assistance of additional NATO members, while the EU is better positioned to address the political and economic causes of piracy. Drug trafficking, government corruption and the unjust practices of foreign oil companies are all exacerbating the offshore crisis and require international attention. The Chief Justice of Ghana, Georgina Wood, has noted that law enforcement must be strengthened and corruption and endemic poverty tackled in order to deny the pirates an environment that is favourable to their activities.

An opportunity has been presented for NATO and the EU to improve cooperation with the multinational organizations of West Africa.

According to maritime security expert James Kraska, the most serious piracy threats develop along a set course. It begins with independent operators, who, after initial successes and lack of resistance, become more sophisticated and organized—eventually forming a miniature paramilitary navy. Nearing completion in East Africa, this process is now well underway in West Africa as well. If the international community does not wish to see a bicoastal breakdown of African maritime order, then the time to act is now.

James Marcus Bridger was selected by the Department of National Defence to receive independent internship funding through the Security and Defence Forum Program. He is currently serving as a Maritime Security Analyst and Editor with the Atlantic Council of Canada. He is a graduate of the University of Toronto and St. Francis Xavier University.



Naval patrols are just the tip of the counter-piracy iceberg



The Atlantic Council of Canada Fall Conference “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: An Alliance for the 21st Century”

In November 2010, NATO unveiled its New Strategic Concept, which bound the Alliance “where possible and when necessary to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstructions.” Just one year later, NATO has put these words into action: engaging in humanitarian intervention in Libya at the same time as it pushes forward with a civil-military transition in Afghanistan, patrols the Gulf of Aden for pirates, and defends its members from the threat of missile strikes and cyber attacks.

Carrying forward with this timely topic, the Atlantic Council of Canada is proud to announce that its Fall Conference will address the myriad issues raised by NATO’s New Strategic Concept. Expanding on the previous Spring Conference, this event will provide a high-level Canadian perspective that incorporates the insight of distinguished speakers working in the fields of politics, military, diplomacy and academia.

Those interested are requested to call (416) 979-1875 or contact kavita.bapat@atlantic-council.ca for further information and registration.

**The Cadieux Auditorium,
Lester B. Pearson Building
125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario
November 22, 2011**

NATO's Future Role in the Abkhazia Dispute

By: Simon Miles

Following the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia declared the Georgian breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and even Georgia itself, to be within Russia's sphere of influence. Though Russia has deescalated to a war of words, the dispute over Abkhazia remains an important concern for the Atlantic community in three key ways. Firstly, the volatility of the conflict poses a considerable threat to regional security, with clear implications to both NATO and the European Union (EU). Incidents occur regularly along the disputed boundary between Georgia and Abkhazia – most recently the wounding of two Georgian civilians on 18 May 2011. Secondly, the Abkhazian question has broader policy implications, raising questions of how the international community should respond to such bids for independence. While Kosovo and South Sudan were successful, unresolved disputes surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to destabilize already turbulent regions. Thirdly, this dispute between Russia and Georgia impacts two key international institutions: the EU and NATO. This article will first present the historical background to the current situation. Then, NATO and EU engagement with both Georgia and Russia since the 2008 conflict will be analyzed; the international response to the recent Abkhazian elections will be discussed; and finally, several policy options for NATO, both unilateral and in concert with the EU, will be presented.

Abkhazia emerged as an independent kingdom in 756, was subsumed into Georgia in 985, and eventually

annexed by Russia in 1863. Soviet authorities incorporated Abkhazia into the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1931; and following the dissolution of the USSR, Georgia sent troops to maintain possession of Abkhazia. Russian involvement continued thereafter as the principal contributor to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces in the region. The critical turning-point for the purposes of this article, however, was the 2008 conflict which precipitated active international participation in the issue. First and foremost, it was the EU which brokered the ceasefire agreements of 12 August and 8 September 2008. Thereafter, on 15 September 2008, the Council of Europe initiated the European Monitoring Mission in Georgia and appointed an EU Special Representative for the Georgian crisis. NATO, too, escalated its cooperation with Georgia, the full details of which are examined below. In retaliation, Russia formally recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, joined only by Nicaragua, Venezuela, and the island nation of Nauru – all persuaded by bilateral deals promising Russian aid or broader investment in their respective energy sectors.

Not surprisingly, relations between Russia and Georgia are acrimonious to say the least, with both sides exchanging insults and accusations of backing terrorists.

Georgia, Russia, and "The Republic of Abkhazia"



A Regional Hegemon?

At present, Russia finances over 50% of Abkhazia's budget (which does pale in comparison to providing some 99% of the South Ossetian government's funds). Between 7,000 and 9,000 Russian troops are currently in Abkhazia under a bilateral agreement in place until 2059, with the possibility of extension until 2074. Their facilities are being actively upgraded by the Russian Ministry of Defense, which is providing considerable quantities of materiel to the "peacekeepers" stationed in both secessionist republics, including rocket artillery capable of striking the capital of Tbilisi, as well as major military installations at Senaki and Gori. Not surprisingly, relations between Russia and Georgia are acrimonious to say the least, with both sides exchanging insults and accusations of backing terrorists. Georgia continues to insist that Russia is not complying with the terms of

the EU-brokered cease fire, most recently accusing Russian of overflying Georgian territory illegally. Georgia is currently blocking Russia's bid to join the WTO, demanding that the border between the two states – as Georgia defines it – be respected and properly demarcated. Nevertheless, the two countries have reached agreements on transportation and energy since the war ended, mediated by the Swiss, so there is a basis for increased cooperation. A renewal of diplomatic relations, however, is yet to come.

Georgia's relations with NATO, on the other hand, are far more positive. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the Allied Heads of State and Government agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO, a pronouncement reaffirmed following the conflict with Russia at the Strasbourg-Kehl and Lisbon Summits in 2009 and 2010, respectively. The NATO-Georgia Commission, founded in the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Georgian conflict established a framework for cooperation between NATO and Georgia; and serves as a forum for political consultations and practical cooperation.

Thereafter, a NATO Liaison Office in Tbilisi was established. NATO and Georgia primarily cooperate on security and defense reform. In terms of security, Georgian troops worked alongside NATO in Kosovo from 1999 to 2008 and at present 937 Georgian troops participate in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan – the highest per-capita rate of participation in the mission.

This support was evident during the 2008 conflict, in which NATO publically and unequivocally backed Georgia. Most recently, the *USS Monterey* (a guided-missile cruiser) visited Batumi in June 2011, to considerable Russian outrage – which compounded Moscow's anger in general at the "Sea Breeze" exercises she was participating in. Militarily, Georgia requires any assistance NATO can offer, with its defense budget at only 50% of 2008 levels and only three working aircraft. Georgia's economy, too, has slowed its growth since the 2008 war as foreign investment has fallen by some 75%. However, NATO members are only willing to assist Georgia to a point, for two reasons. First is a pervasive fear of irking Russia, which, for example, prevented the US from selling Georgia anti-tank weapons. Second is a series of blunders on Georgia's part, including the misplacing of a considerable quantity of US-donated equipment. In terms of NATO's policy towards Georgia, it is clear that modernization assistance is of the essence. Not only will Georgia benefit in general from external expertise, but also as a future member of NATO this will greatly boost the interoperability and combat effectiveness of Georgia's future contributions to NATO operations – building on the already strong foundation laid in Afghanistan. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and members of the North Atlantic Council will visit Georgia from November 9 to 10 to observe firsthand what progress Georgia has made, what remains to be done, and what role NATO can play in facilitating this.



The war is over, but the Russian presence remains

More than Platitudes

The sum total of this amounts to, regrettably, little more than platitudes. While NATO, the EU, and much of the international community insist that Abkhazia is a part of sovereign Georgia, practically speaking this is not the case. Russian troops are officially above local laws and immune from prosecution. The local currency is the Ruble, not the Lari. The rail network and airport are operated by Russian firms. Finally, the region uses Russian, not Georgian, telephone codes. The argument that Abkhazia is a part of Georgia rests, therefore, on tenets of international law which no state is defending with more than rhetoric. The member states of the EU, declarations of support for Georgia notwithstanding, have

made it clear that ultimately they prioritize economic ties with Russia and the profit that brings over taking a principled stand over Georgian territorial integrity.

Just as international laws on sovereignty are being challenged, so too are internationally accepted norms on human rights being flaunted, with equally minimal concrete response from the international community. The conflicts of the 1990s displaced thousands of ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia, who are at present beginning to return to their homes. A recent report by Human Rights Watch, however, illustrates that they face considerable violations of their civil and political rights, driving some to leave yet again and creating a serious obstacle to the restoration of normalcy in the region.

At the root of this is a 2008 decision by Abkhaz leaders to require all residents to obtain Abkhaz passports in order to exercise rights such as, seeking public employment, voting, earning a secondary school diploma, buying and selling property, or travelling freely across the administrative boundary with Georgia. For ethnic Georgians, however, obtaining an Abkhaz passport is, according to Human Rights Watch, frequently hampered by discrimination. The impact of these policies and the general harassment meted out by Russian peacekeepers against ethnic Georgians is clear from the statistics. According to census data collected in 1989, ethnic Abkhaz comprised 18% of the 525,000 residents of Abkhazia, while ethnic Georgians accounted for 46%. By 2003, the ethnic Georgian population had decreased by 81%, Armenians by 41%, Russians by 69%, Greeks by 87%, and others (such as Ukrainians, Belarusians, Estonians, and Jews) by 81%. The Abkhaz, on the other hand, was the only ethnic group to increase in numbers and at present constitutes some 50% of the population through a process denounced as "ethnic cleansing" by the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

While NATO, the EU, and much of the international community insist that Abkhazia is a part of sovereign Georgia, practically speaking this is not the case.

NATO, the EU, and the rest of the Euro-Atlantic community are therefore faced with a choice. One option is to continue the present pattern of minimal action which has failed to achieve any great progress over the course of three years. This article, however, will demonstrate that there is another option open to NATO and its members – one which supports the rule of law, states' sovereignty, and human rights with more than just platitudes. This approach borrows heavily from Cooley and Mitchell's concept of "engagement without recognition" and applies it not only to the US, but to NATO and the EU as well. As they define it, the US "must engage with Abkhazia while making it clear that they will not recognize its independence."

This is one part of a three-track approach NATO, the EU, and the rest of the international community should embark on to facilitate a return to normalcy in Abkhazia.

The first track is to insist that all parties honour the 2008 EU-brokered ceasefire agreement, whose chief tenet is the withdrawal of all Russian troops from what is legally Georgia's territory. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, visiting Tbilisi in the summer of 2010, described Russia's military action in August 2008 as an "invasion" and an "occupation." She announced in a

To abandon plans for Georgia's inclusion would be tantamount to conceding to Russia that they have a de facto veto over who will be included in NATO at a time when the Alliance is focusing its sights on Eastern Europe for new members.

briefing with top-level Georgian officials: "I want to say publicly what I have said privately. I

came to Georgia with a clear message from President Obama and myself. The United States is steadfast in its commitment to Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United States does not recognize spheres of influence." Lip-service to the rule of international law will not suffice – what is needed is a considered diplomatic effort to ensure compliance with the cease-fire. NATO is uniquely poised to take the lead in this matter, as the Alliance has a strong framework for dialogue with both Russia and Georgia – internally and through its members' participation in other international institutions. Furthermore, it (or rather the sum total of its membership) has the required clout to bring the required diplomatic pressure to bear on an intransigent Russia. This is by no means to suggest that the conflict of August 2008 should be resurrected, but rather the opposite: it should be finally laid to rest. Once Georgian President Saakashvili is out of power following the 2013 elections in which he is constitutionally barred from running, Russia will hopefully be open to ameliorating relations with his successor. The new Georgian President will hopefully echo Mr. Saakashvili's pro-NATO and Atlanticist outlook, but also be willing to make the compromises needed to achieve stability. At this point, NATO and EU diplomatic efforts will position both organizations and their members to play a key role as mediators between the two parties.

The second track is direct engagement in Abkhazia by NATO. The Alliance has no small amount of experience dealing with similar matters through its extensive involvement in Kosovo. The Kosovo situation is certainly a different one, however, and it would be wrong of the international community to treat it as analogous to the situation in Abkhazia. The extent to which global governance organs were involved in the former is nevertheless something to which the international community should aspire in its efforts at resolving the latter. Furthermore, the Alliance and its members saw firsthand the destruction which can be wrought when ethnic con-

The key goal of these efforts should be to demonstrate to the Abkhaz people and their leaders that there are other alternatives to being a Russian client state; ultimately eroding Russian domination of the

licts are not resolved peacefully, and will hopefully do all it can to prevent further bloodshed in the already unstable region. The key goal of these efforts should be to demonstrate to the Abkhaz people and their leaders that there are other alternatives to being a Russian client state; ultimately eroding Russian domination of the region.

Introducing Abkhaz policy-makers to international civil society – the Atlantic Treaty Association, for example – through travel

abroad would demonstrate that there are others who share their concern outside of Moscow, and who will not demand significant economic concession for their support. Environmental organizations, for example, can find common cause internationally over the development and deforestation of the region in preparation for the 2014 Olympics in nearby Sochi. Abkhaz businessmen and entrepreneurs will find new markets for their goods and services and reduce the region's economic dependence on Russia, whose recent conclusion of a customs agreement with Abkhazia only solidifies its economic dominance. NATO and EU member states have a history of involvement in the region and in many cases benefit from geographic proximity as well. Furthermore, both organizations encompass many of the world's leading economies in which Abkhazia without a doubt would find opportunities for trade. Reducing the province's dependence on Russia is both an end in and of itself, and will also facilitate success in the first track, as when Russia negotiates it will do so from a position of diminished strength.

The third track calls for the continuation of NATO's plans to welcome Georgia into the Alliance. There are many, such as Germany and France, who are wary of bringing in a new

member with so uncertain a future as Georgia. However, to abandon plans for Georgia's inclusion would be tantamount to conceding to Russia that they have a *de facto* veto over who will be included in NATO at a time when the Alliance is focusing its sights on Eastern Europe for new members. It is clear that Georgia

shares common ideals with the Atlantic community. This should be publically rewarded and fostered, which inclusion in NATO would certainly achieve. Both Greece and Turkey had unresolved territorial questions when they were admitted to NATO in 1952 which is a clear precedent for the inclusion of Georgia when it meets other criteria.



But what choices are there for NATO?

Not only will Georgia's strength be bolstered in negotiations with Russia as a result, but Russia too will certainly behave in a more responsible manner vis-à-vis Abkhazia once the international community's support for Georgian territorial integrity is no longer an abstract concept.

Conclusion

It has been clearly demonstrated in this article that the time has come for a new policy of engagement vis-à-vis the conflict in Abkhazia. The pattern of Russia's behavior as a would-be hegemon needs to be checked, and this article has demonstrated that international organizations such as NATO and the EU are uniquely poised to work together to meet this challenge. This goal would be best served, it is suggested, by adopting a three-track approach. First, NATO, the EU, and their allies should intensify what is at present a weak diplomatic effort to ensure compliance with the 2008 cease-fire agreement, which Russia is in clear violation of. Second, NATO member states – alone and in concert – should engage the people of Abkhazia, their leaders, and local business interests. This will erode Russian political and economic dominance of the province and open its denizens to interaction with others than Moscow through fruitful collaboration. Third, NATO should not shy away from Georgia's accession in the future – not as an abstract concept, but rather by producing a concrete plan for so doing. Not only will Georgia, a nation which has already made clear its volition and commitment to the Alliance's ideals, be strengthened, but Russia will be confronted with proof of opposition to its aspirations of regional domination. In this way, not only will NATO gain a valuable new member; but the international community will make good on its countless iterations of support for human rights and international law.

Simon Miles is an Eastern European political analyst at the Atlantic Council of Canada. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics and University of Toronto.

The Atlantic Council of Canada wishes to gratefully acknowledge the generosity of CIBC. Their generous support is making it possible to second Simon Miles to the head office of the Atlantic Council of Albania in Tirana for one month to assist with the planning of the 57th annual General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association which is being hosted by Albania. Readers can look forward to updates from Simon in the In Focus Newsletter on both Balkan matters and the conference itself.



2011 NATO Study Tour

By: James Marcus Bridger

A study group headed by the Honourable Bill Graham recently returned from the Atlantic Council of Canada's annual NATO Tour, an enthralling weeklong excursion to both Brussels and Paris. The delegation combined insight from a variety of fields, bringing together ACC interns and members of the business, military, and diplomatic communities. The tour offered participants the unparalleled opportunity to hear and engage with key personalities at a variety of military and political institutions.

The first evening in Brussels was spent at a barbeque hosted by Ambassador Martin Trenevski, the head of the Republic of Macedonia's mission to NATO. Over a delicious meal, the group learned about the progress the small country has made towards meeting the Alliance's standards and the obstacles to membership that still lie ahead. The following morning the delegation departed for NATO Headquarters, where they were briefed on the Alliance's current operations and future challenges. Jonathan Parish, a Senior Planning Officer with the Public Diplomacy Division, explained NATO's current security concerns—including weapons proliferation, terrorism, failed and failing states, and cyber attacks—as they pertained to the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Ongoing challenges, such as the difficulty of consensus building in the ever-widening alliance and the need for cost effective "smart defence," were also discussed.

H.E Yves Brodeur, Permanent Representative of the Canadian Delegation to NATO, briefed the group on Canada's position in the Alliance, focusing particularly on its shifting role in Afghanistan. The delegation was then informed about NATO's efforts to broaden its global partnerships through the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Conference Initiative. The Alliance's relationship with Russia and Ukraine was also a topic of spirited discussion.

The following day was spent at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the Alliance's military command center located in Mons, Belgium. At this impressive complex, the group was briefed on the structure of NATO, as well as its ongoing operations in Libya, Afghanistan and Kosovo, aerial surveillance missions and naval patrols in the Mediterranean and Horn of Africa were also discussed. The delegation was then met by an officer from the EU's military attaché to SHAPE, who detailed the European Union's efforts to establish a standing military force as well as the intricacies of NATO-EU cooperation. Following this, the group was treated to an informative question period with high-level military representatives from both NATO and the EU. On the way back to Brussels, the delegation stopped at the historic site of Waterloo and were provided with an interactive tour of the battle by group member, Colonel George Petrolekas.

The EU dimension of transatlantic security and economic cooperation was further illuminated the following day with a trip to the Canadian Mission to the European Union. Frank presentations about the Eurozone debt crisis and Canada's relationship with the EU spurred vigorous discussion among the delegation. It became clear that while both Canada and NATO maintain close and productive relations with the EU, the partnership is not without its irritants and challenges. The day was rounded out with a tour of the EU Parliament, providing an inside look at the structure and functions of the Union.

The next day the group departed "The Capital of Europe" for "The City of Lights." After arriving in Paris, the delegation received a briefing from the staff of l'École de Guerre—the French war college. The delegation was enlightened as to the school's purpose, which is to install a high level of military professionalism and spirit of cooperation among the multinational officers trained at the institution. The school's program, curriculum, and participating nations were all topics of interest for the group, which was once again treated to an honest and informative discussion.

The final day of the tour began at the Canadian Delegation to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), where the group was briefed on the Organization's history and activities, as well as the unique role played by Canada. At OECD headquarters the delegation participated in two excellent presentations. The first dealt with

failed and fragile states, and the difficulty associated with delivering effective aid. The amount of research that the OECD has put into better addressing this important issue quickly became clear, as did the creativity behind their policy proposals. The second presentation speculated on the economic outlook of the Eurozone and wider global economy. Though the topic had been discussed throughout the week, the speaker provided a refreshingly unorthodox view on the possible implication of a Greek default.



The 2011 NATO Tour Group outside of SHAPE, Mons, Belgium

The 2011 NATO Tour was great success—a fortuitous combination of good company, beautiful weather, and absorbing discussion. The participants had their pressing questions answered, but came away with many new areas of inquiry as well. For this author, it was the opportunity of a lifetime. Those interested in the 2012 Tour should not hesitate to contact the ACC for further details.



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Lessons Learned From Libya: Independence and Interoperability within NATO

By: Tom Aagaard

As the rebels consolidate their victory on the ground in Libya, NATO's activities in the air and sea are winding down. Operation Unified Protector has once again reaffirmed the critical importance of the Alliance.

As former diplomat and current Atlantic Council of the US vice-president Damon Wilson notes, "at the start of the crisis, no one was anticipating the Alliance would play a leading role. Yet as leaders

scrambled to organize a military campaign, NATO was the only viable instrument." While reestablishing its reputation as the preeminent organization for effective multilateral military action, the operation in Libya also revealed troubling deficiencies, especially at a time when most partner countries are discussing further cuts to their military capabilities.

In June of this year, outgoing US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates delivered a sharply critical speech to his NATO partners in Brussels on their overreliance on the United States. After decades of playing a supporting role to American-lead and supported operations, NATO's allies have essentially abdicated responsibility for specialized but critical capabilities. While the US stopped flying ground attack missions relatively early in the conflict, an analysis of information about air sorties reveals the depth and breadth of European dependence on specific American assets.

Although it may have been European and Canadian fighters hitting Gaddafi's forces on the ground, it was often only possible because of American aircraft locating the targets, refueling the strike aircraft, neutralizing Libya's air defence system, and even supplying the ordinance. Despite public insistence that US forces play "a constrained and supporting role," the US has flown more sorties than any other contributor and between the start of operations in March and the end of September spent approximately twice as much as France and the UK.

European dependence was most apparent when it came to assets referred to as "force multipliers." Often lacking the glamour of fast jets, these are aircraft whose specialized systems expand the vision and offensive reach of the Alliance, or allow it to operate much more efficiently. European and Canadian strike missions were reliant throughout the campaign on American air-to-air refueling and Electronic Warfare (EW) aircraft, especially since Germany, one of the few European countries to maintain an aircraft specifically for EW and the suppression of enemy air defences, vehemently refused to participate.

One area Gates particularly singled out in his June speech was the inadequacy of current European Intelligence, Sur-

veillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Perhaps taking a shot at the billions of Euros invested in politically-important European fighter programs, Gates emphasized, "the most advanced fighter aircraft are of little use if allies do not have

the means to identify, process, and strike targets as part of an integrated campaign." Europe's weak ISR capabilities has been an acknowledged issue for years; but the Libyan experience brought this home. In an area of operations just

across the Mediterranean, the rest of NATO flew just one-fifth of ISR sorties. Without continuing American involvement, NATO would have essentially been blind.

NATO has started to address this issue but progress has been slow. Thirteen partner countries are in negotiations to purchase RQ-4 Global Hawk UAVs as part of the Alliance Ground Surveillance program. Equipped with powerful electro-optical and radar equipment, these unmanned aircraft are capable of loitering at high altitude for more than a day while providing a high-resolution picture of the area below. This approach of sharing equipment is based on the very successful NATO Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) program which jointly operates a fleet of 18 aircraft. However with the withdrawal of Denmark, and now Canada, from the project the order has shrunk from eight to six, and is likely to contract further. The German Luftwaffe is currently taking delivery of five specially-equipped RQ-4s (dubbed the Eurohawk), but as the Libyan experience has revealed, Germany may not be the most dependable partner.



Despite boasting their own fighter jets, Canadian and European forces remained dependent on the US for aerial refueling, reconnaissance and targeting.

Troublingly, in light of government austerity measures, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) is planning on retiring its small fleet of Sentinel R1 aircraft upon their withdrawal from Afghanistan. These aircraft combine sensors similar to the drone discussed above with a business jet platform to create a flexible surveillance system that can find and track moving ground targets in all weather. Their premature withdrawal from service would be a significant step backwards for European NATO capabilities.



The ideal vs. reality: A NATO-operated reconnaissance plane flying with US F-16s in a 2003 exercise

Even with US drones and command and control aircraft providing high-quality imagery, the human factor came into play. Frustrated by the constant delays in receiving technically-superior American imagery through the Combined Air Operations Centre in Northern Italy, French pilots eventually gave up and relied on their own reconnaissance pods. This leads to one of the most important and immediately actionable lessons, of the Libyan conflict. While debates about defence cuts tend to focus on equipment, systems are only as effective as the people behind them. Personnel and training costs are soft targets for politicians seeking to balance budgets but their reduction has a profound effect on capabilities, one that can be difficult to measure until tested in real-life. For instance, the NATO Combined Air Operations Centre, which was organized to handle around 300 sorties a day, had difficulty early on maintaining an operational tempo of half that number, and this was with the emergency infusion of a significant number of (mostly American) targeting specialists. From reports of high-level NATO meetings, it appears that the Alliance is reconsidering some of its reorganization and personnel downsizing plans in light of this experience.

While some Europeans may bristle at Robert Gates' attitude, it is hard to disagree with his criticism about Alliance members' preparedness when they run out of bombs a few weeks into a relatively minor conflict.

One of the more embarrassing aspects of the conflict for NATO was the fact that several nations exhausted their stockpiles of air-delivered munitions. While some Europeans may bristle at Robert Gates' attitude, it is hard to disagree with his criticism about Alliance members' preparedness when they run out of bombs a few weeks into a relatively minor conflict. Eventually NATO was forced to request an urgent transfer of "smart bombs" from American reserves. While some observers have made much of Norway and Denmark "punching above their weight" in terms of strike sorties, this largely has to do with the fact that their F-16s could carry and

guide the American weapons without modification unlike some other Alliance countries' aircraft. The British and French in particular are likely to have learned a humbling lesson about maintaining adequate stockpiles. Both fielded relatively new indigenously-developed smart missiles to great effect but soon ran low. The RAF was even forced to transfer Brimstone missiles already deployed in Afghanistan to make up for the shortfall in Libya.

As NATO forces return home from Operation Unified Protector we can expect to see more analysis of what worked and what did not. In May 2012, NATO Heads of State and Government will gather in Chicago for the first time since the November 2010 endorsement of the New Strategic Concept. While the grander strategic themes of the concept are unlikely to have been altered by the Libyan mission, it will be interesting to see how the Libyan experience will have affected policy makers' opinions on how best to achieve them, especially in this age of austerity.

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A limited number of copies of the Atlantic Council of Canada's Summer Publication, *Canada in the World: Youth Dialogue on Canadian Security and Defence*, are still available for purchase. The collaborative volume examines a number of pressing issues—such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, maritime security, and cyber-crime—through the eyes of the ACC's talented interns. The cost of the publication is \$10.

DVDs of the ACC's 2009 & 2010 Spring & Fall Conference proceedings are also available. These DVDs are free for ACC members, though a small donation is appreciated to cover mailing costs.

Hungry for Change: Is the Hunger Strike a Legitimate Democratic Tool?

By: Nabila F. Qureshi

For thirteen days, a frail old man wrapped in homespun cotton captured widespread media and public attention across India. Channeling the anger and frustration of Indians over a series of poorly handled government corruption scandals, 74-year-old political activist Anna (“Elder Brother”) Hazare staged a hunger strike for nearly two weeks. He refused to end it unless Parliament agreed to pass a bill by 30 August providing for the creation of a powerful, independent anti-corruption agency – the *Lokpal* – that would possess sweeping powers to investigate all parts of the government from the serving Prime Minister and Supreme Court down to village bureaucrats and officials.



Gandhi's image looms large over Indian politics, so too do his tactics

Hazare staged his fast on a platform in Ramlila Maidan, a park in central Delhi, while surrounded by television cameras broadcasting his every move day and night, and watched by a devoted crowd numbering in the tens of thousands. His humble attire, large-framed glasses and Gandhi cap seemed deliberately reminiscent of the man on the enormous poster behind him: Mahatma Gandhi. Hazare's peaceful campaign to force greater accountability from the government has evoked a kind of nostalgia for what many perceive – correctly or not – as the “golden age” of state responsibility during Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru's time.

In clumsy attempts to respond to the activist, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his government initially tried to suppress Hazare's efforts through imprisonment, but this only guaranteed publicity while garnering more sympathy for him and his cause. The Prime Minister then tried the alternate route of compromise, proposing a *Lokpal* of his own, but found that Hazare adamantly refused to accept a bill whose terms he deemed too weak. Ultimately, however, by 28 August both sides retreated somewhat from their respective positions when Hazare accepted parliament's non-binding support for portions of his anti-graft proposal.

Anna Hazare's ability to tap into the collective rage of the Indian population has been fueled by a deep sense of dissatisfaction with decades of pervasive government corruption. Ranked 87th in the world on Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Index, India has long been plagued by bribery, nepotism, the criminalization of its politics, and complex networks of patron-client relations at every

The government's failure to effectively address these scandals fostered an unflattering image of irresponsibility, perhaps even apathy, toward what most Indian citizens consider to be inexcusable transgressions upon public funding and trust.

level of government. A 2005 survey by Transparency International India found that the police, lower courts, and land administration constituted the most corrupt government agencies in the nation. They were closely followed by government hospitals and public electricity corporations.

What served as the impetus for Hazare's strike, however, was a string of scandals revealed to the public in more recent months. Among them was a bribery scam involving a minister awarding several telecoms licenses for a fraction of their real value to firms with no experience in the industry. Auditors estimated that the state consequently may have lost up to \$39 billion in revenue, equivalent to the Indian defence budget. The government's failure to effectively address these scandals fostered an unflattering image of irresponsibility, perhaps even apathy, toward what most Indian citizens consider to be inexcusable transgressions upon public funding and trust. The state's lack of adequate response to its own mismanagement undoubtedly lent legitimacy to Hazare's cause while increasing pressure on Manmohan Singh to support the bill

Criticism of Hazare

“Parliament has spoken,” Prime Minister Singh said to the Indian news media after the chamber passed the resolution endorsing Hazare's key demands. “The will of Parliament is the will of the people.”

Critics have questioned the truth of this claim, however. Few deny that Hazare's goal to mitigate corruption is noble, nor do they deny the corrosive effect corruption has had on democratic robustness and socio-economic development in India. What critics have found deeply troubling, rather, are the implications that Hazare's campaign may have for procedural democracy in India.

The late B. R. Ambedkar, chief drafter of the Indian constitution, warned of the dangers of “Gandhi-style fasts” to force particular outcomes from a government. Hazare’s hunger strike, critics contend, was essentially a form of blackmail, an “imposition of [his] will on a democratic government.” Gandhi’s fasts may have been justified against British imperialists, but is Hazare’s hunger strike justified against elected leaders?

Gandhi’s fasts may have been justified against British imperialists, but is Hazare’s hunger strike justified against elected leaders?

It may also be contentious, from an empirical standpoint, to label Hazare’s success as “the will of the people.” Delhi’s population exceeds 10-million, yet at their height the crowds gathered at Ramlila Maidan never grew beyond 50,000. Contrast this with the number of demonstrators in Calcutta who marched in May 1998 to protest the Pokhran nuclear blasts. The crowd was 400,000 strong, yet no one took their stance against nuclear weapons to be representative of the entire nation. Today, however, protesters and the media alike have loudly proclaimed that “Anna is India, India is Anna.” Cult-like undertones aside, the doubtfulness of claiming a minority of street protesters to be representative of all Indians has not gone unnoticed by those more wary of Hazare’s methods.

Hazare’s ability to force constitutional change through his hunger strike has raised concerns that it will set a precedent for others – with potentially less desirable goals – to follow. Low-caste Dalits, for example, have expressed their fear that some may try to attack the controversial constitutional provisions that reserve jobs and other particular benefits for members of the lowest castes.

Others take issue with the anti-graft proposal itself, calling it deeply flawed. There are already anti-corruption bureaucrats in the nation, and they have not managed to mitigate corruption in Indian government. In order for the *Lokpal* to successfully fulfill its mandate, it will at the very least require an incentive structure strong enough to prevent its bureaucrats from acting dishonestly. For example, instead of allocating clearly defined jurisdictions to civil servants over which they possess monopoly control, the government could award officials competing jurisdictions so that a client who was served poorly could simply go to another official. Bureaucrats’ pay could also depend in part on how well they are deemed to have served their clients. At the same time, the *Lokpal* officials themselves would need to be subject to intensive moni-

toring and auditing of their behaviour. As historian Ramachandra Guha argues, “a nation’s problems cannot be solved by a Super-Cop... even (or perhaps especially) if he be assisted (as the legislation envisages) by thousands of busybody and themselves corruptible inspectors.”

Positive Implications for India

The methods employed by Hazare to instigate change have aroused debate, as have the possible consequences of the passage of his *Lokpal* bill. It is undeniable, however, that the Indian citizenry have delivered a sound jolt to a government that arguably has not done enough to tackle systemic corruption. However controversial Hazare’s methods may be, they were at the very least peaceful even as his campaign lit the metaphorical fire beneath Parliament to take corruption more seriously.

Though Indian citizens often feel disenchanting with their leaders and their agendas, many are resigned to the idea that corrupt practices in politics are too deeply entrenched to change. Anna Hazare has managed to draw support from diverse groups of Indians, however. In addition to engaging the lower classes, he has captured the enthusiasm of middle-class professionals and college students – a group generally perceived to be politically apathetic. That they have come to believe in their collective agency to incite change through channels beyond the ballot is an important marker of democratic robustness. Whether their active engagement can be sustained, however, remains to be seen.

At its roots, many would argue that democracy is about the popular mandate, even if the popular mandate does not endorse the most effective routes for reform. An empirical assessment of the proportion of citizens physically protesting on the streets should not necessarily be the only way – or the best way – to measure democratic will. As the people’s right to expression is a fundamental tenet of democracy, so is their right to remind an otherwise disconnected legislature of their duty to serve the purposes for which they were elected in the first place.



How to measure the popular will of 1 billion citizens?

The legitimacy of the hunger strike as a democratic tool for change remains up for debate, but there is little doubt that domestic change is needed. Moreover, domestic change can have important international implications. As the dominant state in South Asia, India retains a key position – politically, economically, and geographically – for overseeing security in the region.

With numerous sensitive states sharing its borders, including Pakistan, China, and Myanmar, it is important for international security purposes that India maintains internal stability. NATO is interested in cooperating with India to combat piracy, cyber security threats, and terrorism; but the process will be hampered if the state continues to tolerate systemic corruption. By strengthening its political institutions India can open up important channels for dialogue not only with its own citizens, but with other states and organizations on how best to facilitate regional security.

Nabila F. Qureshi is a research analyst and social media coordinator at the Atlantic Council of Canada. She graduated from the University of Toronto in 2011 with a B.A (Honours) in History and Political Science, and looks forward to law school and a career in international development in her future.

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On Saturday, November 5th, 2011



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